SOVIET SCHOLARS

VIEW

SOUTH ASIA

SOVIET SCHOLARS VIEW SOUTH ASIA

EDITED BY
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FOREWORD

The articles published in this issue of the journal, *Asian Survey*, were written by associates of the oldest and largest Soviet center for Oriental research —The Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The Institute was organized on April 1, 1930 in Leningrad at the Asia Museum of the USSR Academy of Sciences (founded in 1818); also placed in the Institute were the Turkological Department (which has existed in the Academy of Sciences since 1918), the College of Oriental Studies (founded in 1921), and the Institute of Buddhist Culture. Between 1930 and 1950, when the Institute of Oriental Studies was located in Leningrad, it was headed successively by academicians S. F. Ol'denburg, A. N. Samoylovich, A. P. Barannikov, and V. V. Struve.

In 1950 the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences decided to transfer the Institute of Oriental Studies from Leningrad to Moscow; at that time the Pacific Ocean Institute was included in it, and in 1960, the Institute for Chinese Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. After the Institute of Oriental Studies had been transferred to Moscow, its directors were: S. P. Tolstov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Professor V. I. Avdiev; Academician A. A. Guber; and, from 1956 to the present—Academician V. G. Gafurov.

Important qualitative changes have been taking place during recent decades in the work of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, as well as in all of the Soviet Oriental Study Centers. These changes are connected both with the internal logic of the development of the science of Oriental studies and with those historical changes undergone by the chief subject of Orientalists' scientific research—the countries of the East. These changes have caused Orientalists to be faced with completely new and immeasurably more complex, difficult, and crucial tasks. Today's problems have become the most important component of Oriental research. This has led to the appearance of new scientific trends in Orientalistics. The differentiation in the science of Oriental studies is a regular and progressive phenomenon, evidence of the gigantic rates of its development. At the same time, important qualitative shifts have also taken place in those areas of Soviet Oriental studies which are usually considered traditional. These areas have been filled with new scientific content. For example, linguistics has turned to studying the problems of establishing and developing national languages and of the conditions and characteristic features of their functioning in the countries of the East which have achieved governmental independence. A broad study of the modern languages of South and Southeast Asia has been made for the first time in the Soviet Union.

Today several hundred scientific associates are working in the 30 sections and sectors of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the USSR Academy of

Sciences in Moscow and in many offices of its Leningrad branch. Among them are many veterans in the field of Soviet Oriental studies, whose work has contributed to its establishment and development. The majority of the associates of the Institute, however, are people who have entered this field of science during the last 10 to 15 years.

Since 1956 the Institute has published more than 1600 books on the problems of social and political development in the countries of the East, and on their history, ideology, economics, culture, literature, and languages.

In their works the associates of the Institute devote a great deal of attention to studying the processes of the national liberation revolution which is developing in the countries of the East, to questions of international relations, and to the problems of the ideological struggle. Special importance is given to a complete analysis of the socio-economic and political processes taking place in the East. Works are also in progress on investigation of the characteristic features of the agrarian reforms being carried out there—reforms in the state structure, the educational system, the national question, and national movements—as well as the establishment and development of national literatures. The features of the functioning of the state-owned sector which has arisen in many countries of the East, and other topical problems are being studied. The civil history of the nations of the East is being studied in close connection with the history of the interaction of superstructural and basic phenomena. Moreover, the history of the countries of the East is invariably examined within the framework of the worldwide historical process.

The Institute is doing great work in training personnel for Oriental studies. During the last few years several hundred young scholars have been trained, who, when they have finished their graduate study at the Institute, will perform fruitful work in the scientific centers in Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Baku, Ashkhabad, Alma-Ata, Ulan-Ude, Frunze, Samarkand, Makhachkala, and other cities in the Soviet Union.

The articles for the publication of which *Asian Survey* has so kindly put its pages at our disposal present only a few of the problems enumerated above which the associates of the Institute are studying; neither can these articles embrace the entire East geographically, but touch primarily on the region of South Asia.

We are happy to have the opportunity to introduce these articles to our American colleagues, and we are grateful to the publishers of the journal, who have granted us this opportunity.

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TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND SPIRITUAL CULTURE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE "THIRD WORLD"

/ Anis Vafa and
Mikhail Drobyshev

This article examines the influence of technology (primarily the latest technology) on spiritual culture in the countries of the "Third World."

By technology we mean the sum total of the means of labor which function in the sphere of production, and by spiritual culture we mean the sum total of spiritual values and methods by which they are created, applied, and transmitted in the process and on the basis of social and historical practice.

A number of conceptions exist which deem technological progress to be either unquestionably harmful to spiritual culture, or just as unquestionably beneficial to its development. Accentuated in these constructions is one of the aspects of the process of interaction between technology and spiritual culture. The real man, the acting man, the working man, the thinking man, i.e., man as a subject and synthesis of social and cultural-historical activity, seems to be detached from the actual processes by which technology and spiritual culture are developed. The mechanism of the interaction of technology and spiritual culture cannot be found, however, apart from and without the real man, functioning in a real society and in accordance with its laws. It is precisely the developmental laws of a certain social system which determine the interaction of technology and spiritual culture, for these laws determine man's place and role in society. In the light of what has been said we would also like to examine their interaction in the countries of the "Third World."

In the literature devoted to the developing countries, the opinion exists that the fortunes of these countries are so thoroughly different from the fortunes of the rest of humanity that one should speak of a completely special type or types of social development for them, types which do not have and have never had analogies anywhere else. In other words, according to the logic of these conceptions, the world as a whole is not subject to any social law. There are only groups of countries and peoples, each of which is endowed with its own unalterable internal existence. There are possible only various modifications of these internal natures, which is what constitutes the

basis for exchange between different countries in any sphere. Sometimes added to such arguments is an indication of perpetual stagnation and inability to develop, seemingly inherent to the peoples of the "Third World." As it would appear, the basic flaw in such conceptions lies in the fact that they are non-historical. An historical, concrete approach to the present-day problems of the "Third World" requires, above all, an acknowledgement of the fact that we are observing a *certain stage* of social development in these countries which is caused, not by the modification of some eternal national essence, but by a specific aspect of the regular principles which are characteristic of world history as a whole.

In order to understand the level and nature of the development of technology and spiritual culture in these countries it is extremely important, in our opinion, to bear in mind the following circumstance. The paths of their social development in the recent and most recent period, the paths along which capitalism has developed in the majority of them, have turned out to be different from the Western European variant. In the course of adapting the social development of these countries to the demands of the colonial powers, distinctive systems of production relations have been created. In attempting to work out the most effective methods of exploiting the colonies, the colonizers adjusted to local conditions and used many forms of precapitalist types of production. These structures, which had thus been preserved along with the capitalist structures which arose under the influence of external and internal factors, have created an extremely variegated picture of a multi-structured society. It is precisely this social multi-structured quality which underlies the distinctive quality which has been noted in the development of both technology and spiritual culture in the countries of the "Third World."

The presence of various social and economic structures, coexisting over a relatively long period of time, predetermined the multi-layered nature of technology in these countries. Each of the layers corresponds to a certain stage of technological evolution, characteristic of a certain social and economic formation. In the technological arsenal of the countries of the "Third World" modern automated machine systems exist simultaneously not only with the machines, mechanisms, and devices typical of the era in which capitalism was affirmed in the principal European countries, but also with implements of manual labor which belong to the Middle Ages and even earlier eras. The complexity of the tasks facing the countries of the "Third World" in the sphere of technology lies, thus, in the fact that these countries are faced with completing a modern scientific and technical revolution without having begun, or at best, without having completed the technological reforms which took place in the developed countries in the era of the first industrial revolution.

An analogous multi-layered quality is also observed in the spiritual culture of the developing countries. If one considers the ideas embodied in it, one may ascertain the preservation of forms and content which have been

irrevocably lost in the spiritual culture of the developed countries. This is especially true of creative artistic work. But in other spheres of spiritual life too, one may observe phenomena which are characteristic of much earlier stages in their development. In science, for example, there is a widespread orientation toward classification (in other cases—toward chronographicity), uncombined with the synthesis and discrimination necessary for a unified basis for the classification. One might also point out the frequently encountered syncretism, the indivisibility of various spheres in the understanding and spiritual assimilation of the world, etc. All of this also gives the spiritual culture of the countries of the "Third World" what might be called a "multi-temporal" nature.

In turning our attention, however, to what we call the "multi-temporal" nature of the spiritual culture on the one hand and of the means and implements of production on the other, we by no means wish to liken each of these spheres to a polytechnical or ethnographical museum in which displays of different eras have, on different floors, been frozen into immobility, unrelated to each other, alongside the modern ones.

The exhibition does not look like that. It is not a museum that stands before us, but an integrated, developing system, a dynamic situation. It should, moreover, be emphasized that the fundamental line of interaction between technology and spiritual culture can be understood only from the standpoint of social progress and assessed in the light of this progress. Accordingly, the interaction of technology and spiritual culture is also determined by the features of the present stage of social development in the countries of the "Third World."

The importance of modern technology in the progress of the "Third World" is obvious. The process of introducing it into the economic structure of the countries of the "Third World" is obvious. Enterprises of the traditional and new sectors of the economy are being established and fitted out with modern equipment in these countries. In some of them the rates of development of the industries using the most advanced of today's technology are above those of the industries based on less modern technology.

A number of industries with the latest technology directly affect the sphere of spiritual culture, forming an important potential in production and in spreading spiritual values. Among these are film and phono-technology, tele- and radio technology, polygraphic technology, scientific equipment, teaching and informational devices, etc. The relative proportion of this "cultural technology" in the countries of the "Third World" is still small, but it is increasing, and the importance of this technology in developing spiritual culture cannot be denied. One should, however, bear in mind that the direct influence of "cultural technology" on spiritual culture is quite limited. It has an effect chiefly on the form of the cultural works, and not on their content; on the means and extent of spreading the values of culture, not on the process and essence of the spiritual production. The actual "directness" of the influence is quite relative. It is obvious that the degree and intensity of introduc-

ing "cultural technology" and the possibilities of its more or less broad application and use in the interests of the development of spiritual culture (in this case—the spread of spiritual values) depend to a decisive extent on social, socio-economic, and socio-political factors. One of the essential points here is the policy in the sphere of culture and the social orientation of such policy. In addition, an important social aspect of this problem is the fact that there is an obvious dependence between the potentially unlimited possibilities for the "cultural technology" itself to further the spread of spiritual values among a maximally broad contingent of the population and the definite limitations which narrow the sphere of its influence, and are conditioned by social and, partially, by sociopsychological factors. Of course, being introduced to the various values of culture with the aid of the latest technological means is also correlated through the established stereotypes of world perception, the level of education and the level of cultural development, as a whole, of different strata and groups. But then this is the aspect of the interaction of culture and technology which has been linked with the influence of the former on the latter, and which is outside the scope of this article.

When the question is that of the contentual aspect of spiritual values, the influence of the latest technology, although partially direct, is to a great extent linked with the action of the social factors. Conventionally speaking, "between" technology and spiritual culture stand those relationships entered into by people involved in the production process—production relationships. Their nature also determines the nature of the influence of technology on spiritual culture.

The influence of technology (including the latest) on spiritual culture, speaking abstractly, begins within the framework of the "man-technology" system. The scientific and technological revolution is a qualitatively new stage in technological development—a stage of automation and cybernetization of production. At the machine production stage the worker with his muscular energy and nervous and intellectual energy, supplemented the machine, carry its functions through to automation. He served as an auxiliary of the machine. Under the conditions of automation, the automatic mechanism exerts a direct influence on the object of labor. Man now plays the role of an observer, a regulator of the production process. His work is filled with creative content. Man is freed not only from heavy physical labor, but also from the part of the mental, primarily monotonous, non-creative operations connected with administering the production process. Consequently, the very nature of this activity demands a high professional and cultural level of the worker.

It is clear that under these conditions the newest technology exerts an essential influence on such important spheres of spiritual culture as education and science, especially on the group of natural and engineering sciences, and moreover, precisely on the contentual aspect of these spheres of spiritual culture. One cannot help but see that technology also influences

the specific methods and styles of reflecting reality in art, especially in those spheres which are connected with altering the material aspect of reality ("industrial art," technical aesthetics, etc.). Art theoreticians point out, in this connection, that the appearance of machine technology, and especially its development on the latest basis, promotes the formation of new ideas on beauty and the creation of new norms for the beautiful. The concern stressed by creators and consumers of works of art for the constructive aspect of the works, for striving to free a work from anything that disturbs the perception of this quality, is an example of this.

The ideas concerning the relationship between the aesthetic qualities of objects and their constructive and functional quality have been confirmed in art. It is also in connection with the development of technology that such problems have arisen in art as, for example, the problem of a standard in architecture and decorative and applied art; the problem of adequate circulation for the assigned model; the problem of the series and variant aspects of artistic production, etc. Finally, one cannot help but regard the influence of technology in the fact that the problems of technology and the sciences related to it are increasingly frequently becoming problems which disturb writers, artists, and composers. These problems are reflected in the works of various forms of art. But even here (perhaps, rather, precisely here) the decisive role of the social factor in the approach to solving this problem is obvious, particularly in the value orientation of those who set about solving it. In the countries of the "Third World" the problem of realizing and interpreting the role of technology is one of the most vital topics in all ideological and spiritual life. Moreover, the influence of the whole complex of social factors which form the value attitudes and estimates of the role of technology is unquestionable. In the developing countries, as it is throughout the world, clarification of the moral and political attitudes of the creators of the new science and technology with respect to the social significance of their professional activities and the results of their labor has become the object of spiritual search.

Thus, technology is exerting a more or less direct influence in a number of spheres of spiritual culture. But this influence is connected with the activity of the social factors. The role of these factors is increasing and becoming a determining role when the question arises concerning the influence of technological progress on those spheres of spiritual activity and spiritual production which have as their basic intention the understanding of the surrounding world, with a view to truly converting it—in other words, when the influence is on those spheres where man, his activity, and his struggle stand in the center of attention.

In examining the influence of the latest technology on spiritual culture, we proceed from the following conception of the influence of technology on the social relationships in society as a whole. The basic criterion for determining to which class of technology the artistically created means of labor should be attributed is the interaction of man and technology. This

interaction develops historically. Representing a special means of production, each social and economic formation is distinguished by the unity of the productive forces and productive relationships specific to it. It too has its own characteristic technological structure and means of uniting the producer with the means of production. In certain historical periods the productive forces go through a technological revolution. Its essence lies in the fact that inventions appear which cause a radical change in the implements of labor, the forms of energy, production technique, and general physical conditions for the production process. A technological revolution creates the means of preparing the transition to a new technological method of production. It prepares the productive (or industrial) revolution. The latter, however, may be completed only if the appropriate production relationships exist for it. Only then does a technological revolution grow into an industrial one, i.e., bring to life the process through which, on the basis of the new technological means, a new method of production is created, with the new division of labor, new social relationships in production, new social structure for society, new political institutions, and new spiritual life for society which are inherent in it. It establishes itself in the course of the struggle of opposing social classes and in the course of the social revolution which is also called upon to establish new industrial relationships. These relationships liberate the productive forces and make room for the technological revolution to grow into an industrial one and then toward the supremacy of a new production method. When examining the modern scientific and technological revolution in this connection it must be said that where it lacks the appropriate social and political conditions, it cannot develop into an industrial revolution, and as it develops, the technological revolution only sharpens the contradiction existing between the potentials within it and the social obstacles standing in its path. This, further, just as inevitably sharpens the social contradictions in society. A collision is imminent between the social forces directly connected with the changes stemming from introducing new techniques and those who are interested in preserving the old, outmoded social forms which have grown up on the basis of the old structure of technology which has outlived its time. The well known Soviet sociologist, S. Shukhardin, with whose above theoretical reasoning we are on the whole in accord, writes: ". . . capitalism cannot relinquish the division of labor which is characteristic for machine-manufacturing, nor the subordination of man to technical means. This is explained by the fact that capitalism cannot exist without such categories as the labor force and its value, its surplus value, the norm of profit, competition between the workers, the intensification of labor, etc. The new, totally automated production can come into being on condition that the incentive for introducing new techniques is the economy of living labor in general, and not just its paid sections (that is, at the cost of wages); the output of items is determined in advance, according to plan, and not as a game of the market; substitution of technical devices for human productive functions

can be regulated systematically within the limits of the entire national economy and be compensated for simultaneously by shortening working hours, also within the limits of the entire national economy; market capacity increases constantly due to satisfaction of the constantly growing demands of all of the members of society, and not through cutting down, in the form of unemployment and other factors."[1] The influence of technological progress on the spiritual culture of society thus lies in the fact that, because it is surrounded by the struggle of social and political forces, it is one of the most important factors in forming certain aims and purposes brought before society as a whole and before the different social forces of which it is composed. These purposes have already been understood and made real, however, in the course of the ideological and spiritual struggle which is being waged in the arena of social life. Consequently, the influence of technology on spiritual culture is quite important, but also quite limited.

The principles being examined here are now unquestionably becoming apparent in the countries of the "Third World." In these countries there is evidence of a technological revolution—the introduction of the newest technical methods, forms of energy, technological processes, etc. Here, too, new interactions between the means of labor and man in the sense in which he was spoken of in the beginning of this article are taking place. Here, too, conditions under which the technological basis paves the way for changes in production and conditions for transition to an industrial revolution are being formed. Here too contradictions exist between the latest technological potentials and the existing social and political conditions which make it possible for the technological revolution to grow into an industrial one. And finally, here too the influence of the latest technology on the spiritual culture of society, through the mechanism of social and political struggle, is to a certain extent revealing an advance of the problems and aims of social progress into the center of social and spiritual life.

Everything is the same way here. Nevertheless, the introduction, in these countries, of the newest technical resources and the process of the influence of the latest technology on spiritual culture have been complicated by a number of burdensome circumstances connected with the features of their historical development which we have already mentioned.

This does not exhaust the number of burdensome circumstances, however. All of the structures of technology, and the social structures and structures of spiritual production which correspond to them, although existing simultaneously, are, as a matter of fact, themselves built on the ladder of social progress. For the purposes of our research they can be divided, roughly speaking, into the following groups: technology based on the use of pre-machine (handicraft) technology, preliminary machine (manufactory) technology; machine (including conveyer and semi-automated production)

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[1]S. Shukhardin, Afterword to the book by S. Lilli, *Lyudi, mashiny i istoriya* (People, Machines, and History), izd. Progress, Moscow, 1970, pp. 429-430.

and the most recent (automated and cybernetic) technology. Moreover, it is obvious that each of these structures has its own characteristic "man-technology" relationship. In the pre-machine (handicraft) structures, this relationship acts as a direct influence which the worker, with the aid of a simple set of tools, exerts on the object of labor. The division of labor (in both the physical sphere and in the sphere of spiritual production) between workers scarcely shows; each worker must know how to do everything; the worker still preserves a certain interest in his work, an interest which, as remarked by K. Marx and F. Engels, "could be raised to the degree of primitive artistic taste."[2]

In the pre-machine (manufactory) structures, the activities corresponding to the period when capitalist forms penetrated the heart of feudalism and were characterized by an intensified divison of labor, the aspect of the worker begins to take on ugly features. In the words of K. Marx, "Manufactory makes the worker ugly, artificially cultivating in him only one narrow skill, and repressing his world of productive inclinations and gifts."[3] The worker in manufactory serves only as an appendage of the workshop of capital. What was formerly, even on the most insignificant scale, demanded from each worker is now demanded only from the workshop as a whole. A sharp opposition is growing up between the physical and spiritual potentials of production, i.e., the spiritual potentials of the physical production process stand in opposition to the workers as someone else's property and as a force which dominates him. By destroying the versatility and cultivating the onesidedness of the workers, manufactory undermines the basis of spiritual activity in the sense that it breaks the latter's connection with the broad masses of workers, destroys the artistic talents among them, and impoverishes their perception of spiritual values. At the same time, by creating a break between physical and spiritual production, manufactory leads to the separation of the latter into an independent sphere and, at a certain historical stage, to creation of more absolute forms of organization for it.

In the machine structure of technology, under the conditions of a capitalist factory, the tendencies which arose at the manufactory stage are definitively developed. The machine has, in factory production, once and for all replaced the worker's hand. Its functions have begun to be carried out by the mechanically operating organs of the machine itself. The worker has turned into a living appendage of the machine, and as a result the machine has suppressed "the versatile play of muscles and taken from man every possibility for physical and spiritual activity."[4]

It is important, however, to note that it is not the machine in itself, but capitalism which forms the one-sided man, for in place of all the physical and spiritual feelings, private property produces their negation, or, in other

[2] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Vol. 3, p. 52.
[3] *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 373.
[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 434.

words, the feeling of possession, which is equal to the full spiritual impoverishment of the possessers. The subordination and adaptation of creation to mercenary private interests also has a pernicious effect on spiritual culture. As far as the influence of the latest technology, its use under conditions of private property for the means of production, and its influences on spiritual production are concerned, we have already dealt with that in this article.

In the "Third World," where, as has been said, all of the technological and social structures named exist simultaneously, the complexity and acuteness of the problem lies in the fact that several processes are taking place simultaneously, and it is in the light of them that the influence of technology and spiritual culture should be evaluated. The natural and small scale commodity structure, based on handicraft or trade technology, is being destroyed. A petty capitalist structure, based on manufactory technology is being created (or is continuing to develop). A capitalist structure based on the machine technology used under the conditions of a capitalist factory is rapidly developing. On the whole, therefore, processes are developing which have already taken place in the era of the first industrial revolution in other countries; moreover, the conquest of political independence and the implementation of a number of social reforms have led to the creation of conditions favorable to the growth of the machine technological revolution into an industrial one. Within the perspective of the interaction of technology and spiritual culture it should be emphasized in this connection that, from the point of view of the "man-technology" relationship, man in the so-called traditional structures is fully trained to be used as a worker in the capitalist machine structure. Even the most archaic forms of the spiritual and intellectual aspect of the worker recruited from the traditional structures constitute, in our opinion, no decisive obstacle to this. In the first place, from the standpoint of work habits and work skill, they are fully trained to fulfill the functions of a factory worker. This was noted long ago, by none other than the representatives of the colonial administration. In alluding to their opinion, K. Marx as early as 1853 wrote: "The inhabitants of India, as the English authorities themselves admit, possess a special capacity for adapting to completely new types of labor and assimilating the knowledge necessary to run a machine."[5] In the second place, the machine, because under capitalist conditions it leads to transforming the worker into its living appendage, not only demands no special previous skill, but is even inimical to it. The point is, however, that introduction of the capitalist factory in the colonies did not merely lead to the division and opposition of physical and spiritual potentials of production. As a result of the policy of the colonizers it assumed a more perverted form, for the production of knowledge and formation of labor forces of knowledge was taken away from these countries. The monopoly in production and use

[5] *Ibid.*, Vol. 9, p. 228.

remained in the hands of the colonizers. This was one of the powerful factors which hindered the development of the industrial revolution in colonial and dependent countries, the influence of which to this day has an effect on the "Third World." It is not by chance that the struggle against colonialism joined with the struggle against this perversion of the course of the industrial revolution. It is precisely the incomplete nature of the industrial revolution, and not at all the features of the traditional structures and the forms of spiritual production characteristic of them which made the local factory (machine) capitalist structure incapable of transforming and engulfing the traditional structures. This led (and to a certain extent is still leading) to their stagnation and self-reproduction. Of course, under the present conditions, when the forces which have become interested in completing the industrial revolution are unfettered, the process of transforming the traditional structures proceed more intensively. In the countries of the "Third World," active efforts are also being made to abolish the sharp disproportion which has formed between the potentials of physical and spiritual production. These efforts include carrying out the reforms in the sphere of culture which are directed toward its democratization. All of this promotes the transformation of the traditional structures of the corresponding forms of spiritual production, and, to an equal extent, the completion of the industrial revolution. The complexity of the situation, however, lies in the fact that, as has been shown by the experiment in developing the industrial revolution in countries which have not been subjected to colonial oppression, this is a quite long and painful process.

The countries of the "Third World" do not exist in a vacuum. They have already long been drawn into the world economy and the world capitalist division of labor. They cannot be abstracted from the fact that a new technological revolution is going on in the world. Indeed, even the internal processes which are taking place in these countries do not give them an even chance for abstracting themselves from this circumstance. The question arises: can they escape, omit, or, let us say, reduce the time allotted by history to the industrial revolution, by having in some way transformed the processes connected with it? Can the newest forms of technology, related to the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, facilitate this? What are the potentials (positive or negative) for such a transformation in the existing technological and social structures and their spiritual superstructure?

We shall venture to say that in principle it is possible, or at least that such a possibility must not be excluded.

History, the actual course of development of the liberated countries of the East, is already providing some basis for an answer to the first question. In examining the existing facts from the standpoint of the "man-technology" relationship, it can be observed that the possibility of by-passing the stage of industrial (machine) revolution has already been laid in the introduction (so far, along with the machine, and the farther it goes, apparently, the

more to the detriment of the machine) of the newest techniques, which correspond to the standards of the scientific and technological revolution. It must be borne in mind here that the weakness of these countries, which lies in the fact that a number of the leading branches are not yet a field into which machine technology has penetrated, in a certain sense becomes their potential strength. For, having risen to face the dilemma, it is on the basis of whichever technology—machine or automated—those branches of industry will develop, that the countries of the "Third World" can introduce (and experiments show that this is the way it happens in a number of instances) precisely the latest technology. This would make it possible for those countries to by-pass the stage of transition to machine technology, and would promise them a huge gain in rates and quality. In the same industries which today are already functioning on the basis of machine technology, the very logic of development as such, and the chief matter—the presence of the new technology as an actually existing alternative—ensures a more rapid transition to the latter from the standpoint of the technical potentials as such.

As far as the second element of the "man-technology" system is concerned, namely man, this element deserves at least no less (in the opinion of many people—even more) attention than does technology. The transition from pre-machine technology to machine technology does not in general demand from the worker a structural alteration of his working skills and stereotypes of thinking, and intellectual and, in general, creative activity is, under capitalist factory conditions, taken from him and becomes the special privilege of a special stratum of persons; but to master the latest technology such an alteration is demanded to a great extent. One important circumstance, however, in our opinion, exists. To form the skills suitable to control the new technology, the qualities inherent in both the pre-machine and machine production workers are (if one takes them as a whole, historical form characteristic of them) equally inappropriate. The new technology demands other skills, and other stereotypes of thinking. The new production worker must possess active, creative, and integrated thinking. It is no longer enough for him to have at his disposal the sum of knowledge and skills learned by heart, uniformly and mechanically applied in the process of his work. An integrated personality—that is what is needed to control modern techniques. A worker with such features cannot be formed spontaneously. He must be specially trained in a system of enlightenment and education adequate to the demands of the time.

For many scholars, however, it is difficult to answer the questions of the extent to which those who come from pre-machine (the so-called traditional) structures have been prepared for their formation into workers of today's latest production. The skills and stereotypes which are inherent in him as a representative of the traditional structures do not present an insurmountable obstacle in this respect. A considerable part of these skills (we shall not enumerate them, since this has already been done several

times) are, undoubtedly, an obstacle. We would like to draw attention to something else which in our opinion gives no basis for black pessimism in evaluating the potential of workers raised in the traditions connected with pre-machine technology. We assume that such a worker has, along with the set of skills and stereotyped thinking which have only a negative meaning, other stereotypes and skills.

What we are talking about is the fact that the worker engaged in the so-called traditional structures possesses, in an embryonic, rudimentary, undeveloped form, just those skills and stereotypes of thinking which are, on a much higher level, demanded of a worker connected with the latest technology, and which are to a considerable extent suppressed and distorted in the ordinary worker, who has become a simple appendage of the machine in the capitalist factory. The almost total inseparability of physical and spiritual production has led (as was mentioned above) to the fact that "each artisan," in the words of K. Marx and F. Engels, "should be able to do everything that is proposed, with the aid of his implements,"[6]—"a certain interest in his special work and in its skilful fulfillment" takes place in the peasant and artisan; "the understanding, judgment, and will which, be it even on an insignificant scale, the independent peasant and artisan develop."[7] All of these rudiments are quite positive qualities, engendered in the process of work activity and the corresponding social conditions.

Bearing in mind, however, the precise nature of the latter, and their influence on technology and the personality of the worker, we can idealize neither this technology, nor these social conditions, nor this worker as a whole, as do certain theoreticians who contrast the ideal world of olden times with its patriarchal quality to the modern-day civilization of automatic machines, atomic reactors, and cybernetics. It is merely that under certain conditions the positive elements of the skills and stereotypes which were formed in the era of pre-machine civilization should be transformed in accordance with the present needs of the latest technology. It is a question of transforming the indivisible quality of physical and spiritual production ("the ability to do everything") into the wholeness of the activity and the personality of the worker, necessary for modern production. It is a question of raising the "certain interest in his social work," possessed by the artisan and the peasant, to the level of a deep and extensive interest in understanding and transforming the world around him on the basis of the achievements of all of spiritual culture. The problem of just what can be the specific instrument of such a transformation of consciousness and skills does not bring forth special discussions. It is clear that these functions can be adequately fulfilled by a planned system of enlightenment and education. Inasmuch as it is a question of the young generation, it does not in principle matter for such a system from which social strata a man has come. Inasmuch

[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 52.
[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 374.

as it is a question of people who are more or less formed, for those whose origin is that of pre-machine structures, there are no insurmountable obstacles either, as there are on the whole none for workers connected with machine production, of which we shall not speak in detail. Of course, there are many extremely complex problems connected with the tasks outlined above. Suffice to say that such a transformation is unthinkable without the accelerated development of science, education, art, and finally, technology itself. But this is a different set of problems.

The real condition which will ensure the possibility of the influence of advanced technology on man and of the most rapid transformation of man's traditional aspect in the countries of the "Third World," in accordance with the demands of the latest technology and of man himself, are the structural shifts in their social and political life. Otherwise, not even the latest technology will transform this society, and if it is introduced, it will inevitably encounter insurmountable social obstacles. It remains in sharp conflict with the demands of the spiritual progress of these countries and with the demands of their social progress as a whole.

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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

/ Yuri V. Gankovsky

There are great difficulties involved in studying the social structure of society because of its extraordinary complexity (which is explained by the varied nature of Bangladesh's economic system) and because of a lack of reliable sources, inasmuch as no general census of the population has been taken in East Bengal since 1961.

Bangladesh is an agrarian country; up to 90% of the population lives in the rural area, and is involved in various spheres of agricultural production, which provides over 55% of the gross national product.[1] The peasants in Bangladesh constitute more than 70% of the total self-employed population of the country, and are the largest detachment of laborers. A large portion of them (not less than 18%—about 1.4 million families) are landless agricultural workers. As for the landowners, predominant among them are poor peasants with an allotment of up to 2.5 acres (51% of all the property owners), as a rule engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence farming, and often not having even draught animals. Almost half of the poor peasants (over 1.5 million families) have parcels of land of less than one acre, and are actually agricultural workers with an allotment.

By Bangladesh standards, peasants with a plot of land ranging from 2.5 to 12 acres (46% of the property owners) usually belong to the category of peasants of average means. The majority of them (26% of all the peasant landowners), however, have allotments of less than 5 acres; this means that few of the average peasants can engage in profitable farming and become, or have the possibility of becoming, farmers of the capitalistic type. The overwhelming part of the rural workers in Bangladesh are thus landless farm laborers or owners of small or extremely small pieces of property for whom various forms of sharecropping continue to this day to be the basic form of land tenure. The majority of them are in this case engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence farming of the noncapitalistic type (the aim of which is the production of use values, not expanded capitalist reproduction). It is also characteristic of the modern East Bengal village to have masses of "superfluous people" who cannot find, under the present system of agrarian

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[1] *Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-71*, Dacca, 1972, p. 220.

relations, any opportunity for productive use of their energies and capacities.[2]

The rural upper crust are numerically small. There are only 190,000 families who own parcels of land ranging from 12 to 25 acres in size, and 20,000 families who own from 25 to 50 acres. They constitute 3% of all the property owners[3] and own about 19% of the agricultural land in the country. But they hold the agricultural trade in their hands, and control an important part of the rural credit.

A special place in the social structure of the country is occupied by a relatively small group of large landowners (4,600 families) with allotments of from 50 to 150 acres. They have appeared relatively recently—in the 1960s—and on the whole their group consists of businessmen and prominent officials, local and foreign, who have invested their savings in land holdings, the ceiling of which was raised from 33 to 150 acres by the government of M. Ayub Khan in 1959. As a rule they have not been working and are not working their own farm, giving out the land which they have bought for lease or sublease. Along with the kulak leaders in the rural areas, this group of major landowners was, right up to 1971, the principal social support of the Pakistan ruling circles in the East Bengal rural areas. One of the aims pursued by the Bangladesh government on February 20, 1972, when the ceiling for rural ownership was lowered from 150 to 33 acres, was to weaken the position of this social group.

In the first years after Pakistan was formed (1947 to 1950), the East Bengal rural area was dominated by zamindar-landowners (a substantial part of which—about 14,000 families—were not engaged in any entrepreneur activity) and rent-receiving sublessees (not less than 200,000 families), obliged by their prosperity to an existence of various forms of privileged feudal and semi-feudal landownership, subleasing, and land-tenure. Hindus were predominant among them, but there were also quite a few Muslims. The agrarian reforms of the 1950s inflicted serious losses on these social groups, who were parasitizing on the agricultural production, undermining the very conditions of their existence.[4] Almost all the Hindu zamindars and sublessees emigrated to India, and the Muslims settled down in the towns of East Bengal. The latter continue to preserve the remnants of their traditional authority, and still enjoy some influence in the backward rural regions. In the 1960s opposition sentiments were powerful among them, and they took part in the Bengal movement, serving on its right flank; many of

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[2]East Bengal economists estimate the number of these jobless "superfluous people" to be 6.7 to 7 million, and think that they constitute from 30 to 32.4% of the entire able-bodied rural population. Iftikhar Ahmed, "Employment in Bangladesh—Problems and Prospects," Dacca (The International Economic Association Conference), 1973, p. 33; Kabir Uddin Ahmad, *The Breakup of Pakistan*, London, 1972, p. 126.

[3]Musaffar Ahmad, "Planning for the Industrialization of Bangladesh," Dacca (The International Economic Association Conference), 1973, p. 2. See also *The Fourth Five-year Plan. 1970-1975*, Islamabad, 1970, p. 539.

[4]For more detail see *Land Reforms in East Pakistan*, Dacca, 1960.

them supported the Awami League.

Next in number after the peasants is the detachment of Bangladesh laborers, the so-called independent workers in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. In the social respect they are extremely non-homogenous. About 500,000 are small-scale and very small-scale merchants and about one million are artisans. A considerable number of the latter (among which almost all of the rural artisans should be included) are connected with pre-capitalist and small-scale trade structures of the economy, and live in deep poverty. Only some of their category have become (or are on the way to becoming) petty bourgeois, linked with the modern capitalist structure in the Bangladesh economy.[5]

The Bangladesh working class numbers about 600,000 people, of which about 100,000 are plantation workers and almost 100,000 transport workers. The largest detachment of the working class numerically are the textile workers (234,000 people in 1970).[6] The characteristic features of the Bangladesh proletariat are: a high concentration; a relatively high percentage of skilled workers (up to 40% in the large factories and plants) and a simultaneously high percentage of temporary and seasonal workers (especially in the small enterprises and on the plantations); stable ties with the village (at harvest time even in the large cities up to 15% of the workers leave their enterprises) and a great fluctuation of manpower; lack of religious and ethnic uniformity (in the large cities about 20% of the workers, according to 1969-1970 data, are Muslim emigrants from India, the so-called Biharis, and a large part of the plantation workers are composed of representatives of various small communities inhabiting Bangladesh—*Santals*, *Garos*, *Khasis*, etc.). The latter two circumstances interfere with the organizational and professional unity of the proletariat, although since 1971 the percentage of Biharis is somewhat lower.

An important role in the political life of Bangladesh is played by the intelligentsia, who number about 300,000. A large part of them (about 70%) are workers in state institutions and private firms, as well as teachers in the elementary schools, receiving miserly wages. The East Bengal intelligentsia has quite a sizeable (about 20%) Hindu stratum. (Up until 1947 the Hindus constituted the overwhelming majority of the East Bengal intelligentsia; since the formation of Pakistan almost all of them have emigrated to India.)

The Bangladesh intelligentsia is primarily "first generation intelligentsia" coming from the well-to-do or (by East Bengal standards) relatively well-provided strata of society: the bourgeoisie, landowners, prosperous peasants and village merchants, the top artisans, petty bourgeois, and priests of religious worship.

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[5]There is considerable material on the transformation of the traditional forms of small-scale industrial production in East Bengal during the 1947 to 1970 period gathered and analyzed in V. Ya. Belokrenitskiy, *Small-scale Production in Pakistan's Economy*, Moscow, 1972.

[6]*Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-71*, Dacca, 1972, pp. 32-35, 37, 96.

The chronic mass unemployment among persons performing mental work has exerted and is exerting the most serious influence on the social life of the Bangladesh intelligentsia.[7] Young students, who took the most active part in the struggle for the formation of an independent People's Republic of Bangladesh, number about 1.4 million; of them, 250,000 are students at universities and colleges (92.6% of whom are men); the rest are school students in the upper grades.[8]

Bringing business activities in the non-agrarian spheres of the economy within the reach of the Muslim strata of the propertied sections of the population of East Bengal became relatively widespread only after 1947. Extremely close ties, frequently assuming the nature of a "personal union" with the social milieu in which they have grown up, especially with the landowning and commercial and money-lending upper crust in the rural areas, are therefore characteristic of the Bengal national bourgeoisie in Bangladesh.

The number of East Bengal national bourgeois is relatively small, and is made up of only a few tens of thousands of families. Over half of this number (not less than 60%) works primarily, if not exclusively, in the sphere of distribution.[9] In 1971 (i.e., on the eve of the creation of independent Bangladesh), the Bengal bourgeois had about 900 qualified industrial enterprises (in general these were minor and medium-sized enterprises with assets of up to 2.5 million takas) out of the 3,130 existing in the country,[10] as well as about 100 transport, a large number of construction, and a few other firms. By this time the strata of upper Bengal bourgeoisie had been marked out. About 40 large Bengal associations or groups were active, with assets of over 25 million rupees each (half of them had assets exceeding 50 million rupees).[11] Many of them supported and financed the Awami League. After the formation of Bangladesh, some of the representatives of the leading East Bengal business occupied important posts connected with the planning and carrying out of economic policy.

Up until 1971 the basic positions in the non-agricultural sectors of the Bangladesh economy were occupied by foreign national (non-Bengali) bourgeoisie, represented chiefly by the Muslim businessmen who, after 1947, had

[7]In 1965-1969 the labor exchanges existing in the large cities gave work to not more than 20% of the registered unemployed, among which members of the intelligentsia predominated (*Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-71*, p. 40). Concerning the labor market in Bangladesh, the local press carries extensive material (cf., for example, *Morning News*, Dacca, December 26, 1972.

[8]*Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-71*, p. 276.

[9]Official sources note the rapid growth of the commercial bourgeoisie. At the end of 1972 there were 25,000 people engaged in importing goods in the country. Of them, 20% were "nouveau," engaged in this form of business since the formation of Bangladesh (*Bangladesh Observer*, July 21, 1972).

[10]*Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-71*, p. 82.

[11]In this connection it should be noted that in India and Pakistan the owners of enterprises with assets of more than 5 million rupees are included among the upper bourgeoisie.

moved to East Bengal from India or West Pakistan (primarily Punjabis).[12] After the formation of independent Bangladesh, the government of the republic took under state control all of the enterprises with a capital of over 1.5 million rupees which belonged to the non-Bengalis who had abandoned the country in the period of political crisis.[13] The decision was also made to sell to private Bengali capital (the future owners were obliged to present proof of their Bengali origin) several hundred small enterprises with capital of less than 1.5 million rupees, which had belonged before 1971 to the non-Bengalis and had been abandoned by their owners. This dealt a strong blow to the foreign national non-Bengali bourgeoisie established in Bangladesh. It should, however, be borne in mind that not all the groups of non-Bengali bourgeoisie suffered as a result of this action; state control was not extended to enterprises which belonged to the dealers from the merchant Muslim sects of Khojas and Bohras.[14] Thus, the strata of wealthy non-Bengali bourgeoisie in Bangladesh, numbering several thousand families, remained strong through its capital, experience, and international finance and business connections.

According to data published by the Bangladesh press and the announcements of officials, an unhealthy tendency to form a so-called "bureaucratic bourgeoisie"[15] which is trying to parasitize on the state sector of the Bangladesh economy, considerably extended since the nationalization of approximately 260 large industrial enterprises[16] which was carried out in the first half of 1972, has recently been observed in the country.

One of the social strata of society which plays an appreciable role in Bangladesh (although its influence is explained principally by the stability of the surviving forms of social life among the East Bengal workers and is therefore not always manifested openly) are the Ulamas—a class of Muslim theologians, the members of which frequently bear the honorary titles of *maulana* (literally—"our lord") or *maulvi* ("scholarly man"). This class consists of experts on Muslim law *(Ulamas* and *Muftis)*, priests in the mosques *(Mullahs* and *Imams)*, and teachers *(Mudarrises)* in the religious institutions (Maktab, Madrasah, Dar-ul-ulum), of which there are 4,500 in Bangladesh (for comparison, let us point out that the total number of secondary schools in the country is only 3,460, and of colleges of all types, 331).[17] The total number of Muslim theologians is about 35,000. Closely affiliated

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[12] Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The National Question and National Movements in Pakistan*, Moscow, 1967; S. F. Levin, *The Formation of the Upper Bourgeoisie of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1970.

[13] For more detail see *Bangladesh Observer*, January 9 and 12, 1973.

[14] *Times of India*, April 27, 28, 29, 1972.

[15] See, for example, *Bangladesh Observer*, November 22, 1972; *The People*, December 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 1972.

[16] According to a statement made by Sayed Nazrul Islam, Bangladesh Minister of Industry, 261 enterprises with a total capital of 4.5 billion takas were nationalized (*Bangladesh Observer*, January 9, 1973). Also included in this figure are enterprises which until 1971 were in the state sector of East Pakistan's economic system.

[17] *Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, 1970-1971*, p. 276.

with them in their position are the heads of the religious Muslim orders *(Pirs* and *Ishans)*.

The Muslim theologian class is not homogeneous. While its leaders, through their material position and social life, are quite close to the relatively small group of large landowners and wealthy bourgeois[18] of which we spoke above, the principal portion of the Ulamas is closely connected with the poorer peasantry, merchants and artisans. Their aspirations are close and clear to these social groups and the Ulamas have often become spokesmen and organizers for the social movements of this stratum of East Bengal society. In the Hindu milieu, the Hindu priesthood (about 12,000 persons) plays a role analogous to that of the Muslim theologian.

An important feature of Bangladesh, as is known, is the great ethnic (national) unity of the population of the republic, almost 98% of which is made up of Bengalis. The principal ethnic minority of the country, the so-called Biharis, are emigrants from various states in northern India, and their native language is Urdu. They inhabit chiefly the northwestern and central regions of Bangladesh (the Kushtiya, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Bohra, and Dacca districts), as well as Chittagong. At the beginning of 1961 there were 311,000 Biharis in East Bengal.[19] In recent years, as a result of the increasing influx of Muslim emigrants from India, the number of Biharis sharply increased, and by 1971 was over a million. The politically active segment of the Biharis (among whom professional men, office workers, petty tradesmen, entrepreneurs, and other representatives of the so-called "middle class" predominate) have proven to be quite susceptible to the agitation of the right-wing Muslim religious communal parties and have, on the whole, related negatively to the Bengali nationalist movement. During the events of 1971, many Biharis actively supported the opponents of the Awami League and promoted the actions of the A. M. Yahya Khan regime against those participating in the Bengal movement. It is not surprising that after the formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh the position of the Biharis became quite unstable. The well-to-do Biharis tried to emigrate from Bangladesh.[20] For those remaining (about 600,000 people, almost half of whom are now concentrated in the suburbs of Dacca)—primarily poor people or representatives of the lower strata of the "middle class,"[21]—the future is quite uncertain. Extremely serious emotional obstacles were put in the way of their integration with the basic population of Bangladesh by the events of 1971-1972. Therefore, it is most likely that the Biharis will find them-

[18]The influence of the leader of the Muslim theologians reinforces the right which they possess to make use of millions in incomes being received from the Waqfs (the number of which reached 10,400 in East Bengal in 1969)—i.e., from land and other real and personal property, sacrificed by the faithful for the maintenance of Muslim religious institutions and corporations, and completely tax-free.

[19]*Census of Pakistan Population*, 1961, vol. 1, pp. 4-38.

[20]*The People*, December 20, 1972.

[21]*The Times of India*, April 27-29, 1972.

selves in the position of an enclosed ethnographic group for an indefinite period of time.

The other national minorities in Bangladesh (their total number reaches 500,000) are mainly aborigines of the country; they are settled primarily in the outlying regions of the republic. In the southeast, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, live several small national groups of Assam-Burmese descent: the Chakmas (in the Karnaphuli River valley and to the north of it), the Marmas, who are sometimes also called the Maghs or the Moghs (to the south of the Karnaphuli River), the Tipperas or Tipuras, the Morongs or Murungs, the Tanchaungs, Kamis, Ryangs, Lusheis, or Mizos, etc.[22] They are all gradually being assimilated by the Bengalis, a fact attested to by the Chakmas' changing to the Bengali language and the use of the Bengali written language by other national groups in this region.

The largest of the Assam-Burmese peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are the Chakmas, who inhabit the Rangamati district (they number, according to the estimate at the end of 1971, about 250,000 people; they all profess Buddhism). Many times the Chakmas stirred up rebellions against the authority of the English colonizers[23] and right up to 1947 preserved a considerable amount of autonomy under the dominion of the hereditary rajah of the Roy dynasty. The leaders of several Chakma clans (the so-called Dewan or Thalukdar) came out in 1947 against including the Rangamati district as a part of Pakistan, and were suppressed by the East Pakistan authorities; some of them later emigrated to India.[24] The infiltrations into the Chittagong Hill Tracts by tradesmen and entrepreneur-outsiders (who appropriated the lands belonging to the Chakmas) caused the politically active leaders of the Chakmas to try to achieve administrative autonomy for the region which they inhabited. This movement received support, attested to by the victory of its leaders, who stood as independents at the general elections in December 1970. In the summer of 1972 the leaders of the Chakmas sent a memorandum to the Bangladesh government, pointing out the need to concede administrative autonomy to the Chittagong Hill Tract and to form a special legislative body there.[25]

In the northwestern regions of Bangladesh (Dinajpur and Rajshahi) live about 50,000 Santals. In the northeastern regions (Mymensingh and Sylhet) are Khasis, Garos, Khajongs or Khojangs (each of which numbers about 40,000), as well as a few thousand Dalus.[26] In general these are poor peasants (some of them work for part of the year on the tea plantations); there

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[22]For more details see F. A. Trinich, *Vostochny Pakistan*, [East Pakistan], Moscow, 1959; P. Bessaignet, *Tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts*, Dacca, 1958; F. Lebar, G. Hickey, J. Musgrave, *Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia*, New Haven, 1964.

[23]See, for example, Syed Murtasa Ali, *History of Chittagong*, Dacca, 1964, pp. 79-81.

[24]For more details see J. Sen Gupta, *Eclipse of East Pakistan*, Calcutta, 1963, pp. 63-64.

[25]For more details see *Patriot*, New Delhi, October 27, 1972.

[26]For more details see V. I. Kochnev, T. V. Petrov, "The People's Republic of Bangladesh," *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1972, No. 4.

are very few tradesmen and entrepreneurs or teachers and other persons performing intellectual work among them. During the last few decades, various Christian missions have undertaken active work among these peoples; as a result, by the middle of the 1950s, half of the Garos of Mymensingh professed Christianity (chiefly Catholicism); there are also many Christians among the Khajongs.[27]

Most of the Santals (a total of over three million), Khasis, Garos, and Khajongs (no less than 300,000-350,000 of each nationality) live on Indian territory. Since the middle of the 1950s, movements for administrative autonomy have been developing among them, at times taking extreme forms.[28] These movements have met with a definite response among the segment of the Santals, Khasis, Garos, and Khajongs (as well as the Mizos) living in East Bengal, and have undoubtedly had an effect on the social and political development of these peoples. At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, the Khajongs, Garos, and Khasis took an active part in the mass Christian riots in East Pakistan, which took place under the leadership of the left-wing forces.[29]

On the eve of the formation of Pakistan, the Hindus constituted 28% of the population of East Bengal. As a result of the mass migration of population caused by the growth of religious and communal tension after the 1947 division, their number was reduced to 22% in 1951, and to 18.4% in 1961.[30] A large number of Hindus, principally caste Hindus, abandoned East Bengal after the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965. Those Hindus remaining in the country—practically all Bengalis in nationality—belonged chiefly to the so-called scheduled, i.e., lower, castes (they are sometimes called untouchables). They were mostly located in Khulna, Dinajpur, Jessore, and Sylhet districts (from 26 to 39% of the population). The political crisis of 1971 caused a new mass wave of Hindu emigration (as we know, the Hindus constituted a considerable part of the refugees who made their way from East Pakistan into India). After the formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, many of the refugees did not return to the rural areas where they had chiefly lived before, but settled in the large cities in the republic, adding to the declassed (lumpen proletariat) strata of city people.

The Hindu minority in Bangladesh today is made up principally of Bengali-Hindu lower castes (untouchables), occupying the lowest rungs of the social ladder: unskilled day laborers, village artisans, boatsmen, fishermen,

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[27] P. Bessaignet, "Tribes of the Northern Borders of East Pakistan," *Social Research in East Pakistan*, Dacca, 1960.

[28] For more details see Yu. V. Gankovsky, "The Autonomist Movements in the Countries of South Asia," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1970, No. 8, pp. 57-58.

[29] For more details see Yu. V. Gankovsky, L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1964.

[30] *Census of Pakistan, 1951*, Vol. 1, Table 6; *Census of Pakistan Population*, 1961; *Census Bulletin No. 2*, pp. 19, 98-99.

peddlers, etc. The numerically insignificant upper layer of the untouchables are chiefly petty tradesmen and employers, teachers at elementary schools, and professional people. As far as the middle strata of the Hindu communities of East Bengal society are concerned, these are primarily caste Hindus. (There are no wealthy Hindu landowners and entrepreneurs remaining in the country since the reform of the 1950s; practically all of them left to go to India.)

The organization upholding the interests of the propertied layer of the untouchables up to 1971 was the federation of the untouchable castes. In 1969-1970 its leaders came out in favor of holding separate elections by religious and communal curias, or, in case this demand would be rejected, in favor of conceding to the untouchables, proportionately by number, reserved seats in the legislative bodies. The leaders of the federation announced that if this demand should also be rejected, they would carry on a struggle to create a special state or province for the untouchables.[31] The demands of the federation met with sympathetic response and support among the leaders of the Christian community in East Bengal, and some of the Christian Bengalis even took an active part in its activities.

Up until 1947, the Hindu bourgeoisie and intelligentsia predominated in all spheres of business activity in East Bengal. The Hindus held over 80% of the real estate in the cities, the estates in the country, and the posts in state and municipal service. They held in their hands the principal part of the banking, credit, and import and export operations.[32] This created fertile soil for the rise and growth of anti-Hindu sentiments, which were also deepened by agrarian conflicts between the Hindu zamindars and Muslim landlords, and by competition for posts in government service, in trade, etc.[33]

At present the social and economic reasons for religious and communal tension (which had been kindled by the colonialists and their various accomplices, and used to oppose the followers of various religious teachings) have been largely eliminated. In the ideological concepts and social psychology of the East Bengal peasants, workers, artisans, merchants, and semiproletariat of the urban and rural areas, however, are still preserved stable surviving concepts of the religious, social, and caste exclusiveness[34] which make these social strata of society receptive to communalist agitation, promote the activities of the right-wing forces, and hinder the rallying of the

[31]See the statement made by the leaders of the federation of untouchable castes at a press conference in Dacca (*Pakistan Observer*, October 6, 8, 1970).

[32]Even in 1959, 3.4 times more enterprises in the non-agrarian spheres of the country's economic system belonged to the Bengali Hindus than to the Bengali Muslims (G. F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development. Social Goals and Private Incentives*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p. 42 ff.).

[33]For more details see Yu. V. Gankovsky, *Natsional'ny vopros i natsional'nye dvizheniya v Pakistane* (The National Question and National Movements in Pakistan) pp. 96-113; Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 171-174.

[34]"It is difficult to claim," writes Kabir Uddin, "that the strength of the true religious feeling among the simple people is less in 1972 than it was in 1946-1947." (Kabir Uddin Ahmad, *The Breakup of Pakistan*, p. 141).

workers on a class basis.

The characteristics of the social structure of Bangladesh society will not be complete unless we say at least a few words on the elite which is forming in the country. Before 1971, when East Bengal was part of Pakistan, absolute state authority was concentrated in the hands of a narrow upper stratum of well-to-do classes (which also controlled the overwhelming portion of the national wealth of Pakistan). This stratum consisted of the numerically insignificant monopolistic upper crust of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the upper layers of the landowners, and the civil and military bureaucracy. In the ethnic respect the elite strata which ruled Pakistan was nonhomogeneous, and was dominated by those of western and northern Indian extraction, or representatives of West Pakistan (especially the Punjabis).[35] The formation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh deprived this elite layer of the ruling position which they had occupied in the former eastern province of Pakistan. The leaders of the East Bengal national movement, and the social forces which they represented, came into power in the young independent state.

In our opinion, a process of consolidating the new elite stratum (or group) is now taking place in Bangladesh. Joining its ranks (or being included) are especially the representatives of the East Bengal nationalist bourgeoisie, the landowners, intelligentsia leaders, and Bengalis who up until 1971 had occupied posts in the provincial civil, judicial, and police services in East Pakistan (i.e., actually those who were by birth from these social strata of society). A characteristic feature of the elite strata of Bangladesh is its ethnic homogeneousness (all are Bengalis) and relative religious uniformity (a predominance of Muslims). Inasmuch as the process of forming the elite is still far from complete, it is still too early to speak of the forms it will take. Unquestionably, the evolution of the basic forms of property ownership which now exist in Bangladesh will exert a tremendous influence on the course of this process and its final results; these results also depend on which direction the social and economic development of the country takes.

An analysis of the existing sources makes it possible, therefore, to single out the following features characteristic of the social structure of Bangladesh society:

(1) An overwhelming majority of the economically active population (no less than 80%) is involved in the traditional—subsistence and smallscale commercial—structures of the national economy; as far as the private-capitalist and state-capitalist structures are concerned, although they have already become the leaders in the economic system of the country (since it is precisely these structures which ensure extended reproduction on a national basis), for the time being only a negligible part of the population is linked with them;

[35]For more detail see Yu. V. Gankovsky, *Natsional'ny vopros i natsional'nye dvizheniya v Pakistane*, pp. 35-40, 247-248; W. A. Wilcox, *Pakistan*, New York, 1966.

(2) The principal classes and social strata of bourgeois society (the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the modern intelligentsia), the formation of which has taken place and is taking place literally before our eyes, constitute a small part of the population of Bangladesh, numerically small, and tied by thousands of threads to the social milieu which has produced them. The social boundaries have for the time being a comparatively unstable, mobile character;

(3) The relatively slow ripening of capitalist attitudes has led to the formation of numerous *intermediate strata* in the urban and rural population; these intermediate layers are also connected with *modern commercial production*, and with the disappearing *pre-capitalist* structures of the economy. Therefore, in their consciousness, social practice, and forms of social order, features characteristic of the so-called traditional (i.e., precapitalist) social organization are present even today.

(4) A substantial portion of the urban population consists of the numerous declassed lumpen proletariat, who actually have no guarantee whatsoever of stable sources of existence. It should be noted that these characteristic features of the social structure of society are contributing to the preservation of traditional forms of ideology and their influence on the consciousness and social behavior of the broad national masses.

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THE UPPER BOURGEOISIE FROM THE MUSLIM COMMERCIAL COMMUNITY OF MEMONS IN PAKISTAN,* 1947 TO 1971

/ Sergey Levin

A sizeable portion of the Pakistan bourgeoisie are from Muslim professional commercial castes and communities. These people are the Gujarat Muslim Khojas, Memons, and Bohras, who moved to Pakistan, mainly after the 1947 division of India, as well as members of the Punjabi commercial communities of the Khatris, Pirachas, Shamsis, and Chinioti Sheikhs.

Those who have come from these communities have seized supremacy in the Pakistan market. By 1971 they constituted the overwhelming majority of prominent capitalists in Pakistan and were the nucleus of the national monopolistic bourgeoisie which had formed in this country. At the same time, each of these communities maintains its aloofness from the others. In many respects they have opposed and continue to oppose each other and the growing local bourgeoisie of the peoples of Pakistan—the Sindis, Pushtuns, Baluchis, and, up until the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Bengalis. Moreover, capitalist competition frequently takes the form of competition between the commercial castes and communities. It has recently become especially keen because of the appearance of national monopolies in Pakistan.

The self-contained quality of the professional commercial castes and communities in turn gives a very distinctive flavor to the structure of the Pakistan bourgeoisie, and the competition between them exerts an important influence on relations among the national groups and on the arrangement of class and political forces in Pakistan. Because of this, and also because the formation of the bourgeoisie within the framework of each commercial caste or community has its own distinctive features, it becomes necessary to study the history, organization, and economic and political positions of the individual caste or communal groups of the Pakistan bourgeoisie.

The leaders of the Memon community are considered to be the most powerful of such caste groups in the upper bourgeoisie of Pakistan. A considerable number of Pakistan's industrial and financial magnates have come from it. Some of the prominent statesmen and political figures of Pakistan also belong to it. The community of Memons has its own special organization, which provides obligatory mutual support for its members. This organization has contributed substantially to the growth of capital and the development of the entrepreneurial activity of the Memons in Pakistan.

What is the Memon community really like, and what positions do its leaders hold in Pakistan's economic system?

The Memon community came into being in the 14th-15th centuries. The Muslim missionary, Seyid Yusuf-Ud-Din (or Pir Yusuf Sindhi), a descendant of the famous Baghdad theologian of the 12th century, Abdul Kadir Gilani, is regarded as its founder. According to one version, in 1422, to another in 1350, Yusuf Sindhi spent some time in India in order to preach Islam there. According to the legend, he succeeded in converting to Islam 700 families from the Hindu commercial caste of Lohan in Kathiawar, Kutch, and southern Sind, and also, apparently, a certain number of people from other local Hindu castes, chiefly the commercial ones (Khatris, Kutchis, Gujarati Banias). Yusuf Sindhi called the new converts Mumins, i.e., the orthodox, from which, later on, was derived the name Memons.

The new Muslim community was distinguished by great religious zeal and piety. This feature is even today characteristic of the Memons. The reputation for being pious Muslims which has been attached to the Memons contributes greatly to their commercial success in Muslim Pakistan today.

With respect to religion, the Memons are considered orthodox Sunni Muslims. This has not prevented them, however, from preserving for a long time many customs and institutions handed down to them from the Hindu castes from which their community originated.

Thus, until 1940, some Memons from Kutch and Kathiawar conformed not to the Muslim, but to the Hindu common law of the commercial caste of the Lohanas on questions of property inheritance.[1] The Memons of Kutch preserved their caste *panchayats* (councils of five members), which head their *jamaats* (local communities). And one of the principal subdivisions of the Memon—Halais—has inherited from the Lohan Hindus the traditional institute of *Mukhi*—the chief of the caste community, who is also its treasurer. In addition to the mukhis of the local communities, the Halais also have a chief mukhi, who until recently lived in Dhoraji, in Kathiawar (India). The mukhis do not, however, mix into religious affairs, which are under the jurisdiction of Muslim sheikhs and pirs revered by the Memons. The descendants of Abdul Kadir Gilani and Yusuf Sindhi enjoy especially high authority among all the Memons. But the most important feature which distinguishes the Memons from the majority of Muslims in India and Pakistan is the fact that the Memon community has turned into a commercial caste.

As we know, Islam rejects any caste partitions in a society (all of the faithful are formally equal before Allah). The Memons, however, form an enclosed community, set apart from the rest of the Muslims. Characteristic for them are such basic caste features as hereditary profession, endogamy, and even the concept of a certain place in the traditional Hinduist caste hierarchy (the Memons claim to be descended from the warrior Varnas or

[1] A. A. Fyzee. *Outlines of Mohammedan Law*. Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 55-60.

the class of Kshatris, and include themselves in the Rajput castes; on this basis, some of them, like their Hindu forefathers, refuse to take food from the hands of Hindus or Muslims of the lower castes). Moreover, the Memons themselves are divided into subcastes. The most important of these are the Kutchis and the already mentioned Halais. The Kutchis consider themselves to be the highest subcaste, and are very reluctant to enter into marriage with the Halais.[2]

Finally, the organization of the Memons, like the organizations of the other Hindu commercial castes, stipulates that there be obligatory mutual support of its members in the sphere of business enterprise. The forms of this mutual support vary: preferential intracaste credit, including also that from special communal funds, exchange of information, a combined struggle against competitors, etc.

The Memons have long been famous in India as very enterprising tradesmen. Merchants from this community have engaged in trade with the most varied goods, on land and on sea. In the 16th and 17th centuries they settled throughout all of Gujarat, and set up a number of factories on the Malabar coast. The Memon merchants played a particularly important role in the trade of the city of Surat, which was at that time the leading trade center of western India.

From the end of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th, a mass settlement of Memons began throughout India, and a few decades later they also emigrated beyond its borders, chiefly to the countries of the Indian Ocean basin. By the end of the 19th century, rich communities of Memons were appearing in the ports of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, in Ceylon and Burma, and in East and South Africa.[3]

Apparently, among the settlement of Memons outside the borders of their native land in northern Gujarat there grew up a widespread practice of carrying on trade with the aid of distinctive joint stock companies. Each member of such a company, acting in any locality on his own responsibility and at his own risk, was at the same time the agent for all the rest. When he returned home at the appointed time, his total profits and losses were calculated and the most advantageous prospects for joint capital investment in the future were discussed. This type of trading practice may be explained by the mobility of the Memons' capital, the rapid spread of their operations into the huge territory from central and south Africa to China, and the springing up of the Memons' distinctive international commercial houses,

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[2] *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, Vol. IX, Pt. II, Bombay, 1899, pp. 50-57; V. R. Russel, Lal Bahadur Hira Lal. *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India.* London, 1916, pp. 440-443.

[3] The prominent figure in the Indian national liberation movement, M. K. Gandhi, went to South Africa in 1893 as a lawyer for the wealthy Memon firm of "Dada Abdullah & Co.," the descendants of the owners of which, incidentally, are flourishing today in Pakistan. In his autobiography Gandhi gives an interesting description of the Memons of Natal. Gandhi's autobiography has been published three times in the USSR in Russian, under the title *Moya Zhizn'* (My Life).

which had enterprises in many countries simultaneously.

The formation of the bourgeoisie from the Memon community took place not only over a huge territory, but also under the most varied conditions. Comprador operations played a very important role everywhere in the original amassing of capital by the Memon bourgeoisie. From the second half of the 19th century, however, the Memon leaders began to convert to independent industrial entrepreneurship. The process of forming the bourgeoisie from this community proceeded with special intensity in Bombay, where several tens of thousands of Memons had gradually settled.

The principal mass of Memons was and is composed of petty tradesmen—shopkeepers, grocers, wandering peddlers, and agents and clerks in firms belonging to others. In some regions of Kutch (India), and near Karachi and on the Makran coast of present-day Pakistan, the Memons are still engaged in commercial agriculture, gardening, and fishing.

As early as the colonial period, however, a number of major manufacturers, shipowners, and merchants, with control over millions in capital, came from among the Memons. Even before the division of India in 1947, some of the representatives of the Memon leaders were connected with English monopolistic capital, and took a direct part in forming the Indian monopolies. Among them were contemporary Pakistan's monopolists, the Adamjees, Haroons, B. M. Abu Bekr, and others.

Parallel to and in connection with the changes in the standards of living of the Memons, considerable changes also took place in their daily life, customs, world view, and social psychology. From medieval merchants they turned into modern bourgeoisie. At the same time the Memons preserved their caste aloofness and organization. But this traditional organization began to be filled with new content.

In the beginning of the 20th century, a reform movement arose in the Memon community, directed toward reorganizing their religious and caste institutions and adapting them to the conditions of bourgeois society, particularly to the demands of capitalist entrepreneurship. This movement was headed by a Bombay manufacturer and prominent public figure, H. Yu. Sobani.

After the first world war, bourgeois business, social, and educational organizations appeared among the Memons on a communal-caste basis. The most important of them were the Memon trade associations in Bombay, Poona, Colombo, and a few other large cities, the Memon Chamber of Commerce in Bombay, the Memon Educational and Welfare Society, and the "League of Young Memons." The Memons have their own schools, colleges, hospitals, clubs, and, since the 1920s, their own periodicals in the Gujarati language (the newspaper *Memon Mitra* and the monthly *Memon Patrika* in Bombay, the newspaper *Memon Samachar* in Karachi, and others).[4]

Important changes have also taken place in community administration.

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[4]At the present time, in Karachi alone, the Pakistanian Memons are publishing two weeklies, *Pak Memon* and *Memon Awaz*, and the monthly magazine, *Memon Alam*.

The authority of the hereditary Mukhis and traditional panchayats has been replaced by elective organs of self-government that are bourgeois in both form and essence. Since the end of the 1930s, All-India Memon conferences were convened periodically. At the head of these new organizations have appeared representatives of the upper bourgeoisie, who tried to use the organizations to extend their influence in the community.

The division of the Hindu bourgeoisie into isolated caste and religious-communal groups has already in itself created favorable conditions for capitalist competition to take the form of intercaste competition and religious-communal conflicts. In the south of India, in Madras and Bangalore, the Memons ran into competition with the Chettiars, a Tamil commercial caste; in Bengal with the Bengali bourgeoisie and Marwaris; in Punjab, with the Punjabi commercial castes and the Sikhs; in Bombay, Gujarat, and Sind, with other western Indian commercial castes—and not only with the Hindus, but also with Muslims. In time, however, with the aid of the English colonialists, the conflict between the Hindu and Muslim bourgeoisie came to the fore on an all-India scale. Many Memons took an active part in the Muslim religious and communal movements. The leaders of the Memons financed the Muslim League Party, which since 1940 was in the forefront of the Pakistan movement, and were widely established in the leadership of this party. And after the formation of an independent Pakistan in 1947, tens of thousands of Memons emigrated to that new state from India, and other countries, and transferred their capital there.

At present Pakistan has become the chief center of entrepreneurial activity for the Memon bourgeoisie. In the 1960s about 150,000 Memons, or approximately half of the community, were living there. True, the Memons were then only 0.16% of the population of Pakistan. But the proportion of them among the Pakistan bourgeoisie, especially the upper bourgeoisie, was much higher. Every fourth private factory or plant in Pakistan belonged to the Memons.[5] The Memon leaders form the most powerful group in the Pakistan monopolistic bourgeoisie. Specifically, the nucleus of the latter, as Pakistan regards it, consists of 22 monopolistic families, seven of which are Memons. These are the commercial, industrial, and financial magnates, widely known in Pakistan and beyond its borders, the Adamjees, Dawoods, Bawanys, Karims, Dadas, Haroons, and the Rangoonwala-Bengali group.

The Adamjees are known above all as the "jute kings." Before Bangladesh was formed, they owned the Adamjees Jute Mills, the largest jute company, not only in Pakistan, but also in the world. By 1971, 35,000 workers were employed in its mills in East Bengal. At the same time the Adamjees also controlled about 20 other major industrial, commercial, and financial companies, and numerous enterprises which they operated in various spheres of the Pakistan economy. Among them were textile, pulp and paper, and tea factories, chemical and machine construction plants, and oil-mills, plants for

[5] G. F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development. Social Goals and Private Incentives*, Cambridge, 1967, p. 42.

assembling tractors, radios, and television sets, and jute presses, tea plantations, sugar mills, etc. In cooperation with the famous American chemical monopoly American Cyanamid International, the Adamjees are building a large plant for artificial fertilizer near Lahore. The Muslim Commercial Bank—the fourth largest commercial bank in Pakistan—serves as the principal financial power for the Adamjees. Among their other financial enterprises should be mentioned the Adamjees Insurance Company, which is becoming one of the leading Pakistani insurance companies, the Oriental Investment and Trading Co., and the philanthropic Adamjees Fund which, while not being formally a commercial enterprise, owns stock in various companies.

More than 50,000 people have been employed in enterprises directly controlled by the Adamjees alone, and the assets of these enterprises reached at least 2.25 billion rupees in 1966-1967. The Adamjees occupied third place in amount of assets among the monopolistic groups in Pakistan.[6]

In addition, several enterprises are in the Adamjees' sphere of influence. On the one hand, they had sizable assets and directorships in approximately 30 major companies "belonging to others" alone, both private and state controlled, (including five sugar, three jute, two cement, three petroleum and gas, two steamship companies, the post of chairman of the state corporation for industrial credit and investments, etc.). On the other hand, many capitalists, especially from Memon communities, have invested in the Adamjees enterprises. As a result, a number of major capitalists have affiliated with the Adamjees group, and the group itself has become the center of a wider industrial and financial complex.

The Adamjees were directly connected with the formation of a number of cartels in Pakistan, including those in banking and insurance, and in jute, cotton, sugar, and tea industries, trade in raw jute, etc. Moreover, they constantly occupied the ruling positions in the corresponding industrial monopolistic organizations in Pakistan.

The Dawood concern has been characterized by exceptionally high growth rates during the last few years. Its owners, in contrast to the Adamjees, were not large-scale industrialists when Pakistan was formed. At that time they were engaged chiefly in trade, and owned only a few small cotton enterprises. The Dawoods have now become industrial magnates in Pakistan. The direct support given them by the government, especially after the government of M. Ayub Khan came to power (the Dawoods acquired great influence in the ruling circles), played a major role in the formation and growth of their concerns.

Before the events of 1971-1972, there were 20 companies in the Dawood

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[6]Here and in subsequent passages, approximate estimates of the assets of the monopolistic associations of the Memons are given on the basis of Exchange reference books: *Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1968; *Year Book of the Karachi Stock Exchange, Ltd.*, Karachi, 1968; and of the prospectus and reports of the individual firms and material from the Pakistan press.

concern. The majority of them were among the largest in Pakistan. The basic industrial companies of the concern were: the Dawood Cotton Mills, Burewala Textile Mills, and the Lawrencepur Woolen and Textile Mills in West Pakistan; the Karnaphuli Paper Mills (the largest pulp and paper combine in all of South Asia); the Karnaphuli Rayon and Chemicals (production of artificial fibres and other synthetic materials) in East Bengal; the Dawood Mines for coal extraction; and the Dawood Jute Mills (they began to construct a large mill in East Pakistan). In cooperation with the American Hercules firm, the Dawoods have organized a company, Dawood Hercules Chemicals, which is building a huge artificial fertilizer plant near Lahore. In addition, the Dawood concern founded petroleum and steamship companies a few years ago, and the former had already succeeded in developing trade in oil and petroleum products throughout Pakistan by 1971.

In the sphere of finance, the Dawoods controlled two insurance companies, as well as the Cooperative Bank of the Memons, created on their initiative in 1958 in Karachi. It has now become an extremely important caste credit enterprise for this community in Pakistan. The philanthropic "Dawood Fund" is also essentially a major financial enterprise. By the end of 1968, the assets of this fund were over 50 million rupees and were chiefly invested in the securities of various companies.

By the end of the 1960s, the Dawood concern was considered the leading private industrial association in Pakistan. Its assets exceeded a billion rupees. True, with respect to the size of assets, the Dawood concern, which did not have its own commercial bank, was at that time in fourth place among Pakistan's monopolistic associations. The Dawoods, however, held large shares in many companies owned by others, as well as in state banks and financial corporations. In addition, the Dawoods, like the Adamjees, enjoyed quite an extensive "sphere of influence" which included, in addition to many petty and average capitalists, some large-scale ones, primarily Memons.

The Bawany group is very closely connected with the Adamjees in both business and family relationships. Like the Adamjees, the Bawanys had been engaged in large-scale industrial enterprises in India and Burma even before 1947. When they settled down in Pakistan after 1947, the Bawanys operated here chiefly as textile and jute magnates. There are about 25 companies in the Bawany group, including eight textile, three jute, sugar, chemical, and electrical engineering companies; they also had interests in petroleum, tobacco, and construction industries, and in the insurance business. The assets of this group in Pakistan exceeded 300 million rupees. In addition, until 1968 they owned commercial and industrial enterprises in Burma, and until the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, in India.

As far back as the colonial period, the Muslim ruler (Nawab) of the principality of Junagadh in Kathiawar (India), invested considerable capital in the Bawany enterprises. The Nawab of Junagadh is to this day a major stockholder in the Bawany companies. Many Memons, especially those from

Junagadh, fellow countrymen of the Bawanys, also invested large funds in the enterprises of this group.

The Karims, who are also from Kathiawar, were also large-scale industrialists long before the formation of Pakistan. They owned a number of commercial and industrial enterprises in various countries—India, Burma, Hong Kong, and even Japan. After 1947 the Karims settled in Pakistan, although they still retain large interests in the countries of Southeast Asia and India.

In Pakistan, however, having begun with trade, the Karims later established a number of industrial companies, among which are eight textile, one jute, three match, and two metalworking industries. This group was the leading producer in Pakistan of yarn and items made from artificial silk, and was among the leading participants in the cartel agreements in the jute and various branches of the textile industries. In addition, they had sizable assets and directorships in the companies of the Adamjees, Dawoods, and the Valika concern.

One of the oldest commercial houses of the Memons is the Dada commercial house. Long before the formation of Pakistan, the ancestors of its present day proprietors established a group of trade and industrial enterprises in India, Burma, South Africa, and the countries of the Near East. In Pakistan, the Dadas were among the major exporters and importers, at the same time to a considerable extent retaining their interests in enterprises in other countries, including India. The Dadas also founded a great number of industrial enterprises in Pakistan. Many of them were small and medium-sized, but there are also a number of large ones among them, including the Asbestos Cement Company (plants in Hyderabad, Karachi, and Chittagong), three textile companies, oil mills, cotton, and chemical plants. But the Dada's share in Pakistani big business, and their capital, must not be judged only on the basis of the enterprises which they control directly. The point is that the Dadas, who have continuously had ruling positions in the Karachi Exchange, have made wide use of concealed forms of financial control. They have had substantial shares in a large number of enterprises. The Dadas have also been junior partners in a number of Pakistani and foreign monopolies. All this also provides a basis for including the Dadas among the 22 monopolist families of Pakistan.

There are about 20 companies in the Haroon group. It is headed by the brothers Yusuf, Mahmud, and Sayid Haroon, who have for many years been actively engaged in politics, and have extensive business and political connections (Yusuf was governor of West Pakistan in March 1969, and Mahmud was Minister of Agriculture in the A. M. Yahya Khan government). The principal spheres of the Haroons' activity are the press, automobile, chemical, and petroleum refining industries and the film industry, the export of cotton, the import of petroleum and motor vehicles, and hotels and restaurants. The group of Haroons controlled the monopolistic association, Pakistan Services, which included the major hotels in both parts of the coun-

try, one of the largest newspaper associations in Pakistan, the Pakistan Herald (the newspapers *Dawn, Evening Star, Vatan, Hurriet,* etc.), the Eastern Film Studios, an automobile assembly plant in Karachi, major auto repair shops in various cities in West Pakistan, a plant for the production of lubricating materials, and several cooperative banks in Karachi and Sind. The Haroons, like the Dadas, have held considerable shares and directorships in many companies, part of which they apparently controlled.

The Rangoonwala-Bengali group has amalgamated about 30 enterprises, with total assets of no less than 200 million rupees. Its owners come from the principality of Veraval in Kathiawar. By 1947 they had enterprises in northern Gujarat, Bombay, Bengal, and Burma. In Pakistan this group operated in the food, textile, chemical, and woodworking industries, and were also engaged in large-scale trade in timber. Along with the Pakistan affiliate of the Anglo-Dutch concern of Unilever, it was one of the leading producers of vegetable oil or vanaspati (the Bengal Oil Mills, Burma Oil Mills, Oil Industries of Pakistan), and one of the leaders of the group, M. A. Rangoonwala, headed a cartel in this industry. This same M. A. Rangoonwala, a very influential and authoritative figure in the business world, from 1964-1971 occupied the post of president of a prominent Pakistan semi-state-owned commercial bank—the National Bank of Pakistan—and by 1969 was on the board of 40 major companies which "belonged to others."[7]

In addition to these seven families, there should be included in the monopolistic leadership of the Pakistan bourgeoisie about another dozen families or groups of major Memon industrialists who have continued to serve as partners in Pakistani and foreign monopolies, and have themselves occupied monopolistic positions in some industry, or have been leading participants in cartel agreements. These are: the Dadabhoys, 17 companies in Pakistan and one in India; the Jaffer Brothers, 16 companies in Pakistan, two in England, one in India, and enterprises in Kuwait and Arabian principalities on the shores of the Red Sea (this group, with the aid of English capital, is building a large trisuperphosphate plant in Karachi); Haji Ahmed Haji Hasham (tobacco and sugar industry); Husein Ibrahim (textile, sugar industry, tube-rolling mills); the Pakolawal; the Akbarjis; and others.

They are all related to each other through mutual interests and overlapping directorates in each other's companies, as well as personally, and frequently through family relationships too. Very often the industrial enterprises of one of the monopolistic associations of Memons disposes of its output or purchases the necessary raw material through the trade network of the other monopolistic Memon associations. This is the situation, for example, with the enterprises of the Adamjees and Bawanys, the owners of which have long been related with each other through family ties. Often even a formally independent Memon commercial firm serves at the same time as the commercial agent for industrial enterprises belonging to various capitalists

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[7] *The Leader*, September 4, 1969.

in this community. Thus, for example, the wholesale commercial firm of Kassam Brothers serves in Karachi as the marketing agent for the textile mills of the Bawany, Dadabhoy and Husein Ibrahim groups. All of this makes monopolistic collusion between the representatives of the bourgeois leaders from the Memon communities much easier. Moreover, it is not at all obligatory for such collusion to be fixed in writing. In Pakistan it is most often brought about privately and in the form of a verbal "gentleman's agreement" of the cartel type.

With the aid of such private cartel agreements, the Memon leaders have seized the dominating position in Pakistan in a number of monopolized sectors of industry and trade. Among them were the production and sale of oil, the textile industry, and the trade in textiles in Karachi, Sind, and East Pakistan, the jute industry in East Pakistan and the sugar industry in West Pakistan, and the pulp and paper industry, a few basic chemical industries, and others.

An important factor contributing to the preservation of Memon unity is their caste organization. Among them, as among the members of other professional trade communities, the competition and various types of machinations which usually accompany capitalist enterprise are not permitted in relationships with the members of their own caste. Furthermore, this organization ensures its leaders the possibility of using communal funds in their own interests, and also—to a considerable extent—the individual capital or savings of the other members of the community. The leadership of this caste organization of Pakistan Memons, however, is in the hands of just the same monopolistic leadership.

Thus, for example, in the administrative respect, all the Pakistan Memons are divided into local communities or jamaats, which are created on the principle of belonging to a certain subcaste (Halais, Dhorajis, Kutchis, Veravadas, Okhais, etc.), or association of countrymen, as, for example, the Bombay Memon Brotherhood or the Jetpur Memon Association in Karachi. These local communities have their own schools, hospitals, mosques, living quarters, and credit cooperative societies. They are as a rule headed only by the large capitalists, and especially such magnates of Pakistan big business as M. A. Rangoonwala, the Dadas, Haroons, Adamjees, Dawoods, Pakolawalas, etc. They are the ones who control the All-Pakistan Memon Federation, the president of which is Kassam Dada, the Memon Cooperative Bank (the Dawoods), The Pakistan Memon Educational and Welfare Society (the Adamjees, Latif Ibrahim Jamal from the group of Husein Ibrahim, the Haroons, Bawanys), and other organizations of Memons in Pakistan.

Supported by their position in the Pakistan economic system, and by the caste organization, the representatives of the Memon leaders have ensured themselves key posts in the majority of the important organizations of Pakistan's business circles, including the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Karachi, Chittagong, and Hyderabad, on the boards of the Karachi and Dacca

Stock Exchanges, in the industrial, textile, jute, sugar, and other associations, and, finally, on various consultative committees for industry, trade, and finance for the government. Moreover, the various representatives of the upper bourgeoisie from the Memon communities in these organizations maintain solidarity, and frequently come out as a united front against common competitors. As a result, quite tense relationships had formed among the Memons with the growing local bourgeoisie of the peoples of Pakistan, particularly with the Bengalis and Pushtuns, and with the Gujarat leaders of the commercial community of the Khoja Ismailis and certain Punjab commercial castes.

Sometimes sharp conflicts even arise on this fertile soil. One such interesting conflict took place at the beginning of 1968. The leaders of the Pakistanian Khoja Ismailis, and the owners of one of the leading monopolistic associations in the country, the Fansies, for a long time could not build their own textile mills in Karachi because of the opposition of the Memon magnates dominating textiles there. Then the Fansies took advantage of the fact that they controlled the Karachi Gas Co., which had a monopoly on the supply of gas for all of the enterprises of the Karachi Federal area. On the pretext of objective difficulties, the Fansies raised the prices for the gas sold to the textile mills in Karachi, and demanded cash payment from them for two months in advance. When the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association refused to comply with their demand in general they stopped supplying gas to the textile mills. Since gas serves as the basic source of power for the textile industries of Karachi, the mills began to shut down, and their owners began to incur losses. The All Pakistan Textile Mills Association addressed its complaint to the government. This conflict caused a great uproar in the press.[8] In the end, the conflict was smoothed out, and the prices for gas remained as before, but the Fansies organized their own textile company, the Mohammad Farooq Textile Mills, which soon afterwards built a large factory in Karachi.

Also in 1968, another sharp clash took place in the sugar industry between the Memon leaders and the sugar mill owners, who were descended from the feudal aristocracy of the Pushtun tribe of Yusufzais. Toward the middle of the 1960s the dominant position in the Pakistan sugar market and in the Industrial Association of Sugar Mill Owners was occupied by a syndicate of Pushtun sugar mill owners. The huge profits which the sugar companies received attracted new enterprises to this industry. In 1965-1968, a number of new plants were built in the sugar industry of West Pakistan, and still another monopolistic group was formed, consisting of five companies of Memons (the Adamjees, Bawanys, Haji Ahmed Haji Hasham, Husein Ibrahim and the Adam Ltd. group) as well as two other companies of sugar mill owners affiliated with them, with whom the Memon leaders were connected by mutual interests. Sharp competition flared up between these two groups,

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[8] *Morning News*, January 30; February 10, 17; March 2, 30; April 30, 1968; *The Pakistan Times*, March 31, 1968.

and in December 1968 it gave rise to a great political scandal. By this time strong dissatisfaction had ripened among the population of Pakistan in connection with the scarcity and high price of sugar. Speaking at a press conference in Dacca, one of the leaders of the Pushtun syndicate, Abdul Ghafur Khan, the Nawab of Hoti, then occupying the post of Minister of Trade for Pakistan, publicly accused his competitors of "manipulations in the sugar trade" which caused its scarcity and high prices, and he expressed his intention of starting an investigation of their abuses.[9] The "manipulators," who had been mentioned by name, issued a joint statement to the press in which, not limiting themselves to a protest against "the ungrounded and irresponsible accusations of the Minister of Trade," they in turn demanded a court examination, inasmuch as these accusations "were undermining their reputation," and also asked the President of Pakistan to intervene in the conflict.[10] For several weeks after this, material appeared in the Pakistan press on the abusive monopolies in the sugar trade, and the names of the Adamjees, Bawanys, the Nawab of Hoti, and other industrial and financial magnates were spread about. There were, however, persons too influential and close to the ruling circles implicated in the scandal, not to mention the fact that the general political situation which had developed in the country at the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969 was too tense for the government to permit themselves a court examination. They tried to hush up the scandal. Of course, this did not eliminate the competition between the Memon leaders and the Pushtun sugar mill owners.

Items often appear in the Pakistan press which imply that the Memon organizations which are formally outside of politics are in fact also being used by the leaders of this community for political purposes. Moreover, in such cases the Memon leaders are pursuing not only the common class interests of the upper Pakistan bourgeoisie, but also frequently their own group interests. This was the case, for example, during the election campaign in Pakistan in 1964-1965, or during the supplementary elections in the summer of 1966 for the post of deputy from the Karachi district in the Pakistan National Assembly, which had become vacant. Some of the Memon leaders (Mahmud Harun, Ahmed E. H. Jaffer, Siddik Dawood, Ghulam Nabi Memon, etc.) came out as rivals of the representatives of the other caste or national groups of upper Pakistan bourgeoisie who were competing with the Memons. Thus, at the elections in the National Assembly in March 1965, Ahmed E. H. Jaffer, an industrial magnate and one of the Memon leaders, enlisted official support for his candidacy from the Association for the Aid of the Welfare of Memons in Karachi. The competition and political rivalry between the Memon Haroons and the leaders of the Punjabi Piracha trade community, H. Habibulla, serves as another illustration. The caste organizations of both the Memons and the Pirachas in Karachi, Sind, and

[9] *Pakistan Observer*, December 17, 1968.
[10] *Dawn*, December 19, 1968.

Baluchistan ended up being drawn into the struggle between them; in the end this struggle in the summer of 1966 served as one of the reasons for the growth of the factional conflicts in the then ruling party of the Muslim League and for the reorganization of the provincial government of West Pakistan.

Strained relations with the Bengal national bourgeoisie had formed among the Memons. Sharp competition developed in the 1960s between the Memons and the Bengali entrepreneurs, particularly in the jute, textile, and food industries, banking and insurance affairs, and in the domestic and foreign trade of East Pakistan. Great dissatisfaction was aroused among the Bengali businessmen by the activity of the controlling commercial and industrial and financial Memon magnates of the Pakistan monopolies in other sectors (for example, the monopolistic machinations with the prices of the companies of the Dawood concern).

Considering the growth of the Bengali national movement and attempting to ensure themselves a more favorable climate for enterprise activity in East Bengal, certain major capitalist Memons began in the middle of the 1960s to attract influential representatives of the Bengali elite onto the boards of their companies, and to make wider use of Bengalis as administrative personnel in their enterprises. On the whole, however, the Memons in East Bengal by 1971 had maintained their caste aloofness in the business sphere, and along with the Punjabis were regarded by the emerging Bengali bourgeoisie as their chief competitors in the East Bengal market. Therefore, after the formation of the republic of Bangladesh, the enterprises which belonged to the Memon leaders there were the first nationalized. As a result, the upper bourgeoisie from the Memon community lost the enterprises, capital, and economic positions which they had had in East Bengal up until 1971.

The situation is different in modern Pakistan. The government of Z. A. Bhutto has carried out certain measures restricting the positions of major private capital and monopolies (establishing state control over 31 enterprises in ten sectors of heavy industry, strengthening control over commercial banks, abolishing the system of managing agents, nationalizing the insurance business, etc.) These measures, however, have not been especially directed against the Memons or the other caste or national groups of the upper bourgeoisie as was the nationalization program in Bangladesh. In spite of the fact that the economic positions of the Memon leaders in Pakistan have been considerably weakened in connection with the recent events on the subcontinent of South Asia, the group remains, as before, one of the strongest caste groups of the upper Pakistan bourgeoisie.

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THE URBANIZATION PROCESSES AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE URBAN POPULATION IN PAKISTAN

/ Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky

Between 1947 and 1971 Pakistan was one of the least urbanized countries of the "Third World," but the proportion of urban population in West Pakistan was relatively large. According to the 1961 census it was 22.5%. If the ratio between the growth rates of the urban and rural populations in the 1960s was close to this index during the preceding decade (which can be judged by the 1951 and 1961 censuses), the proportion of city dwellers at the beginning of the 1970s should approach 30%.

According to Pakistan census statistics, a population center may be classified as an urban area if it has more than 5000 inhabitants and possesses certain features seen in an urban type of settlement (a form of municipal self-government, communal conveniences, etc.); in addition, administrative centers are recognized as urban areas even if the population there numbers less than 5000. Thus in Pakistan there may be population centers classed as cities which would not number among the cities in other countries, including neighboring states. In India, for example, the requirement for a population center to be classed as a city is that, for a certain population density, three fourths of the adult males be engaged in work outside the sphere of agriculture. In addition, we know that the UN demographers classify cities as population centers with over 20,000 inhabitants.

The special nature of the small cities has been reflected in the documents of the Pakistan Planning Commission, in which an urban area is restricted to population centers with over 25,000 inhabitants. But even with this narrowing of the limits of urban population, its dimensions and proportions remain impressive. The point is that in 1961, 59% of the city dwellers lived in cities with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants; and 19% and 22% of the urban population, respectively, lived in medium-sized (from 25,000 to 100,000) and small (under 25,000) cities and townships. The proportion of inhabitants of large and medium-sized urban areas at the beginning of the 1970s was apparently over 20%.

The distribution of the urban population of present-day Pakistan is, in the regional respect, uneven. The greatest concentration of city dwellers (as of the population in general) is found in the Indus Valley. Among the present provinces, the least urbanized are the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan (see Table 1). The largest proportion of urban

TABLE 1

URBAN POPULATION OF WEST PAKISTAN IN 1961
(In the Districts Which Form the Present-day Provinces)

	Punjab		Sind		NWFP		Baluchistan		West Pakistan	
Size of cities	No. of inhabitants in thous.	%	No. of inhabitants in thous.	%	No. of inhabitants in thous.	%	No. of inhabitants in thous.	%	No. of inhabitants in thous.	%
Over 100,000	2909	53	2451	77	219	28	107	48	5686	59
25,000 to 100,000	1176	21	309	10	318	41	—	—	1803	19
Under 25,000	1390	26	412	13	247	31	117	52	2166	22
Total urban pop.	5475		3172		784		224		9655	
Total pop.	25581		8469		7578		1252		42880	
% urban pop.	21.4%		37.4%		10.3%		17.9%		22.5%	
% inhabitants of large cities	11.3%		28.9%		2.9%		8.6%		13.2%	

Source: Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Census Bulletin No. 2, Karachi, 1963.

population is in Sind, but only because this province contains the former capital and largest city in Pakistan—Karachi.

It is in Baluchistan that the small cities are most significant; according to the data for 1961, more than half of the city dwellers lived in them. Moreover, among these cities the extremely small ones, with under 5000 inhabitants, were predominant. The small cities also occupy an important place in NWFP and Punjab. Thus, if one excludes the urban population of Sind, the structure of which is determined by Karachi, the proportion of small city dwellers in 1961 was equal to 27% of the urban population.

What are the cities of Pakistan like? Let us briefly examine their origin and structure. It is most suitable to subdivide Pakistan cities into three types: the old ones, which grew up in the era before the English conquest; the modern ones, which were formed during the colonial period; and the new ones, which appeared during the years of independent statehood. The most numerous in present-day Pakistan are the modern cities. The number of population centers which had already received city status in the period since independence (according to the data for 1961 they constituted over a fifth of all the cities) is also quite large. The old cities rank numerically below the two other groups, but among them the proportion of the largest city centers is higher.

The old cities, which have been preserved from medieval times, are either the former capitals of individual principalities, centers of regions which to a great extent were independent within the larger state formations of feudal times, or fortified points on the borders of principalities and states. A city which was the headquarters of a feudal ruler was, as a rule, monocentric, grouped around the feudal residence, its court, and armed camp. In the feudal era the cities were centers of trade and crafts. They drew a large number of artisans to serve the needs of the feudal aristocracy. Some of the cities have been famous from deepest antiquity as centers for caravan trade (Multan and Peshawar, for example).

Under British colonial rule, many cities lost their importance, and often their city status along with it. On the other hand, a relatively small portion of these cities acquired new features in the colonial era. Quarters for the British civil administration (civil lines) appeared in them; military towns (cantonments) were built for military subdivisions and military administration, usually at a certain distance from the old city. Thus, within the limits of a single city area, two cities would seemingly spring up—the old and the new. Traces of this division are frequently preserved to this day. Among the modern cities are some which came into being through the expansion of the political and administrative system under the British, as well as through their military and strategic plans. The modern cities in Baluchistan and the NWFP are basically of this type. On the other hand, many modern cities arose as the result of the opening up of land, which was tied in with the development of irrigation and expansion of the bases of agricultural production. The cities in the western part of Punjab, the so-called "colony cities," are almost exclusively of this type. There are very large ones among the latter today, as, for example, Lyallpur. A number of modern cities owe their rapid growth to the development of trade and transportation networks, especially sea transport (Karachi), and railroad communications. Finally the capitalist industrialization which began in the colonial period led to the location of manufacturing enterprises in the cities, especially in the large ones. In that period an important factor in the growth of the small and medium-sized cities was, in the first place, the increase in the natural growth rate of the population and the development of local trade centers. The penetration of elements of European architecture and municipal buildings which gave the population center the features of city settlements in the eyes of the colonial administration officials, was also of some importance.

City development in the postwar era at first took place under complex political circumstances. The division of colonial India and the mass migration of the inhabitants brought about great changes in the composition of the urban population of the districts which form present-day Pakistan. The 1951 census recorded a certain increase in the degree of urbanization in comparison with 1941. Due to the influx of refugees, individual cities grew up rapidly, especially Karachi—the capital at that time. Refugees from India constituted about half or even more of the inhabitants of many of the

cities, chiefly in Punjab and Sind. Some refugee colonies were even recognized as cities (Khazro in Punjab, for example).

In the years since independence, cities originated to a large extent in connection with the economic development of the country. During the decade from 1951 to 1961, small, purely industrial cities and settlements of an urban type appeared (Ahmadnagar, Jehangira, Daudkhel, Jauharabad). These cities arose around a major enterprise or around a whole industrial complex which had been or was being built. The total number of new cities of this type is not, however, large. Among the population centers which were included as cities for the first time in 1961, the overwhelming majority owed this classification to their population growth and to a certain improvement in the system of community services.

At the same time, many of the old and modern cities have changed considerably in appearance during the last few decades. Industrial zones have appeared in these cities, especially in the largest ones. These zones have as a rule grown up slightly apart from the traditional center of the city, often with the direct support of the state. While in the large cities there is a marked concentration of the manufacturing enterprises in one or a few districts in the city, in the smaller ones the industrial enterprises are usually concentrated outside the limits of the central sections of the city (the latter are the most expensive plots of land, and for that very reason—the high prices of the property—industrial buildings are sometimes constructed outside the city boundaries). Quarters inhabited by construction workers have appeared in connection with the major industrial and hydroelectric power construction in a number of cities. Industrial zones and workers' quarters thus constitute new features in the Pakistan city.

It is difficult, however, to judge from them the nature of the majority of the cities, and of their functional role in the economic, social, and political life of Pakistan. Classification of cities according to the functions which they fulfill is one of the basic methods in economic and geographic literature, and is most often based on detailed statistical data on the distribution of gainfully employed urban population according to the sectors, with a distinction made between basic (city forming) and nonbasic (city serving) sectors. Unfortunately, we can only make a first attempt in implementing this type of typology By using the data on the cities of West Pakistan contained in the material from the last census taken (1961), as well as information on the value of individual cities to the country's economic system at that period (they are taken chiefly from general works on economic geography), we have compiled a rough diagram of the distribution of the basic functions among the West Pakistan cities at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s (see Table 2).

It should not be surprising that political functions predominate over all the rest. West Pakistan has remained a primarily agrarian country with respect to its economic structure. At the same time, its political and administrative system has inherited features from British colonial rule, under

TABLE 2

FUNCTIONS OF WEST PAKISTAN CITIES (1961)

Classification of functions	Distribution of functions among cities									
	Punjab		Sind		NWFP		Baluchistan		All West Pakistan	
1. *Administrative-political*	73		48		21		25		167	
1.1. Administrative centers		(70)		(48)		(18)		(25)		(161)
1.2. Military towns (cantonments)		(11)		(2)		(10)		(2)		(25)
2. *Industrial*	38		14		11		8		71	
2.1. Centers for mining industry and hydro-electric power		(1)		(—)		(—)		(2)		(3)
2.2. Manufacturing centers		(23)		(9)		(10)		(2)		(44)
2.3. Handicraft centers		(21)		[illegible]		(4)		(5)		(35)
3. *Trade and Transport*	30		13		7		10		60	
3.1. Railway Junctions		(12)		(6)		(2)		(3)		(23)
3.2. River and Sea ports		(—)		(1)		(—)		(2)		(3)
3.3. Transit and major wholesale trade centers		(20)		(9)		(7)		(6)		(42)
4. *Cultural*	11		5		4		1		21	
4.1. Education centers		(9)		(3)		(3)		(—)		(15)
4.2. Historical and religious centers		(6)		(4)		(2)		(1)		(13)
4.3. Resorts		(1)		(—)		(1)		(1)		(3)

which great attention was paid to political administration.[1]

The economic functions, even taken as a whole, have given way to the political. The predominance of the industrial function over that of trade and transport may be partially explained by the fact that the economic-geographic literature used frequently pertained to the industrial centers of a city, where there were only one or two quite large (by Pakistan standards) factories. Furthermore, singling out the trade and transport centers was made difficult because of the widespread and non-specificity of such functions as wholesale trade in grain and other products of agricultural production. It should therefore be assumed that the spread of the industrial function is somewhat overestimated according to our material, while the trade-transport function suffers from underestimation.

The spread of the cultural function lags considerably behind that of the political and economic. The cities which had this function constituted less than a tenth of all the cities. Moreover, the educational centers are primarily the large cities where the universities, colleges and technical schools are located. Included among the historical and religious centers are cities which possess cultural and historical monuments and a few centers of religious pilgrimage (a considerable number of such centers are located in rural areas).

The distribution of functions among the cities is naturally uneven. Some cities fulfilled several functions, while others in general did not play any sizeable role in the economic and socio-political life of the country. Three types of cities are singled out: polyfunctional, unifunctional, and those fulfilling only local functions. Of the polyfunctional cities, 14 had all four of the functions which we have mentioned. All of these were the largest urban centers (12 with a population of over 100,000 and two with the number of inhabitants approaching 100,000). There were somewhat more cities with three functions—22. These are chiefly those of medium size according to population density (there were 40 cities in all having a population of from 25,000 to 100,000 in 1961). They lacked, as a rule, the cultural function. The most numerous among the polyfunctional cities were those with two functions—36. These were principally small population centers with from 20,000 to 35,000 inhabitants. Most frequently encountered was a combination of the political and administrative function with one of the two economic functions.

Unifunctional cities constituted the most numerous type of group (127). These were principally small cities and very small urban areas. The chief function of these cities is political and administrative. The overwhelming

[1]The concept of signs of urbanism in the censuses of the colonial period is itself primarily linked with fulfillment of the political and administrative function. Thus, the regional center was considered and continues to be considered as a city, regardless of the number of inhabitants. In the sparsely populated localities in Baluchistan, population centers with a population of under 1500 are on this basis included as cities. Still more indicative in this respect is the recognition of certain military settlements as cities. In one of them, according to data from the 1961 census, there were only 200 inhabitants.

majority of them are regional centers. In addition, a special variety is comprised of small, purely industrial centers, port (primarily for fishing) cities (Pasni, Gwadur), small railway junctions (Kundian), trade and craft centers (Bhera, Hala), and mining industries (Khevra), as well as military towns (Cherat, Mansarcamp).

The second largest group numerically is composed of 116 cities, which fulfill functions of only local importance. These are exclusively small cities, the overwhelming majority of which have a population of not over 10,000. But among these cities, the functions of which are inadequately marked, are some quite large ones with over 20,000 inhabitants. The cities and urban settlements in this group have undoubtedly played a substantial role on their tahsil-taluka, or even district scales, since they are centers for wholesale trade in agricultural produce and focal points for the surrounding rural population. It is not by chance that the number of such cities was greatest in Punjab, in regions developed and settled in recent and very recent times (the old regions of Punjab possess a more subdivided administrative system).

The cities in West Pakistan have thus formed two functional networks. One of these networks, consisting mainly of medium-sized cities but also including some large and small cities, owed its origin and development to the establishment of a system of national economy and centralized political power. These cities were mainly situated in the Indus Valley, which was seemingly the "heart" of the configuration of the first functional network, with a few branches to the west and northwest (Quetta, Peshawar). The other network of cities, to a large extent independent of the first, chiefly joined the small urban areas—centers of local administration and central localities for certain rural regions. The urban centers which form them are more or less equally scattered throughout the country.

The functional classification of cities reflects, above all, the characteristic features of urbanization which have been formed over a long period of time. The new tendencies which appeared during the years of Pakistan's independent development had not succeeded in revealing themselves fully by 1961. In the 1960s they made themselves felt to a greater extent. We know that in this period in West Pakistan there was an intensive growth in industry, including some sectors of heavy industry, and that the scale of mining and especially of hydroelectric power construction increased. There were changes in the geographical distribution of industrial projects, and Karachi's importance as an industrial center decreased, since it yielded, according to the Census of Manufacturing Industries 1956-60, a slightly smaller portion of production than the industry of all the other regions in West Pakistan. A greater geographical dispersion of the manufacturing industry, and the appearance of new centers for the mining industry undoubtedly changed the economic functions of a number of cities and increased the role of modern economic development in the urbanization process. All of these shifts, however, could not radically change the nature

of the functional network of modern-day Pakistani cities which had been established through the decades.

A genetic and functional analysis, to the extent to which it has been given above, cannot adequately depict all of the major features of the urbanization processes in Pakistan. Pakistani sociologists, in studying the specificity of these processes in Pakistan and in other countries in South Asia, have noted such common factors as an increase in population and in its density in regions with a developed irrigational system, a decrease in agricultural productivity estimated per capita, the indebtedness of the rural inhabitants, their lack of full-time employment, and the fragmentation of property holdings. These factors have acted as "push forces," driving the rural population into the cities. Among the "pull forces" they have singled out the development of industry, transportation, and the infrastructure of social and daily life. The large role played by the "push forces" in the urbanization process led to the fact that the rural population settled in the cities of West Pakistan (chiefly in the largest of them), and at first often had no work and no place to live. The "internal migration" (from the country to the city) was initially only a small addition to the mass immigration of refugees from India which was experienced by the cities of West Pakistan at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, and to those difficult problems which it created (the growth of sections of slums and hovels, neglect and unsanitary conditions, unemployment, and lack of full-time employment). In comparison with the initial period in Pakistan's history, the situation in the cities had somewhat improved by the end of the 1960s, but the problems of increasing the rate of housing construction and of establishing the necessary communal conveniences (sewage systems, water supply, and provision of gas and electricity) are, as before, urgent.[2]

According to the 1961 census, 2.4% of the nonagricultural labor forces in the cities were unemployed. According to the data from sample surveys made in January 1964 and April-June and July-August 1965, respectively, 1.5% (roughly), 1.96%, and 3.61% of the gainfully employed urban population were unemployed (and seeking work). The proportion of unemployed seems small, but it must be remembered that the overwhelming proportion of them are concentrated in the large cities, and that consequently the proportion of unemployed population in these cities was approximately twice as high. In addition, the data of the sample surveys show that in the mid-1960s almost 5% of the urban gainfully employed population (150,000-200,000 people) worked less than 31 hours a week. This indicates the scale of part time or partial employment. Also to be taken into consideration is the fact that Pakistan statistics singled out a special category of persons "not working and not seeking work." According to the data for 1964, they constituted over 4% of the urban inhabitants over 10 years of age. The majority of them were people who were temporarily disabled, had

[2] *Problems of Urbanization in Pakistan*. Karachi, 1969.

lost hope of work, lived on charity, were satisfied with promises of work, etc. Also included in this category of persons were landowners and other property owners. Wealthy landowners live in the cities as a result of one of those "pull factors" which are created by the numerous conveniences which city life offers the well-to-do strata of society. For one reason or another the city served as a focal point for those members of the population who were—willingly or unwillingly—unemployed. The proportion of the labor forces in the cities of West Pakistan in the mid-1960s was less than 30%, a lower figure than that for the rural area (over 33%).

The important influence of the "push forces" has also been felt in the nature of the employment for the urban population. In comparing the urbanization processes in Pakistan with analogous processes in the capitalist countries, Pakistani sociologists, particularly Hassan Nawaz Gardezi, have emphasized the great importance of the "tertiary sector" as a source of employment for the growing urban population. The sizeable portion of population groups connected with trade, finances, repair, and services was actually one of the important features of the social and professional composition of the population of West Pakistan cities (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE OF SELF-EMPLOYED POPULATION OF WEST PAKISTAN (in %)

Spheres of employment	Urban area (1964)[a]	Large cities (1961)[b]	Medium-sized and small cities[c]	Rural area (1964)[a]
Agriculture	9.1	4.1	14.1	73.8
Industry (including mining)	24.0	29.6	18.4	10.9
Construction	2.5	4.2	0.8	1.2
Transport and communications	5.6	7.7	3.5	1.1
Trade	22.2	17.9	26.5	3.8
Services	33.8	32.4	35.2	7.9
Other (including electric, gas, and water supply)	2.8	4.1	1.5	1.3
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] *Population and Labor Force in Pakistan*, Karachi, 1966, p. 52.

[b] *Population Census of Pakistan 1961*, Vol. 6, Karachi (1966)

[c] Calculated on the assumption of structural invariability in the employment of the urban gainfully-employed population in 1961 and 1964, and the equality of the population in the large and other cities. Since the ratio of the urban population of these two categories in 1961 actually equalled approximately 60:40, the employment figures for the medium-sized and small cities somewhat exaggerate their closeness to the employment in the large cities. The changes in the employment structure of the gainfully employed population in the large cities during 1961-1964 would operate in this same direction.

Persons employed in the sphere of physical production (agriculture, industry, and construction) constituted only about 36% of the urban gainfully employed population (as opposed to 86% among the rural gainfully employed population). The proportion of this population in the large cities was not much higher—38%. In the medium-sized and small cities, apparently only a third of the labor forces were employed in the sphere of productive labor, and almost half of them were engaged in agriculture, hunting, and fishing.

In comparison with the rural gainfully employed population, the urban was seven times less involved in agriculture, two and a half times more in industry, four times more in the sphere of services, and almost six times more in trade. The economic specialization of the cities was thus shown not so much in the difference between the proportion of industrial jobs for the population as in the difference between the proportions of those employed in trade and in the sphere of services. This becomes especially obvious when one examines the structure of employment in the medium-sized and small cities. In these urban settlements as well as in the rural areas, industrial employment was basic for a small part of the gainfully employed population. But almost two thirds of the labor forces were employed in the sphere of trade and services in the medium-sized and small cities, while in the rural areas only somewhat over a tenth were engaged in these spheres.

The data from the sample survey of 1964 make it possible to link the employment structure of the urban population to their employment status (see Table 4). Information on the proportion of employers, employees, self-employed, and unpaid family helpers was obtained for the entire gainfully employed population of West Pakistan. In view of the fact that the principal part of it was composed of the rural population, corrections must be made, since in the cities the modern (capitalist) forms of economic life have been relatively more developed. This is mainly true of such sectors as industry, transport and communications, and construction; it is true to a lesser degree for the spheres of services and trade.

According to the figures shown in Table 4, employers, along with employees were fewer in number than the two other categories. The gap, however, was not large, and in view of the stipulation made above, it may be considered that the urban labor force fell into two approximately equal groups, one of which was connected with the more or less modern (capitalist) sector, and the other with the traditional and semi-traditional sector. In the large cities this balance was disturbed in favor of the modern forms, and in the majority of the medium-sized and small cities in favor of the traditional ones.

In comparison with the gainfully employed rural population, the urban as a whole shows an essentially closer connection with the modern (capitalist) sector (see Table 5). Also indicative of this is the data on the incomes of the urban and rural population which were used by A. Bergan in his

TABLE 4

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF URBAN GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION (1964)[a]

(in thousands)

Sphere of employment	Total employed[a]	Employers[b]	Employees[b]	Self-employed[b]	Unpaid Family Helpers[b]
1	2	3	4	5	6
Agriculture	284	3	43	151	87
Mining industry	5	—	4	1	—
Manufacturing industry	739	7	318	307	5
Construction	77	—	49	23	5
Power, gas, and water supply	22	2	16	2	2
Trade	690	7	94	506	85
Transport and communications	175	4	99	60	12
Services	1049	7	700	276	66
Other	65	—	39	23	3
Total	3106	30	1362	1349	365

[a]*Population and Labor Force in Pakistan, 1964*, Karachi, 1966, p. 52.
[b]Estimated according to the proportion of these categories in the employment structure of all of the gainfully employed population according to the corresponding spheres.

TABLE 5

EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION IN WEST PAKISTAN

	Entrepreneurs resorting to hired labor forces	Employees	Self-employed	Unpaid family helpers
		(In percent of total gainfully employed population according to data for 1964)		
Urban area	1%	44%	43%	12%
Rural area	1%	24%	50%	25%
All of West Pakistan	1%	28%	48%	23%

1966 study. It was obtained by the Pakistan Central Statistical Bureau in the course of investigations of the current economic conditions for the 1963-1964 fiscal year. The difference between the structure of the personal incomes of the urban and rural populations makes it possible to draw still more definite conclusions concerning the contrast in the urban and rural economic structure (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

SOURCES OF PERSONAL INCOMES FOR THE POPULATION OF WEST PAKISTAN

(1963-1964, in percents adding up to total income)[a]

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th rowspan="2">Wages and salary</th><th colspan="2">Income of self-employed from:</th><th rowspan="2">Rent, interest, dividends</th><th rowspan="2">Other sources[b]</th></tr>
<tr><th>agric. spheres</th><th>nonagric. spheres</th></tr>
<tr><td>Urban area</td><td>55.6</td><td>4.1</td><td>24.9</td><td>5.8</td><td>9.6</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">29.0</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Rural area</td><td>15.1</td><td>49.2</td><td>6.9</td><td>4.9</td><td>23.9</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">56.1</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>All of West Pakistan</td><td>26.5</td><td>36.5</td><td>12.0</td><td>5.1</td><td>19.9</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">48.5</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

[a]A. Bergan, "Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings in Pakistan 1963-1964," PIDE, Karachi, T.A. 17.

[b]Other sources of income include pensions, house rental allowance, and "regular assistance to sons and daughters."

The total income of all the urban families was estimated in 1963-1964 at 5,680 million rupees, as opposed to 14,560 million for the rural households (approximately 1:3). The average per capita income in the city proved to be essentially higher—515 rupees per year as opposed to 373. At the same time the income distribution in the urban area was more uneven in comparison with that in the rural area (concentration ratio 0.430 as opposed to 0.357). Only 1% of the total income of the city dwellers fell to the lower (according to income received) 5% of the householders, and 26% to the upper 5% of the families. The lower 10% of the householders had only 2.5% of the total income, but the upper 10% had more than a third of this income. In addition, according to A. Bergan's observations, in view of the limited scale of sampling and the relatively small number of families with a high income, "sampling errors" could influence the overall picture of income distribution. Nineteen percent of the householders selected for investigation were dropped because of the impossibility of

establishing contact with them or their refusal to give out data on their incomes. "We must not rule out the possibility that the incomes of the families who did not give any answer was to a certain extent above average."[3]

An increase in the proportion of city dwellers in the composition of the population of the country is customarily termed urbanization. But this proportion is only the external sign of the process. The essence of urbanization lies in the increased role played by the cities in the life of the country, and in the spread of the urban way of life. This process has demographic as well as economic, social, and cultural and every-day life aspects. The proportion of urban dwellers in the composition of the population of modern-day Pakistan overstates the level attained in the course of urbanization in this sense. In Pakistan one observes not only a spread of the urban way of life to the rural areas (as also occurs in economically developed countries), but also that the rural (traditional) way of life has a considerable influence on the city and on the urban population. This influence is most noticeable in the small cities and decreases as the scale and expansion of the modern functions of the cities increases.

In present-day Pakistan, cities which are of the traditional type in the structural and genetic and functional respects are quantitatively predominant. Although the smallest portion of the urban population lives in them, it should not be forgotten that the modern functions of the large and medium-sized cities often do not change the traditional aspect of many quarters of the cities and of whole regions. The features characterizing the migrational stream from the country to the city also have a certain significance. Many emigrants leave their family in the country and send part of their pay there and from time to time return to take part in the field work, frequently regarding their moving to the city as a temporary phenomenon. Countering this and many other aspects of the direct influence which the rural way of life exerts on the urban way are the tendencies to draw into the orbit of the urban economy the rural areas which are situated near the large modern city, or in regions where the density of urban centers is greater (for example, in Punjab). The general social and economic environment frequently indicates the process and the level of urbanization more clearly than the most precise statistical data on the population living within the municipalities, cantonments, municipal committees, etc.

The urbanization of Pakistan is in this sense closely connected with the processes by which traditional society is transformed, and the agricultural bases of its economic system and the rural basis of its inhabitants' settling are undermined. A leading role in these processes is played by the state, which plans the broad economic development, including the development of

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[3] A. Bergan, "Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings in Pakistan 1963-1964," PIDE, Karachi, 1966, pp. 4-6.

the social sectors. At the same time it can withstand such undesirable manifestations of urbanization as the "swelling" of individual supercities, the increase in the mass of partially or totally unemployed as well as of the nonworking population, and the growth of social contrasts and property inequality. Successes in this respect depend to a considerable extent not only on the economic growth rates, but also on the ways and means of economic construction, which are chosen by the state, and the social and political forces in society which determine its character.

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THE SOCIAL TYPES OF RURAL HIRED WORKERS IN INDEPENDENT INDIA

/ Victor G. Rastyannikov

Who are they, the nonpropertied population in the rural areas, who form the gigantic manpower resources of the nation; what social types are represented, and what is the nature of the change in the pattern of their social relations? These and many other questions inevitably face the scholar studying the development process in the rural areas of the countries of the "Third World." This article will examine, using India as the example, just one category of the nonpropertied population of the rural area—namely, the one which earns its livelihood by expending only its labor on another person's production.

One of the most characteristic features of the agrarian economy in India was the fact that by the time when, in the course of strengthening the system of the colonial yoke, the mass expropriation of producers who owned their own labor factors (small cultivator-landowners, artisans, and others) began to develop, there *already existed* in the rural areas, and here and there quite sizeable in proportion, *a stratum of people who had been relieved of property* (the numerous "community servants," landless agricultural workers, etc.). These people—the product of the previous social division of labor —were drawn into production in the rural areas, as a rule under various conditions of dependence.[1]

On the whole, the "expropriators' mission" of the colonizers was manifested in two ways: on the one hand, the traditional system of social relations was destroyed, and thus the already existing nonpropertied population

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[1]The Soviet Indologist, L. B. Alaev, in studying the traditional structure in the territory of which the modern state of Uttar Pradesh is comprised, established that in the 1870s approximately a third of the total volume of manual labor expended in agriculture was composed of the labor performed by landless workers, dependent on the landowners. Moreover, throughout the various regions, according to the author's conclusion, "the use of outside labor on the farms proved to be in inverse proportion to the degree of concentration of land property and the spread of tenanted land. It is apparent that there is complete justification in posing the question as to why the extensive stratum of landless dependent workers is not the result of abolishing the community or of depriving the peasantry of the land, but is a traditional feature, inherent in the Indian social structure itself." "Incidentally," specifies L. B. Alaev, "the proof of this thesis still requires much confirmation." (L. B. Alaev, "On the Question of the Role of the Labor of Landless Workers in the Agriculture of the Northwestern Provinces of India in the 19th Century," in: *Countries and Peoples of the East*, Pt. XIV, India—Book 3. "Nauka," Moscow, 1972, p. 166).

of the rural areas was "liberated" from its former sources of livelihood; and on the other hand, the ranks of this population were intensively replenished with new groups of people—the dispossessed, formerly self-dependent producer—small property owners. As a result, by the time the country achieved independence, the non-propertied rural population, including those totally relieved of their property, had increased to a considerable extent.

But, as India's historical experience shows, capital in an enslaved country could not draw this population, separated from the conditions and means of production, into its own production process. Moreover, the very existence and development of capital presupposed as its prerequisite the existence, at the other pole of national society, of a gigantic mass of expropriated population, only partially engaged in the process of production and exploited, as a rule, by the worst methods.

In the rural areas, in addition to the forms of direct attachment of the expropriated producers to the land under the worst conditions (share-cropping tenancy), there was, on the one hand, excessively widespread relations of buying and selling the labor-power of the expropriated producers which were not connected with the functioning of the capitalist structure, and on the other hand, the relations of "domination and kabala" (K. Marx) in exploiting the labor of this type of producer. These phenomena were also characteristic of the era of independence.

According to the data from a series of surveys (The Reserve Bank of India and the National Council of Applied Economic Research)[2] in the first third of the 1960s in India somewhat *over half* of the rural households, in various amounts and under various conditions, put their labor at the disposal of the households and establishments of the producers in exchange for wages.

The incentives for the producer to resort to the use of outside labor are quite varied. The labor market is inflated by noneconomic demand for outside labor which arises as a result of the influence of traditional social institutions (the prohibition against members of the higher castes performing manual labor, the inverse relationship between social prestige in the rural society and manual labor, etc.). The fact that, according to the data from the Eighth Round of the National Sample Survey, 11% of the cultivators' households were "wholly or mainly" based on "hired labor" shows how large a role was played by the tradition-caused demand for outside labor in expanding the market for "hired labor" in the mid-1950s.[3]

Apparently, however, the chief factor in drawing hired labor into agricultural production on a mass scale, not called for by normal agricultural

[2] "All-India Rural Debt and Investment Survey, 1961-62. Tables relating to Gross Farm and Non-Farm Receipts and Important Items of Non-farm Expenditures," Bombay (mimeo); "All-India Rural Household Survey," Vol. III, New Delhi, 1966.

[3] "The National Sample Survey. 8th Round, July 1954-June 1955, N60, Tables with Notes on Farming Conditions and Practices in Rural Areas: 1953-54," Delhi, 1962, pp. 30-31.

requirements, is the struggle for sources of livelihood in small farming. The problem is that the agrarian overpopulation is manifested in underutilization of the human resources in the production process, not only of the totally expropriated population, but also of the numerous strata of peasant-farmers (according to the data from the "Studies in the Economics of Farm Management" [Farm Management Studies], in various regions of India the average requirements of an agricultural household for family labor was, in the second half of the 1950s, one-fifth to two-fifths of the yearly working time of the actual family workers, i.e., not even of all the able-bodied members of the family). And small farming, which has the most acute need, discards its own labor that is in excess, even though in the short-term periods of pressing agricultural work the labor that is normally surplus becomes necessary; the vacuum is filled by outside labor. Thus, through using the system of *pooling labor through the market*, a basic economic choice is made by the small farmer who is trying to supplement his income through the difference between wages received for work elsewhere for a more prolonged period of time, on one side, and the total expenditure for outside labor engaged for a brief period on his own farm. The agrarian overpopulation thereby creates its own mechanism, which gives rise to the tendency to *level* the income of the expropriated and pauperized population, including the section of it that is represented by those whose main occupation is that of agricultural labor.

The outside labor enlisted in the agricultural socio-economic structures, which function on the basis of simple reproduction, obviously cannot be regarded as *hired labor* in the fully economic sense of this concept (i.e., as labor producing a surplus value for the sake of its further reproduction). The hired workers who put their labor efforts into these structures constitute a type of *agrarian protoproletariat*. Under the conditions of the multiform structure of India's agrarian economy, this type of people is most widespread among those who sell labor-power; the extent of their distribution by regions is in inverse proportion to the level of development of the capitalist structure, and in direct proportion to the level of development of the relative overpopulation. Not creating any surplus value (and in extensive sectors of the agrarian economy—simply exchange value), and not capable of achieving the necessary minimum for subsistence through their own labor, the hired worker of this type is a *pauper in the fullest, most complete sense of the word*. The scale of pauperism which reigns in the agrarian society of a certain region may be measured more accurately by the scale of spread and the size of the personal consumption of the agrarian protoproletariat.

As for the specific distribution of those who sell labor-power in their qualitatively different categories, the type of production which is predominant in a certain region also determines the major economic features of the outside labor drawn into production, i.e., the inclination of the army of labor-power sellers toward the hired labor category or the agrarian protoproletariat category.

The "Farm Management Studies" for 1953/54 to 1959/60 show that the outside labor used in agriculture by the various groups of farms is extremely unevenly distributed in the various regions. For example, in the districts of Akola and Amraoti (East Maharashtra), 79% of the outside labor was concentrated on the farms accumulating surplus product; in West Godavari (Andhra Pradesh), 68%; in Ferozepore and Amritsar (Punjab), 57%; in Meerut and Muzaffarnagar (West Uttar Pradesh), 45%; in the districts of East Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, respectively, 68% and 42% on farms with net earnings of more than 1000 rupees per year. On the other hand, in Salem and Coimbatore (Tamilnadu), Ahmednagar (West Maharashtra), Sambalpur (Orissa), and Hooghly and 24 Parganas (West Bengal), the overwhelming mass of outside labor was concentrated in subsistence agriculture and more than half (or even 86% to 100%) of the outside labor was consumed on farms which could not even make ends meet.

Unfortunately, there is no basic original data which would permit calculation of analogous figures for the whole of India. It may, however, be noted that according to the "Table of Ranks" for the 75 Indian districts compiled by the Reserve Bank of India in 1951-52,[4] Akola and West Godavari were among the upper 10% of the most highly developed agricultural regions in India (the Punjab districts examined, especially Ferozepore, may undoubtedly also be included among them). Therefore, if one uses the information in the "Farm Management Studies" when calculating the data from other material,[5] one may conclude with a great degree of probability that in the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s the *overwhelming mass of outside labor enlisted in agricultural production (possibly from two-thirds to three-fourths per amount of working time expended) was required for subsistence, semisubsistence, or petty-commodity farming (reproducing only the resources for their own means of livelihood), and did not create any surplus value (or product), or was used in such a subsistence economy which, although it created a surplus product on the basis of exploiting outside labor, completely consumed it.* Accordingly, only the smallest part of the outside labor was used in farming which accumulated a surplus product.

Several tendencies are characteristic of the process of changing the structure of utilizing outside labor in Indian agriculture. Among them should be mentioned the tendency to lower the scale of use of outside labor in connection with supplanting the traditional type of hiring—under the influence of the formation of a petty-commodity production structure, the representa-

[4] "All-India Rural Credit Survey," Vol. I, pt. 1, Bombay, 1956.

[5] Here may be mentioned, for example, the estimates of the district per capita income made according to 1955-56 by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (see "Inter-District and Inter-State Income Differentials—1955/56," New Delhi, 1963) and such valuable material as the reports of the Reserve Bank of India on the rural area survey of 1961/62, in which the figures for the proportion by states of the wages in the overall receipts for the rural household and the values of this income have been totalled. ("All-India Rural Debt and Investment Survey, 1961-62. Tables Relating to Gross Farm and Non-farm Receipts . . .").

tives of which are trying their utmost to be supported by the labor resources of their own households.

Another tendency arises from carrying out agrarian reforms, which in some cases deliver a hard blow to the traditional system of hiring. The destructive effect of the reform is especially apparent in regions in which the use of outside labor on farms was of a mass nature, precisely because most of the farms belong to landowners from the upper castes for whom the very act of approaching a plow was strictly taboo. One such region is the state of Uttar Pradesh, especially its eastern region.

A survey, made by Baljit Singh and Shridhar Misra, of the results of the agrarian reform in Uttar Pradesh showed that from 1951/52 to 1960/61 there was a wide-scale splitting up of the large cultivated holdings in the state. Thus, the cultivated holdings of the landowners, whom the authors called "farmers" (in general these are the large landowners), were cut from 21.8 acres to 16.7 acres per farm, or by 23.4%; as a result, the average cultivated holding of members of the upper castes was also noticeably decreased—from 11.9 acres to 10.8 acres, or by 9.2% (let us note in passing that the average cultivated holding of the farmer of the scheduled castes went practically unchanged, constituting 4.4 and 4.3 acres during these years, respectively). The process of splitting up the large landholding had the greatest effect on the most backward region of the state—eastern Uttar Pradesh. Here, as a result of the inroads made on the households with the largest holdings, the average size of the cultivated holding in the region was cut from 7.1 to 5.5 acres, or by 22.6%.[6]

Moreover, the exploitation of outside labor (generally the labor of dependent workers) constituted the economic basis of the households with the large cultivated holdings in the state. For example, in households with 40 acres of land and more in 1951/52, 89% of the farming area was cultivated by outside labor, and in 1960/61—100%.[7]

The splitting up of the large cultivated holdings, which took place under the influence of the agrarian reform, signified that "farming through hired labor has been at a discount, and some of the area formerly so cultivated is now cultivated by households who use mainly their own labor."[8] Such a process expressed the major social change in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh: namely, the beginning of the break-up of the joint families with large cultivated holdings, who used for their personal consumption practically all of the product which they had appropriated in the course of exploiting outside labor, and chiefly the gradual erosion of the rural social tradition which forbade the members of the upper castes to engage in manual labor.

The process of the "disappearance of large estates" led to a noticeable

[6] Baljit Singh and Shridhar Misra, *A Study of Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh*, Calcutta, etc., 1964, pp. 245, 246.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 154

decrease in the area which was cultivated by outside labor: in 1951/52 it was 24.7% but in 1960/61 only 21.1%. If one takes only the group of "farmers," the change in their use of "permanent farm servants" (attached laborers) was characterized by the following figures:[9]

	1951/52	1960/61
Percent of households employing "permanent farm servants"	68.0	57.7
Average number of "permanent farm servants" per 100 households employing their labor	243	177

But the reform still did not deal the final blow to the precapitalist forms of consumption of outside labor, i.e., consumption for the sake of producing use values for landowning farmers and not for the sake of increasing capital. In eastern Uttar Pradesh, where the overwhelming portion of the outside labor being used is allotted to these forms, in 1960/61 49.3% of the total farming area, all of the area on farms with cultivated holdings of 20 acres and more, and three-fifths of the area on farms with cultivated holdings of 10-20 acres, were cultivated on the basis of outside labor.[10]

At the same time, the further development in India of entrepreneurial farming, which turns into capitalist farming, stimulates the growth of the demand for outside labor, of the very demand created by the real production needs. This process is considerably promoted by the "green revolution" (in regions where it is taking place), which at its present stage of development, due to the substantial increase in production per unit of area, leads to a great increase in the need for human labor.

The tendency engendered by agrarian overpopulation—i.e., to retain a huge mass of outside labor in small-scale and petty production—is in opposition to and will as before overcome such interstructural shifting of outside labor. The reality of the Indian rural life at the beginning of the 1970s gives no evidence at all that the oppressive burden of agrarian overpopulation is being resolved. Therefore the "mutual aid" which only paupers can allow themselves (exchange of labor through the sphere of the market) will as before form the very basis of existence for the huge masses of producers engaged in small-scale production.

Special attention should be given to the types of relations between the worker and his employer who uses his labor on a farm which creates a surplus product, for only on this type of farm can production subordinated to the aim of capitalist accumulation in general be found. To counterbalance the "free terms of exchange . . . between both parties," "based on exchange

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 249, 251.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

values, and not on relations of domination and kabala"[11] (such an exchange, according to K. Marx, is one of the inherent features in the category of "hired labor") in the Indian rural areas, and in precisely the largest households, there has been a widespread practice of the various forms of worker *dependence* on the employer which, in the last analysis, are realized in a lowering of the fund of the worker's vital resources to a minimal level.

Two extremely widespread forms of the workers' personal dependence on the employers exist in the rural areas of India. In the first place, this dependence is a group concept based on the estrangement of the will of one social collective by the other through the device of traditional institutions. This form of dependence results from the caste stratification of Indian society, which is preserved to this day. The very fact that large groups of workers who supply agriculture with their labor belong to a socially lower stratum of the rural population—to "the untouchables"—permits those using their labor to pay for it on a lower wage scale. In a number of states in India "untouchables" form a quite large (or even overwhelming) part of the army of agricultural workers. According to the data for 1950/51, they constituted 34.0% of the total number of families of agricultural workers in Madras, 38.5% in Bihar, 55% in Uttar Pradesh, 60% in Orissa, and 82.0% in the Punjab.[12]

In the second place, this is an individual dependence manifested through tying a certain specific worker to a certain specific consumer of his labor. This type of dependence is usually ensured by the debt-bondage of the workers (moreover, the debt is frequently handed down from generation to generation, thus reproducing the personal dependence of the worker and his family for many decades). According to the data for 1956/57, 63.9% of the families of agricultural workers had debts (as against 44.5% in 1950/51), and the average debt per family was 88 rupees, or 14.3% of the total sum of the family's expenditures on livelihood.[13] Part of these workers were held in bondage directly by their employers.

The change in the agrarian economy in the direction of the production of exchange values is not automatically accompanied by the disappearance of the debt-bondage and of the non-economic compulsion in the exploitation of outside labor on the cultivated holdings. This "disproportion" reflects only a certain stage in the evolution of the total aggregate of production relations. Characteristic of this stage is the fact that the "new" (formation of production, the process of accumulation in which exploitation is accomplished through commodity relations is seemingly superimposed on the "old" exploitation of the dependent, not the free labor) rather than eliminating it. Debt-bondage in the exploitation of the worker under today's conditions

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[11] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, 2nd Edition, Vol. 46, pt. 1, p. 452. (Russ. ed.)

[12] "Agricultural Labour Enquiry. Rural Man-power and Occupational Structure," Delhi, 1954, pp. 55-57, 110, 129, 130, 142, 157, 158.

[13] "Agricultural Labour in India. Report on the Second Agricultural Labour Enquiry, 1956-57," Vol. I, Delhi, 1960, p. 221.

fulfills the function of a *primitive* accumulation for the one who uses his labor, and in the Indian rural areas embodies one of the mass types of relationships which represent intermediate socio-economic structures.

Evidence of the portion of the real wages of the worker which the landowners, even in the developed agricultural regions, appropriated for themselves through utilization of the debt-bondage methods of exploiting outside labor is seen, for example, in the material from the survey on the use of agricultural workers in the Bhatinda district in Punjab. According to the data for 1958/59 to 1960/61, the permanent workers in this region were invariably hired on condition that they first be given an interest-free loan, and the pay for their labor, as the survey showed, was lower than the pay for the labor of the free workers. While the average wage of the casual worker (drawn from the free labor market) was 0.33 rupees per hour of work, the corresponding pay for the permanent farm laborers was only 0.21 rupees, or one third lower.[14] This third, in the last analysis, was the monetary expression of the part of the working time which the worker gave to the landowner "gratis" in the form of a "supplement" to the "legal" surplus labor appropriated by him (at the time of final settlement appropriate adjustment concerning initial advance payment was made).

The process of *emerging* hired labor in the totality of features inherent in this category—i.e., as a category belonging to the capitalist mode of production—is on the whole at its initial stage in the agriculture of India; at the same time, taken in the regional cross-section, it is proceeding extremely unevenly, and its starting points in the various regions date back to various periods in the history of the present century. It has been picking up speed since the second half of the 1960s under the impact of the "green revolution" in certain regions, and the further technological restructuring of the production basis of the farms which are accumulating surplus value inevitably promotes the forming of a modern class of hired agricultural workers.

The entire huge mass of workers drawn into production on the basis of free market relations, or on the basis of debt-bondage (here including the agricultural laborers by trade, too), is thus not a single class, but a *conglomerate of social strata*, the economic makeup of which is determined by the nature of the economic structures in which they live.

The fact that the dominating role in this conglomerate is played by the groups which belong to the precapitalist (including the intermediate) structures has a tremendous influence on the social psychology and on the nature of the socio-economic demands of the workers. Extremely important among these are: the allotment of land, i.e., the self-affirming of the worker as an independent producer; social equality, i.e., destruction of the forms of noneconomic compulsion, of "untouchability," etc.; raising wages especially through abolishing the various relationships of debt-bondage in exploiting

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[14] A. S. Sharma, *"Employment and Wage Structure of Farm Labour in Punjab,"* in: *Manpower Journal,* New Delhi, Vol. II, 1967, No. 4, pp. 81, 86.

the workers; lowering and stabilizing food prices, i.e., eliminating the monopoly of trade-intermediary capital and introducing a state system of control and regulation of the market. In their totality these demands reflect the urgent need for abolishing the *monopoly of private exploitative property*, in both its prebourgeois and its "modernized" forms.

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PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY[1]

/ Vladimir Moskalenko

The crash of the world colonial system caused dozens of new sovereign states to appear. The peoples of these states, who had formerly been merely objects of the policy of the imperialist powers, began to take an active part in the decisions of the world's destiny. The position of the young states of the "Third World" has an important significance today in the fundamental problems of the modern age; their foreign policy constitutes a substantial part of today's international relations. On the other hand, for these very countries, foreign policy has become an important means of solving the gigantic problems involved in strengthening their independence, breaking old and establishing new relations with former parent states, and developing many-sided relations with the other countries of the world, as well as being important in the sphere of internal reorganization.

The course of Pakistan's foreign policy has been complex, and has passed through several stages during its development. In the early years it generally adhered to a neutralist course. Then, however, it departed from this course, concluded military agreements with the United States, entered into blocs (SEATO and the Baghdad Pact). In this period Pakistan developed its foreign policy and foreign economic ties, mainly with the Western powers. Subsequently, at the turn of the 1960s, Pakistan's foreign policy strategy began to be reviewed. Courses directed toward strengthening its independence, renouncing the onesided orientation toward the Western powers, and extending cooperation with the socialist states and the Afro-Asian countries began to gather momentum in its foreign policy. Such periodization in the development of Pakistan's foreign policy, with certain deviations, is widespread and acknowledged. The author of this article is, in general, with certain reservations which will be dealt with below, also its advocate. A considerable variety of opinions is observed, however, in regard to the reasons for the changes in Pakistan's foreign policy. Many foreign scholars feel that major reasons for these changes are phenomena of an external order, sometimes not even directly connected with Pakistan, as, for example, the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, the changes in the policy of the United States with respect to the countries of the Subcontinent which accompanied the coming to power of the Kennedy administration, etc. To regard the external factors

[1]This article reviews the historic period from August 1947 to December 1971.

as the determinant, and what is more, as the only reason for the turn in the course of Pakistan's foreign policy, does not seem correct to us.

Foreign policy is a part of the over-all policy of a given state or, to be more precise, of the classes which are in a position of authority. The foreign policy of a state, its goals and basic directions are determined precisely by the interests of the ruling classes. The Marxist-Leninist conception of the process by which the policy of a state, particularly the foreign policy, is formed, does not reject but, on the contrary, assumes that this process is influenced by various internal and external factors such as the specific condition in the country at a given moment, the degree of political activity of the broad masses of the population, the personal qualities of the statesmen, etc. There is great significance for developing countries in external factors—the policies of the great powers, the position of the neighboring states, the former parent state's attitude toward them, etc. Therefore, for correct understanding and true evaluation of a course of foreign policy, the factors which influence it should be taken into consideration as far as possible. Here, however, it should be remembered that no matter how much these factors influence the foreign policy of the state, diverting it from a course in the "pure form," in the last analysis it remains an expression of the interests of the ruling classes in the external sphere, the sphere of international relations.

In Pakistan, all during the period of its existence which is being reviewed in this article, the ruling classes were the bourgeoisie and the landowners. This general situation, however, did not exclude the fact that at various times the determining influence on state policy was exerted by various strata and groups of these classes.

Soviet Pakistanists, especially Professor Yury Gankovsky, have come to the conclusion that by virtue of the special features of the historical development of colonial India, there was an immediate appearance at the helm of authority in independent Pakistan of numerically insignificant leaders of the ruling classes—the land magnates of West Pakistan (chiefly the Punjabis and Sindhis) and the upper bourgeoisie, which had come from India to settle here after 1947. The economic activity of the latter was mainly in the sphere of distribution, where it operated in close contact with the foreign monopolies; the chief sources of its income were the trade-financial operations, and it therefore had little interest in the development of rational production or in the growth of a home market. As far as the West Pakistan major landlords were concerned, they tried to preserve their semi-feudal privileges and huge estates. Both of them were interested in whatever state policy (and actually conducted it) would favor the reinforcement of their economic and political power, and the satisfaction of their narrow group interests, which in practice meant the maximum possible preservation of the structure of Pakistan society which had been formed by 1947. It is not surprising that these groups, which determined the state course of Pakistan during 1947-1958, did not carry out during this period any substantial reorganiza-

tion in the various spheres of domestic life of the society. The policy of the ruling circles in this period not only ran counter to the interests of the broad masses of the population in the country and the objective requirements for developing the society, but was also to a certain extent at variance with the interests of other groups of the ruling classes, which were more closely connected with entrepreneurial activity, and strove for a forced development of capitalism and elimination of the survivors of the colonial and feudal past who hindered this—i.e., strove for a certain modernization of society. (Specifically, the growing industrial bourgeoisie and the quite considerable strata of landowners connected with entrepreneurial activity were the foremost of these groups. It was precisely these strata of the ruling classes, economically strengthened, which, in spite of all the obstacles in the more than ten year period of Pakistan's existence, began to exert a decisive influence in drawing up the state's policy after the events of October 1958.)

The state of Pakistan which was formed in 1947 inherited from the colonial era an extremely backward economic system and acute socio-economic and political problems. The ruling bloc of the country, weak in economic and political respects, which had no firm position in the state, and a certain part of which was not even genetically connected with the population of the country, was from the very beginning greatly in need of various forms of support and assistance from outside in order to consolidate its position. Pakistan's ruling circles also needed support in connection with the tension that had arisen in relations with India, as well as with Afghanistan. Therefore, the chief driving force of Pakistan's foreign policy for many years was an attempt by its ruling groups to have, in the words of M. Ayub Khan, "friends—powerful friends, who are interested in our security, who are interested in our freedom, and who are interested in our progress."[2] "That is the reason why," stressed M. Ayub Khan, "we are in military alliance with the United States of America."[3] In reality, this striving by the ruling circles for several years after achieving independence led Pakistan to a onesided orientation toward the Western powers, and especially toward the most powerful of them—the United States of America—to concluding military agreements with them and entering into the military pacts created by them. In the early years, however, when the "search for friends" was going on, Pakistan's foreign policy *objectively* (we stress this word) was of a neutralist nature. An important factor influencing the state's foreign policy line in this direction was the mood and the emotions of the people, who had just been liberated from foreign domination.

In the "search for friends" the ruling group first turned to England and the British Commonwealth. This was conditioned by the British influence

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[2]Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol. IV, July 1961-June 1962, Karachi, p. 86. (Quote taken from a speech made August 25, 1961 at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, in Karachi).

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 86-87

in economics, the state machine, the armed forces of the country, and by the Pakistani elite's longtime associations with England, as well as by Pakistan's position as a British dominion and member of the Commonwealth. An important role was also played here by the fact that Pakistan did not yet occupy the place in the Asian policy of the United States which was subsequently assigned to it; in the early postwar years, the United States' attention was riveted on events in the Far East. England, however, weakened during the Second World War, was not in a position to supply Pakistan with any considerable economic and military aid. Moreover, England was interested in strengthening its position in India, and therefore did not come to occupy the position with respect to it that Pakistan wanted. All of this caused dissatisfaction in Pakistan.[4] Active attempts were made by the Pakistani leaders to create an alliance of Muslim countries in which Pakistan, as the major Muslim state, would occupy the ruling position. The realization of these plans should have strengthened Pakistan's foreign policy position and its positions in the disputes with India. In the domestic life of Pakistan, progress in rallying the Islamic states could have intensified the feelings of Muslim unity among the population, could have distracted their attention from internal difficulties, stabilized the country's internal political situation, and thus strengthened the position of the ruling classes. The implementation of these plans, however, proved to be no easy matter, and in the end it was impossible for many reasons (one of them was the fact that the other states had no desire to recognize Pakistan's pretensions to the role of leader in the Muslin world).[5]

As a result, from the beginning of the 1950s, Pakistan's leaders began all the more to pin their hopes on the strongest of the Western countries, the United States.[6] In turn, the latter, after the conclusion of the civil war in China and the proclaiming of the PRC, began to assign a special place in their policy to South Asia. Pakistan's significance in this policy especially increased after it became clear that India would not take part in the plans to establish blocs in this region, and would pursue a policy of nonalignment. The large role assigned to Pakistan in the plans of the United States was determined by its important strategic position at the junction of the countries

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[4]See *Foreign Policy of Pakistan. An Analysis*, Karachi, 1964, pp. 66-68.

[5]For more detail, see Yu. V. Gankovsky, L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, Moscow, 1964.

[6]The Pakistan ruling group was interested in such alliances as would further strengthen its position within the country in the face of the growing opposition movement; would grant them substantial means for overcoming economic (specifically food) difficulties (which would make it possible to delay the carrying out of reforms and reorganizations of various spheres in the life of the society), for consolidating and expanding the state and military bureaucratic machine, the police, and the army. Pakistan's orientation in the process of "searching for friends" was to no small extent determined by the anti-communism and anti-Sovietism of the Pakistan leaders at that time. Obliged to proceed in that period to develop ties with the Soviet Union, it did this unwillingly, making use of any possibility of slowing down the process. See I. Kompantsev, *Pakistani Sovetskij Şoyuz* (Pakistan and the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1970, pp. 26-27.

of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, in direct proximity with the borders of the USSR and the PRC, and by its considerable human and natural resources. Pakistan was conceived as a means of putting pressure on India, in order to make her give up the policy of nonalignment. Finally, with the aid of this Muslim country, the Western powers counted on strengthening their influence over the other Muslim states, and even on influencing the Muslims of the Soviet Union and the PRC.[7]

In 1950-1953, a series of agreements were signed on American aid to Pakistan. Already these agreements imposed definite obligations on Pakistan. The agreement of May 19, 1954, "The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement," bound Pakistan to United States policy seriously.

Simultaneously, at the beginning of the 1950s, the elements of neutralism in Pakistan's foreign policy were weakening; Pakistan was more and more oriented toward the Western powers, especially the United States. The actual entrance into the bloc was therefore no turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy, but an action ensuing logically from the process of onesided orientation which had already begun, and in turn, naturally reinforcing this process. Therefore, with Pakistan's entrance into the bloc, one can speak authoritatively of the end of its period of formal neutralism in the sense that in the entire preceding period it had been a formally nonaligned country. The neutralist elements in Pakistan's foreign policy were, however, significant only in the early years of its existence (although there were strong opposing elements), when the "search for friends" was going on. It seems to us that this search, in fact, to a considerable extent also determined Pakistan's neutrality, causing it at that time to be quite restricted, and chiefly obligated (even in the literature of Pakistan this period is sometimes called the period of "uncertain," "passive" neutrality).[8] At the beginning of the 1950s, in the foreign policy of Pakistan, the elements opposed to neutralism grew stronger. It does not, therefore, seem reasonable to us to single out the initial period as an independent period in Pakistan's foreign policy, although it of course occupies a special place in the history of Pakistan's foreign policy up to the beginning of the 1960s, when an important change took place in the line of Pakistan's foreign policy under the influence of a combination of internal and external factors, chief of which were the changes in the social structure of the ruling group.

The foreign policy activity of the Pakistan state attests to the fact that its foreign policy was not only the complex result of the action of a set of values of varying significance, but was never uniform, and was a complex phenomenon in which, along with the elements predominating at a given stage, there also existed different, opposing elements. The transition to a new period of

[7]George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade," *Asian Survey*, VIII:5, May 1968, p. 406.

[8]See, for example, Samin Khan, *Pakistan: Ideology, Constitution, Laws, Foreign Policy*, Karachi, 1961, p. 102.

foreign policy was accomplished gradually; the elements which were in opposition to the leading trend grew stronger and, in the end, turned into the chief course of foreign policy, while the elements which had determined it before became secondary, but did not disappear, causing the complexity and multifarious nature of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Let us examine the foreign policy of Pakistan in the 1950s after the agreement with the United States and entrance into the bloc. The fact that in these years Pakistan followed the course of the Western powers is generally acknowledged. M. Ayub Khan, for example, in his political autobiography, *Friend not Masters*, notes that by the time of its coming to power, the "political identification of the country [Pakistan] with the West was complete."[9] The well known scholar K. B. Sayeed considers Pakistan to have been practically in the position of a satellite of the United States during these years.[10] But, if one simply states the onesidedness of Pakistan's orientation in this period and restricts oneself to this, it will indicate that this question has not been considered in all of its complexity and variety. For even in this period elements existed in Pakistan's foreign policy which differed from its general tendency. This was caused by such factors as the unpopularity in the country of the onesidedness of its foreign policy; the intensification of the competition between the Western monopolies and the growing national bourgeoisie and its interest in the diversification of Pakistan's foreign ties and in additional sources of aid; the difference in the positions of Pakistan and the Western powers with respect to the trend of the blocs; Afro-Asian solidarity; the growth of the power of the socialist system, etc. All of these factors were precisely those which in the final analysis led to the change in Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1960s. Pakistan's attitude on a number of problems did not coincide with that of its Western allies. Especially significant were the divergences on problems which were disturbing the whole "Third World." Despite the general negative attitude toward the development of multiple ties with the socialist countries, the Pakistani ruling circles, in this period, proceeded to extend those ties. In 1956, for example, Pakistan signed trade agreements with a number of socialist countries. On June 27, 1956, the first trade agreement was concluded between Pakistan and the USSR (up until then trade between them had been carried on through individual contracts), which provided for a mutual concession of most favored nation status; the item in the agreement which stipulated that all trade payments should be made in Pakistani rupees was extremely important. Pakistan had as a rule carried its accounts for trade transactions with other countries in foreign currency. For several years after this agreement was concluded, the volume of Pakistan-Soviet trade somewhat increased, remaining, however, extremely

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[9]M. Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca, 1967, p. 116.

[10]K. B. Sayeed, "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs*, XLI:2, 1968, pp. 233, 240.

insignificant by absolute and relative standards (approximately one percent of Pakistan's foreign trade turnover).[11]

The change in Pakistan's foreign policy line in the 1960s was caused by the intensive processes which had taken place during the more than ten years of the state's development, and by intensification of the contradiction between the needs of the independent development of Pakistan society and the different forms of dependence on foreign powers. The onesided orientation toward these countries also had an undesirable effect on the interests of a large portion of the ruling classes, which underwent a certain evolution during the initial period of Pakistan's development.

It should especially be noted that in spite of the existing obstacles there was a growth of the economy during this period, especially in industrial production. The private sector of the national economy also expanded and grew stronger. A concentration of production and capital took place.[12] This meant a strengthening of the economic positions of the ruling classes, an increase in their incomes and riches; their political forms of government also grew stronger—with the aid of the Western allies the state, military and political machine also expanded and grew stronger. The position of the ruling classes as a whole consolidated in comparison with what it had been during the early years of Pakistan's existence; this made possible a more independent course for the state.

Important shifts also took place in the ruling classes themselves. The development of capitalist enterprise and the quite rapid growth rates of industrial production caused the strengthening of the national industrial and trade-industrial bourgeoisie, as well as an extension of the entrepreneurial activity of the landowners, especially its quite numerous middle strata[13]—i.e., the group which engaged in capitalist economy, but was as a rule deprived of these semifeudal privileges which the leading landowners had at their disposal. After the 1958 change in power, it was precisely these groups which began to determine Pakistan's state policy. They were interested in weakening the dependence of the country's reproduction process on foreign monopolies, in creating the basic sectors of heavy industry, in expanding the home market, and in a more versatile and rapid development of the economy (in the period before 1959-1960, the average yearly growth rāte of the gross product was only 2.5%).[14] It was for precisely these aims that the new government carried out a series of reforms in various spheres of the

[11]See the *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 9:4, 1970, p. 60; *Pakistan Basic Facts*, 1965-66, Rawalpindi, 1966, p. 73.

[12]See S. Levin, *Formizovanie krupnoi burzhuazii Pakistana* (The Formation of the Upper Bourgeoisie in Pakistan), Moscow, 1970, pp. 114-117.

[13]These processes are studied in detail in works by the Soviet Pakistanist V. G. Rastyannikov. See V. G. Rastyannikov, S. A. Kuz'min, *Problemy ekonomiki Pakistana* (Problems in Pakistan's Economy), Moscow, 1958, pp. 93-128; V. G. Rastyannikov, "Tekhnicheskaya baza sel'skogo khozyaystva Pakistana" (The Technological Basis of Agriculture in Pakistan) in the collection, *Pakistan: Istoriya i ekonomika* (Pakistan: Its History and its Economy), Moscow, 1959, pp. 95-96.

[14]*Pakistan Economic Survey. 1966-67*, Rawalpindi, 1967 (Statistical Section) pp. 2-3.

domestic life of the society. It is natural that it was these interests of the ruling circles that also determined their foreign policy.

Pakistan's onesided orientation weakened its position in the world market; it made it extremely sensitive to the slightest fluctuation in the economy of the Western powers (this sensitivity was shown to be especially negative for Pakistan in 1957-1958 when there was an economic recession in the capitalist world), and defenseless before the actions of the monopolies; it reinforced Pakistan's role as a supplier of raw material and a consumer of the finished products of developed capitalist countries, when its growing national industry needed market sales; it hindered the trend of foreign capital activity in the country in a way desirable for the national bourgeoisie; finally, this position deprived Pakistan of the possibility of making use of, in the words of the *Pakistan Times*, "the result of the competition of the two world giants."[15] The above mentioned groups of ruling classes in authority in Pakistan began to pursue a course directed toward weakening the dependence on the Western allies, establishing conditions for cooperation with them which were more profitable for themselves, and using the struggles of the two world systems and the keen competition within the capitalist system.

Following along with the policy of the Western allies led to a certain drop in Pakistan's authority and significance on the international scene and to its isolation, which was not convenient for the ruling circles. This position for Pakistan aroused special dissatisfaction among broad strata of the population. Pakistan's participation in the plans and activities of the Pentagon excited great apprehension in the country. The lengths to which this participation went was shown by Pakistan's participation in the 1960 American U-2 spy flights over Soviet territory.

External factors too exerted a strong influence on the change in the foreign policy line of Pakistan: a certain modification in the United States' policy in the Subcontinent, the rise and aggravation of tension in Sino-Indian relations, etc. An intensification in Pakistan's foreign policy of the tendencies toward strengthening independence, breaking away from its onesided orientation, and extending cooperation on the international scene was promoted by the success of the peaceloving foreign policy of the USSR, which dispelled the myth of the "Soviet threat" created by apologists of "the cold war." Let us note that the changes in Pakistan's foreign policy strategy were part of an over-all process of "equalizing" in the foreign policy of many of the developing countries (the reason for which were approximately the same factors of an internal and external order as in Pakistan). Under these conditions Pakistan exerted a definite influence on other states. In turn, it was subject to an influence on their part, which was especially important, if one bears in mind, for example, a country like Iran—Pakistan's neighbor and ally.

An extremely important circumstance which should be remembered when

[15] *The Pakistan Times*, October 27, 1962.

considering this topic, and which requires a special explanation, is the fact that, in contrast to the domestic policy, the changes in foreign policy did not begin immediately after the new government of M. Ayub Khan had come to power. The internal reforms began following the events in October 1958; the commission for carrying out agrarian reforms was formed at the end of October, and announcement was made of the reform in January 1959; in the same month a new policy in the sphere of trade began to be implemented, the next month in industry, etc. At the same time, in the early years of its activity the new regime followed the former line of foreign policy. In this period the government of M. Ayub Khan came out as an opponent of neutrality, as a true ally of the Western powers, and as an active participant in all of the military measures of SEATO, and of the Central Treaty Organization. In a speech in Karachi on December 25, 1958, on the celebration of the birthday of M. A. Jinnah, M. Ayub Khan stated: "We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady, dependable friends."[16] In 1959 a "Friendship and Trade" agreement, which American monopolies had tried to achieve previously, was concluded with the United States; the same year a new military agreement was signed with the United States. In general, the end of the 1950s was a period of the flourishing of Pakistani-American relations. At the same time, it was the period of the worst relations between Pakistan and China. There was also unfriendliness in the policy of the Pakistan government in its relations with the USSR and other socialist states.

How can one explain the fact that the changes in the foreign policy did not begin immediately after the new groups of ruling classes came to power but later, when the basic domestic reforms had been proclaimed and were being implemented? It can apparently be explained by the fact that changes in state policy most often begin with the domestic policy; the chief factor, however, obviously lay in the specific situation in Pakistan at that time. The 1958 coup took place under conditions of acute economic and social tension and political crisis. Therefore the chief object of concern and activity for the new government lay in domestic problems, the need to ease internal tension, and the solution of problems which had long ago been created by the entire course of development of Pakistan society. The point here is not only the fact that in such a situation the government did not "have time" for foreign policy, although this did happen.[17] The basic reason was that the attainment of the main object—settling the internal problems—was conceived by the new Pakistan government by means of certain reforms in various internal spheres of the life of the society, with invariability in the foreign policy, an alliance with the Western powers, and support from the United States, and

[16] M. Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol. 1, October 1958-June 1959, p. 28.

[17] This was illustrated by the curtailment of the general volume of foreign policy activity engaged in by the government, above all the considerable decrease in such a form of it as reciprocal official visits by the rulers of Pakistan and foreign states. For approximately a year after coming to power, the new Pakistan leaders practically did not leave the country (nor did they receive leaders from foreign states).

American economic and military aid. The latter was especially important, since the leaders of the army, which depended on United States military equipment, were at the head of the new Pakistan government. The new tendencies in Pakistan's foreign policy began to be consolidated when the authorities succeeded, through a series of reforms, in achieving some internal stabilization.[18] By this time the influence of the above examined external factors, the significance of which we in no way underestimate, had intensified.

In foreign scholarly literature one observes an urge to call a certain event a turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy line, and thus to establish a more or less precise date for the change in the state's foreign policy. The Sino-Indian military conflict very often serves as this event. It is natural that in such a case 1962 is named as the date of the change in Pakistan's foreign policy. K. B. Sayeed mentions that "in 1962 Pakistan's disenchantment with the pro-Western alliance crystallized into cordiality towards the Chinese."[19] Such an approach to this problem does not seem fruitful, for in this case there drops out of the subject of study the period which embraces the early 1960s, during which the new elements in foreign policy gained strength, but had not yet become decisive factors (as subsequently happened). They were seemingly in a state of equilibrium with the elements which determined the course of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1950s (in this sense, this period is similar to that at the beginning of the 1950s, but naturally, with a different content). Specifically, this was shown in the fact that in some tendencies the foreign policy had in this period already begun to acquire the features of the new one, but in others, it remained as before. Thus, for example, from the very beginning of the 1960s policies had been outlined toward extending collaboration with the socialist countries (the Soviet-Pakistani negotiations and the signing of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union, in oil and gas exploration, and the change in Pakistan's position in relation to PRC representation in the UN, etc.). At the same time, let us note, the attitude toward the blocs and the commitments which resulted from remaining in them still remained unchanged.[20] Thus, the change in the foreign policy line was in a certain transitional period; such events as the above mentioned treaties with USSR, the positions with respect to China's representation in the UN, and the signing of a number of agreements with the PRC and others, are evidence and testimony of such changes.

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[18] One of the official publications explains directly: "With increasing stability at home, the Revolutionary Government found it possible to devote more attention to improving and stabilizing Pakistan's relations with other countries and thus contributing more effectively to the maintenance and promotion of world peace." (*Towards Consolidation. Two years of the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan*, Karachi, p. 27).

[19] K. B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232.

[20] In December 1960, President M. Ayub Khan, in commenting on the situation in Laos, stated: "If Pakistan (as SEATO member) is called upon to shoulder its burden and responsibility we will never hesitate to do it." (Quoted from an article in K. B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 233). This position was also supported by the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Kadir, at a session of the SEATO Council in March 1961.

Among them, one of the first and most significant testimonies to the change in Pakistan's foreign policy is without a doubt its government's turning, in the summer of 1960, to the USSR for aid in organizing and carrying out the prospecting for oil and gas; the agreement signed in the following year made it possible for Pakistan to create a State Corporation for the development of the oil and gas industry, and to achieve certain concessions from the Anglo-American petroleum companies operating in the country.

The new period in Pakistan's foreign policy activity in the 1960s was a period in which Pakistan became active on the international scene, relinquishing its onesided orientation, developing relations with the great powers on the basis of bilateral equations, and extending various ties with many world states. In this period Pakistan actively entered into the most important problems of the modern day—peace and peaceful coexistence, universal and total disarmament and the ban on atomic weapons, colonialism and neo-colonialism, etc. This course contributed to reinforcing Pakistan's authority and prestige, as was evidenced by its selection as a non-permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the Committee on Disarmament; at the 17th session of the UN General Assembly, the Pakistan representative, Ch. M. Zafrullah Khan, was chosen chairman of this session of the General Assembly, and was subsequently appointed as a judge in the International Court.

The development of various ties between Pakistan and the socialist countries reached significant dimensions. In these years reciprocal visits took place between the leaders of Pakistan and these countries. In 1968 the head of the Soviet government visited Pakistan for the first time; the first visit made by a Pakistan President to the USSR was in 1965. Pakistan concluded a series of trade agreements with the socialist countries, in accordance with which it received needed industrial items, equipment, and agricultural equipment, in exchange for the traditional export products and industrial items (the latter were very important for the development of national industry). With the economic and technical aid of the socialist countries, dozens of large projects were constructed in extremely important sectors of the country's national economy. The help of the socialist countries (in addition to its direct significance) was also important for Pakistan because it obliged the Western powers to resort to certain concessions, to give up the conditions for supplying its aid which had been the most burdensome for Pakistan, and to send its aid to sectors which it had formerly ignored.

In this period, however, there were elements in Pakistan's foreign policy which differed from the general trend and weakened the positive effect of this policy, working to its detriment. Among these elements should be included Pakistan's continued membership in the blocs. Even though Pakistan's attitude toward them changed essentially in this period, nevertheless the very fact that it remained in the blocs imposed certain obligations on it. The continuing tension in its relations with India also exerted a negative, deforming influence on Pakistan's foreign policy.

The negative elements in Pakistan's foreign policy grew stronger at the end of this period—i.e., at the beginning of the 1970s. The influence of the United States and the PRC began to have a noticeable effect on the foreign policy of the country. Such a "bipolar" policy was not conducive to strengthening the independent line of the country's foreign policy nor to overcoming the problems arising on the subcontinent, and did not correspond to Pakistan's national interests. Therefore, after the government of Z. A. Bhutto came to power in December 1971, a certain correction of the state's foreign policy was made.

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THE TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL RELATIONS IN INDEPENDENT INDIA

/ Alexander Chicherov*

The deeply contradictory development of India's economic system, particularly the development of capitalism there at the end of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries—i.e., still under British colonial rule—considerably hastened the processes of *national consolidation* of the peoples of this country, the *formation of a number of nations* in regions which were at the highest level of social, economic and political development, and the appearance of mass democratic movements in defense of the rights of the separate peoples and nations of the country—the Bengalis, Marathas, Telugu, Tamils, Punjabis, and others.[1]

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*The article primarily alludes to works by Soviet authors in order to acquaint the readers with the scope of research in Soviet Indology and Pakistanistics. They were used by the author to formulate a number of theoretical problems connected with determining the principal stages in the development of national relations in India in modern and contemporary history. The works by Soviet scholars which are cited henceforth make numerous references to the extremely broad and varied range of sources, for the problems examined, in the Indian and West European languages. Considering the specific nature of this publication, the author limited the scientific references exclusively to works by his Soviet colleagues, many of whom, especially the associates in the India, Nepal, and Ceylon Division of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, offered advice and criticism which were of great help to the author in his work on this subject.

[1]The historical-economic and cultural-linguistic studies of the past few years permit us to assume that the initial formational stages in a number of nations in the individual regions of the Indian peninsula, and the conception there of its own type of national movements apparently may date from the 17th and 18th centuries. This is connected with the singling out of certain national communities from the mass of peoples who had settled this territory, on the basis of the formation of their *ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and economic unity as a specific and historical* category. Thus, seemingly even *before* the establishment of British colonial rule in India in the second half of the 18th century, the history of the formation here of a number of nations has its beginnings, and in the course of the colonial seizure of the country by the European states, collisions already had taken place between the national—or proto-national—movements which are arising and the foreign economic and political system which gave a special character to the future of forming the nations even in the colonial period. For more detail concerning this, see: A. M. D'yakov, *Natsional'nyy vopros v sovremennoy Indii* (The National Question in Present-Day India), Moscow, 1963; N. I. Semenova, *Istoriya sikkhskogo dvizheniya v Indii* (The History of the Sikh Movement in India), Moscow, 1963; Yu. V. Gankovsky, *Narody Pakistana—osnovnye etapy etnicheskoy istorii* (The Peoples of Pakistan—the Principal Stages in Their Ethnic History), Moscow, 1964; A. I. Chicherov, *Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Indii pered angliyskim zavoyevaniyem—remeslo i torgovlya v XVI-XVIII vv* (The Economic Development of India Before the English Conquest—Crafts and Trade in the 16th to 18th Centuries), Moscow, 1965; V. I. Kazakov, *Bor'ba za cozdaniye natsional'nykh shtatov v nezavisimoy Indii* (The Struggle to Establish National States in Independent India), Moscow, 1967; and others.

Until 1947, however—the eve of independence—these national movements were essentially united and in many ways "overlapped" by the all-Indian struggle of all the peoples for political independence against the common enemy—British colonial rule. Thus, the period from approximately the middle of the 18th to the middle of the 20th century may be singled out as a qualitatively *special historical era* in the development of national relations in India, when the struggle of the various peoples of this country for their national rights was manifested primarily (but not adequately) in the *national liberation movement.*[2]

Within this long historical period, one may apparently distinguish a stage (to approximately the mid-19th century) when the national movements were led primarily by the feudal elements, and the ideas of "feudal nationalism" appeared more predominant, overriding, specifically, the ideology of "peasant nationalism."[3] The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, which were characterized by a considerable development in local capitalistic enterprise in India, apparently signified the coming of a new stage in the national movements, when the primarily *bourgeois elements* would take their stand at the head of the national liberation movement, and the ideology of bourgeois nationalism would begin to dominate in this movement.[4]

The presence of colonial oppression in all its forms—economic, political, and cultural—doubtless exerted a certain inhibiting, conservative influence on the processes of forming the nations in India. Furthermore, and extremely important, the prolonged struggle for independence not only contributed to consolidating the various peoples of India within the national liberation movement as a "single whole," resisting the foreign colonial rule, but also to a certain extent hastened the processes of forming the numerous nations in India, and of the self-realization of each of them as a *special national unity* with ethical, economic, cultural-linguistic, and other specific ties and characteristic features common to this formation precisely, in spite of the fact that within this national community existed the most varied, historically established groups—differing in caste, religion, language, etc.

At the same time, at the new stage of development of national relations, especially in the 1920s and 1940s of the 20th century, and linked with the acceleration in the processes of forming the *multi-national* groups of the Indian business community and the inequality of the socio-economic de-

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[2]For more detail, see *Novaya istoriya Indii* (The Modern History of India), Moscow, 1961; *Noveyshaya istoriya Indii* (The Contemporary History of India), Moscow, 1959; Yu. V. Gankovsky, L. R. Polonskaya, *Istoriya Pakistana*, (A History of Pakistan), Moscow, 1961.

[3]See I. M. Reysner, *Narodnye vosstaniya v Indii v XVII-XVIII vv.* (The Mass Uprising in India 1857-1859), Moscow, 1957.

[4]V. I. Pavlov, *Formirovaniye indiyskoy burzhuazii* (The Formation of the Indian Bourgeoisie), Moscow, 1958; N. M. Gol'dberg, *Ocherki po istorii Indii. Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizheniye v novoye vremya* (Essays on the History of India. The National Liberation Movement in Modern Times), Moscow, 1965; *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noye dvizheniye v Indii i deyatel'nost' B. G. Tilaka* (The National Liberation Movement in India and B. G. Tilak), Moscow, 1958.

velopment of the regions of the country, national contradictions began to appear increasingly *within* the common current of the liberation movement (for example, the struggle of the Tamil Nationalist "Justice" Party against the key position in the liberation movement of the major political party in the country—the Indian National Congress). It is important to stress the negative influence of the ideology and politics of religious communalism over the development of the national relations in India. In this period the Muslim League advanced the theory of "two nations"—i.e., Hindu and Muslim—in order to divide India on the basis of religion, and to create an independent Muslim Pakistan.[5] In addition to the dominant communal ideas in this can be seen the attempt made by the relatively less developed business and feudal groups of a number of national regions in the country (Sind, Punjab, Bengal, and others) which dominated the Muslim League to ensure, within the framework of Muslim Pakistan, their own economic and political interests in the struggle with the more developed strata of the Hindu multinational businessmen, which had the greatest influence on the leaders of the Congress.

The "Jamaat-i Islami" Party, which had rejected the idea of dividing India and demanded that all Hindus turn to Islam, propagated the ideas of extreme Muslim communalism. It is also important to note that the "two nations" theory, which originated not from the position of Muslim but from the ideas of Hindu communalism, was preached by the Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—reactionary organizations which demanded that all the religious communities in India be subordinated to the Hindus, and that a "united and indivisible" country of Hindus be created on this basis.[6] The similar positions of both Muslim and Hindu communalism essentially stemmed from denying the multinational nature of Indian society.

The history of the independent development of Pakistan proved irrefutably that the very concept of a nation based only on a common religion, and denying the actual national differences within this religious "nation," is inevitably linked with reactionary political tendencies, and contains objective soil for intensifying the national conflicts. This was especially convincingly demonstrated by the struggle of the people in East Bengal and

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[5] E. N. Komarov, A. D. Litman, *Mirovozzreniye Mokhandasa Karamchanda Gandi* (The World View of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi), Moscow, 1969; O. V. Martyshin, *Politicheskiye vzglyady Mokhandasa Karamchanda Gandi* (The Political Views of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi), Moscow, 1970; L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *Musul'manskiye techeniya v obshchestvennoy mysli Indii i Pakistana (kritika "musul'manskogo natsionalizma")* [The Muslim Currents in the Social Thought of India and Pakistan (A Critique of "Muslim Nationalism")], Moscow, 1963.

[6] A. U. Akhmedzyanov, A. M. D'yakov, "Politicheskaya ideologiya indusskikh religiozno-obshchinnykh partiy," in the collection *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya i filosofskaya mysl' Indii* (Socio-Political and Philosophical Thought in India), Moscow, 1962; *Pakistan. Spravochnik* (Pakistan. A Reference Book), Moscow, 1966.

by the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh.[7] Naturally, the reactionary forces, and especially the colonial authorities, succeeded in using this type of national or religious conflict, as well as others in the liberation movement, to split and weaken it.

The period of Indian independent development created *qualitatively different* conditions for extending the national movements of the peoples of India, and for the beginning of a *new* stage in the development of their national relations. The conflicts of the different peoples in the country with imperialism were maintained under conditions of political independence, for the *national* exploitation of the liberated countries continued (under new conditions), mainly through utilization of the social and economic backwardness of these countries. The important aspect of the national movements under conditions of independence thus appears when they are connected primarily with the processes of carrying out the democratic reforms which intensify the struggle for economic independence, for strengthening the political independence of the country, and for social progress.

The rapid development of capitalism in the country during the 1950s and 1960s caused a considerable acceleration in the processes of national consolidation of the different peoples of India. The main slogans of the national movements in this period were the demands for establishing so-called "linguistic states" formed on the basis of territories primarily inhabited by one nation, speaking one language. These demands became the programs for the mass democratic movements of many of the peoples in the country. They were not only actively supported, but also advanced by the local "young" business groups of the various nations (Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Punjabi, and others), who were trying to strengthen their positions in the state apparatus, to struggle for dominance in "their own" local national market against those "old," more developed and powerful monopolistic groups (by birth primarily from the regions of northwestern India), which even under British rule had spread their influence in many regions of the country, and now frequently came out as an "other national" power where the national movements were developing rapidly.

An important feature of this stage of the national movements was preservation of leadership, in general, by the ruling party, the Indian National Congress (INC). Within the INC, democratic groups, which were as a rule supported by the mass movements in different national regions, succeeded in creating some new "linguistic states," surmounting the serious opposition of the conservative forces which were connected specifically with the "other national" vested interests. This was necessary both in the interests of strengthening the unity of the country on a federal basis and preserving authority in the hands of the economically predominant forces, and for the future development of the nations and the safeguarding of their national rights.

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[7] V. N. Moskalenko, *Problemy sovremennogo Pakistana*, (The Problems of Present-Day Pakistan), Moscow, 1972.

Thus, the fulfillment of these national demands also determined the content of a number of extremely important reforms in the state structure in India in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, which meant abolishing the bases of the old feudal-colonial administrative structure and establishing a qualitatively new federal and multinational Union of states.[8] These processes have even yet not been totally completed. The appearance of all the new states (in 1960 there were 14, and now 21) on the map of India and the demands constantly being brought by the various peoples concerning their being granted rights of autonomy, etc., continue to be an area of political struggle in India today.

Nevertheless, from approximately the end of the 1960s, a *new period* in the development of national relations in India seems to have been starting. The problem of *economic and political rights for the states*, i.e., for the basic national complexes *within* the Indian Union is becoming a central issue (which does not exclude the existence of a number of other demands: for self-determination, autonomy, etc.). It is precisely the problem of reciprocal relations between the states and the center (the Union government), which includes all the basic principles of the federal structure of the Indian Union: political problems, economic structure, language, culture, law, etc., which has, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, become an important object of political and class struggle in the country, determining the extremely important trends of the national question in present-day India.

It is natural that the very origin of the social problem of reciprocal relations between the states and the center, and of their rights and powers dates back to the early years of independence; this was reflected particularly in the political discussions around these questions when India's constitution was created and when the bases for its federative structure were being determined. But in this period, the problems of territorial unity for the principal national complexes of the country were at the heart of the national demands. At the same time, the existence of an actual monopoly of political power in the hands of the INC in both the center and almost all the states of the country permitted the leaders of the ruling party to solve the problems arising in this sphere in the 1950s and early 1960s with relatively no special complications.[9] The first serious problems for this mechanism occurred as early as 1957-1959, when in the state of Kerala the government operated under the guidance of the communists for the first time.[10] The development of a grave crisis in the political power of the Congress party in the second half of the 1960s contributed to the fact that the questions of the reciprocal

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[8]For more detail see T. F. Devyatkina, *Likvidatsiya knyazhestv v sovremennoy Indii* (The Abolishment of Local States in Present-Day India), Moscow, 1961.

[9]See T. F. Devyatkina, *Indiyskiy natsional'nyy kongress (1947-1964)* [The Indian National Congress (1947-1964)], Moscow, 1970.

[10]See P. V. Kutsobin, *Sovremennaya Indiya. Rasstanovka klassovykh i politicheskikh sil* (Present-Day India. The Alignment of Class and Political Forces), Moscow, 1963.

relations between the states and the center began to turn into a crucial economic and political problem.

This new stage in the development of these national relations is to a considerable extent determined by a number of factors which characterize the general social, economic and political principles of India's development at the end of the 1960s. Among these should especially be noted the considerable intensification of the democratic movement, which reflected the sharpened dissatisfaction among the working masses with the authority of the Congress with the worsening of their economic conditions, the deepening of social inequality, the strengthening of the monopolies, etc. At the same time, considerable sharpening of the conflicts within the national business class is noted, particularly between its developed and strengthened monopolistic strata, which strives for subordination of the state-capitalist mechanism to its selfish interests, and the numerically predominant lower groups of the middle class. The latter are represented by the developing multinational business community on the level of the states. Many of them demand a certain reorientation of the economic policy and the whole state sector of the national economy so that they may to a greater extent favor the growth of the small-scale and medium-sized entrepreneurs, and their struggle with the predominating positions of the upper monopolistic (and on the level of the states, frequently "other national") groups.

While at the preceding stage of the national movements the ruling Congress party was seemingly a cementing force for the Indian union, the picture was different by the end of the 1960s. The oligarchic tendencies in the activity of many state organizations in the Congress, subordination of their policy to the interests of the "other national" conservative monopolistic forces, and finally, the similar trend in the policy of the reactionary party bosses in the center (the "Syndicate" group)—all combined to cause many local national bourgeois groups to come out against the ruling party, having strengthened the many parties on the level of the states which opposed the Congress, and also having split the local organizations of the INC.

It was precisely these factors that brought about a serious crisis in the one-party power of the INC as a result of the general elections of 1967, and also caused the strengthening of the local "state" parties opposing the Congress, such as the Dravida Munetra Karagam in Madras (Tamilnadu), Akali Dal in Punjab, etc., and the establishment in nine of the 16 states in 1967-1969 of non-Congress coalition governments.[11]

The very important preconditions in order to fulfill this task were created during the general elections in 1971-1972, when the Congress strengthened its positions in the Union Parliament and the legislative assemblies in the

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[11]See for more detail E. N. Komarov, A. I. Chicherov, "*Tendentsii politicheskogo razvitiya sovremennoy Indii,*" (The Tendencies in the Political Development of Present-Day India), in the collection, *Ideologicheskiye problemy sovremennoy Indii* (The Ideological Problems of Present-Day India), Moscow, 1970.

most important states. An important feature distinguishing this present stage in the development of the national relations in India was the prominent place taken by the social and economic demands connected to the need for serious improvement in the position of the laboring masses, which had not been characteristic for the preceding stage.

It would seem that one of the important reasons for the fact that the progressive forces in the Congress, headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, were used in 1969 to split the ruling party and to oust the conservative "Syndicate" group from the party "high command" was the attempt to return to the INC the support of broad strata of the multinational bourgeois business groups and of the sizeable detachments of the democratic movement in the states, and to once again make the policy of the Congress an instrument for uniting the multinational country on the basis of progressive social and economic reforms.[12]

The fact that the government of Indira Gandhi has, during the last two years, created four new states—Meghalaya, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura, and several new union territories, and that it is trying to carry out a more flexible policy with respect to the needs of the states, in a number of cases meeting their economic and other demands halfway, indicates that the "new course" of the government of Indira Gandhi is taking into account the process of developing the economic, political, social, and cultural links among the different peoples and nations of the Union, and thus trying to preserve the united and the basic features of the federal system of the country. Nevertheless, some of the radically inclined groups are advancing demands for a change in the bases of this federal system, feeling that it serves as an instrument for "perpetuating the power" of the INC in the center and prevents the necessary economic progress of the national states.

The separate groups of multinational bourgeoisie are insisting on providing the states with special rights and privileges, demanding sometimes practically disintegration of the Indian Union. All types of political methods are used for this. For example, the southern Indian Tamil nationalistic circles, at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, engaged in a struggle to reinforce their positions in the local market against the representatives of the northern Indian monopolistic groups which wield considerable influence in the economy in the south of India, and, trying to obtain the support of the mass movement, began increasingly actively to advance the slogans of struggle with the "imperialism of the north" and "Hindi-imperialism." Moreover, use was made of the fact that the local population, which spoke Tamil, had a strongly negative attitude toward the central government's practical steps to make Hindi, which is spoken by the people in a number of northern and central regions in India, the language

[12]For more detail see E. N. Komarov, "*Indiya: novyy rubezh,*" (India: the New Stage), in the collection, *Sovremennaya Indiya. K 25-letiyu nezavisimosti* (Present-Day India. On its 25 years of Independence), Moscow, 1972.

of communication among the different states of the Union. Furthermore, the nationalistic political organization, Dravida Munetra Karagam (DMK—the Progressive Dravidanand Federation) advanced in this period, as a programmed separatist slogan, the establishment of an "independent Dravidanadu State"—a "Socialist Federation" of southern states—Madras, Kerala, Andhra, and Mysore—settled by Dravidian peoples (in contrast to the northern Indian peoples, who belonged to the Indo-Iranian group).[13]

This demand also showed the distinct expansionist economic interests of the growing Tamil business class who were trying to bring under their influence not only the strictly Tamilnadu territory (Madras), but also the entire southern regions of the country—that is, by using some of the advantages of their economic development to carry out economic exploitation of the other Dravidian peoples too. Thus, in coming out against the so-called "imperialist" positions of the northern Indian monopolistic groups in the south of the country, the Tamil bourgeoisie tried to replace these groups in the economic and correspondingly political exploitation of a number of national regions of the Dravidian south of India. It was important that the Tamil nationalists advanced these demands as early as the 1930s and 1940s, when the colonial yoke was in existence and the national liberation movement was developing in the country. It was precisely this sharp nationalist propaganda which aided the DMK party in dealing a crushing defeat to the ruling INC in Madras at the general elections in 1967 and in forming in this state (the present Tamilnadu) its own single-party government.

It is important to note that the DMK party after 1963 withdrew its demand for separation from India. Nevertheless, under today's conditions in this party there is a tendency to bring about a thorough change in the constitution of the country with a view to considerably expanding the rights of the states, to the detriment of the rights of the Union Government. In a special Rajamannar Commission Report prepared according to a resolution of the DMK government, demands are being brought to abolish the supreme rights of the central government and the Parliament in all the principal spheres of the economic, political, legal, and cultural life of the country, and to transfer these rights to the states, retaining for the Central Government only the functions of defense and foreign relations.[14]

In opposition to this tendency is another one which dominated recent political development of the country—the attempt of the ruling circles to bring about the consolidation of India's unity on the basis of preserving their political and economic power in the country as a whole. Used for this purpose are the ties developing within the framework of capitalism between

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[13]For more detail see N. I. Semenova, "*Programmnye ustanovki partii 'Dravida munetra kazhagam'*" (The Program of the 'Dravida Munetra Karagam' Party), in the collection, *Ideologicheskiye techeniya sovremennoy Indii* (The Ideological Tendencies in Present-Day India), Moscow, 1965.

[14]"The Report of the Center—State Relations Inquiry Committee. Government of Tamilnadu 1971," Madras, 1971.

the various regions of the country, the peculiar "integration" of the various national complexes into the united system of a modern multinational federative state, with the satisfaction of certain rights of the separate peoples or nations in the country. The growing state sector of the country's economy plays an important centralizing, unifying role in this process. The government of Indira Gandhi, while satisfying certain demands of the developing national relations, is at the same time intensifying the struggle against the artificial arousing of nationalistic, chauvinistic, and communalistic sentiments and separatist tendencies, which hinder the implementation of the democratic social, economic, and political measures outlined by the government.

The development of the national relations in India since independence thus shows a number of very important achievements in solving the national question on a basis within the framework of an independent multinational federal state, but national problems continue to remain the object of sharp intrapolitical struggle.

The progressive and democratic forces in the country are coming out for the adoption of more effective measures against the great power chauvinism which is rearing its head, and the various forms of separatism, the adherents of which are not only the representatives of rightist forces but also the radical nationalist and Maoist elements. The progressive organizations are coming out in favor of further democratic solutions to the national question in the country, including increasing the rights of the states, which should not be to the detriment of the national interests of the country as a whole, and of all its peoples.[15]

Acquiring an important positive significance in determining the democratic positions on the extremely complex problems of national development of independent India is the historic experience of solving the national question in the USSR, although the differences in principle in the overall structure should naturally be taken into consideration. The Soviet Union's achievements in solving the immense problems of raising the economic structures and cultures of the formerly backward and exploited national regions of Czarist Russia made a tremendous impression on advanced thinkers in India even in the years of the national liberation movement. One of the first to acquaint the Indian community with the achievements of the USSR in this sphere, and to call upon the Indians to study this experience carefully, was the great Indian writer, Rabindranath Tagore, who stressed the fact that it was the socialist revolution and power for the workers which had brought national liberation to the peoples of Russia. In his famous *Letters on Russia*, written after visiting the Soviet Union in 1930, Rabindranath Tagore noted, specifically: "The time has not yet come

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[15]For more detail see *Problemy kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya v Indii* (The Problems of the Communist Movement in India), Moscow, 1971; L. P. Ul'yanova, *Indiya: pravovoye polozheniye shtatov* (India: The Constitutional Positions of the States), Moscow, 1972.

to draw definite conclusions, but I could not help but be impressed by everything that I saw.... How much concern has been shown, what tremendous energy has been expended, so that not one person should feel useless and unsuitable for work. Not just in Belorussia, but even among the semicivilized peoples of Central Asia they [the leaders of the country—A. Ch.] are spreading education with rapid strides. There is no limit to their untiring energy, directed toward opening the way for these peoples to the heights of science."[16]

India's eminent political leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, also wrote of the achievements made by the USSR in solving the national question. In his *Autobiography*, written in 1940, Nehru stressed that, "by following the precepts of the great Lenin," gigantic forces had been put to work in the Soviet Union in the sphere of solving the national question. "I was particularly impressed," wrote Nehru, "by the reports of the great progress achieved under Soviet authority in the backward regions of Central Asia. Therefore, in the last analysis, I was wholeheartedly on the side of Russia; the existence and example of the Soviet Union was a bright and gratifying phenomenon in a dark and gloomy world. . . ."[17] Nehru emphasized the combination of international and national features in the world view of the Soviet nation, which was created by the socialist revolution.[18]

It is indicative that under the conditions of independent India, interest has considerably increased in the Soviet experience in solving the national question. For example, in the mid-1950s, when the country was faced with the problem of reorganizing the states on a national basis, the Indian government sent representatives to the USSR to study its experience in solving "linguistic problems." In the official documents prepared after this trip, it was noted that the USSR is an important example of a successful solution to the problems connected with the multinational composition of the population.[19]

In our time, at the new stage of development of national relations in India, under conditions which aggravate the class and general democratic struggle in the country, the progressive forces are trying to make creative use of the great experience of the Soviet Union to determine their positions in solving the complex problems of national development in independent India.

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[16] R. Tagore, *Letters on Russia*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 10-11.
[17] J. Nehru, *Autobiography*, Moscow, 1955, p. 383.
[18] J. Nehru, *The Opening of India*, Moscow, 1955, p. 567.
[19] "Report of the Official Language Commission," New Delhi, 1957, p. 481.

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THE USSR EXPERIENCE IN SOLVING THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE LIBERATED COUNTRIES OF THE EAST

/ Gulam Muradov

Almost two thirds of the world population lives in the countries of the East. All of the great (or primary) human races are represented here. The ethnic as well as the religious composition of the population is notable for its great complexity. In spite of the processes, accelerated during recent decades, of consolidating the small and very small ethnic groups, tribes, and nationalities into relatively large national communities, ethnographers still place the number of large and small ethnic groups in this area in the hundreds. The majority of the countries of the East have an ethnically nonhomogeneous population. Moreover, within the individual states there sometimes live dozens of peoples (for example, there are no less than 150 in Indonesia, about 90 in the Philippines, over 70 in India, etc.). Only Korea, Somaliland, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and a few other Arab states have a relatively homogeneous ethnic composition.

An important feature of the ethnic map of the East is the fact that for a number of reasons (the roots of which usually lie in the historical past), often the political boundaries here do not coincide with the ethnic ones. As a result, the territories settled by many large and small ethnic groups are split by political cordons, and these peoples themselves live within the borders of different states.

This ethnic nonhomogeneousness of the population and the features of the settlements of many peoples produce numerous intra- and interstate conflicts and complications. Frequently these conflicts are intensified by the open or disguised meddling of former colonial powers, which are trying to compensate for the loss of direct political power in the former colonies by spreading various forms of indirect domination.

Although the disintegration of the colonial system and the formation of the young sovereign states have created objective possibilities for overcoming the conflicts and hostility between nations, numerous obstacles stand in the way of realizing these possibilities. The tension in the relations between the nationalities (frequently complicated by uneven levels of social and economic development and national consolidation of the different peoples, as well as by racial or religious conflicts), is an actual fact in the political life of many of the states in the East.

The struggle to find a democratic solution to the national question, to

abolish all forms of national or national-religious discrimination, and to eliminate the actual inequality in economic, cultural, and administrative spheres between the peoples who inhabit these states often moves to the forefront of their political life. The national question may be more or less intense, and may take different forms, but it makes itself felt in many countries of the East.

It should be noted that the national question also occupies an extremely important place in the political life of many highly developed capitalist countries. It is not by chance that many political figures are even inclined to regard nationalism as the strongest political force in the world.

Under the conditions of the steady growth of the role of the states of the East in the world today, surmounting the grim heritage of the colonial past in the sphere of relations between the people becomes extremely important. A democratic solution to the national question contributes to the strengthening of the integrity and sovereignty of the young states, and promotes a democratic solution to other pressing problems of independent development.

"Tsarist Russia," wrote V. I. Lenin in December 1914, "is justly called the prison of the peoples."[1] The yoke of tsarist oppression and the bourgeois-landlord kabalas had oppressed all of the peoples in our country, but it was the people of the outlying colonial districts, who had also experienced the burden of national and national-religious discrimination, who suffered especially deeply.

In spite of the historic progressiveness of including Central Asia and the Transcaucasus as part of Russia, which was noted by K. Marx and F. Engels, and the voluntary annexation of a few other territories, the outlying national districts of the Russian empire had by the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries been turned into colonies for Russian capitalism. On the eve of the revolution, 38.5% of the non-Russian population of tsarist Russia lived in the stage of precapitalist relationships. Tsarism held back the social, economic and cultural development of the outlying national districts. As a result, the European areas of the Russian empire on the whole developed more rapidly than did the Asian areas, and the differences in the level of their development did not smooth out, but increased. While in 1896 the central industrial region of the empire (Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tver', Tula, Nizhniy Novgorod)—2.1% of the territory and 13.5% of the population—produced 22% of the country's entire industrial output, in 1913 it was already 37.1%.[2] All of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, and Dagestan had only three cities with a population of over 100,000, and at the beginning of the 20th century produced only half as many industrial items as Vladi-

[1] V. I. Lenin, "On the National Pride of the Great Russians," *Poln. sobraniye soch.* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 26, p. 107.

[2] I. Baranskiy, *Economic Geography of the Soviet Union. Survey on the Sectors of Gosplan*, Moscow, Leningrad, 1926, p. 70, pp. 259-260.

mirskaya province alone (and if the Baku region, with its oil, is excluded, then it was eight times less!).

Industrial enterprises were established on the territory of the outlying national districts chiefly to mine the natural minerals, and the local workers were severely exploited. For example, in 1909, in the Safed-Dar'insk Mine (Bukhara), which belonged to P. Zhuravo-Pokorsky, according to official data only 220 rubles and 50 kopeks were spent for the wages for 591 workers, i.e., less than for heating and lighting the mine, which came to 537 rubles, 34 kopeks.[3]

Of the 105 institutions of higher education, 98 were in the European part of Russia. In Central Asia there was no VUZ (higher educational institution) for two million inhabitants, and there was only one secondary school. In the entire region of Turkestan there were only 105 elementary schools, with 209 teachers (furthermore, only three schools held instruction in the local languages as well as in Russian). Less than 5% of the children completed the full course in the elementary school. In the entire Syr'-Dar'ya province in 1897 there was not one local inhabitant with more than an elementary school education.[4] In Armenia, only one of 246 local inhabitants attended elementary school. The picture was the same in Azerbaydzhan (one out of 240). It is not surprising that over 90% of the indigenous population of Siberia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus was illiterate; more than 40 nationalities in tsarist Russia did not even have their own written language.

The national oppression was burdened by a lack of political rights; racial and religious discrimination, which assumed the most barbarous and ugly forms; remnants of serfdom and the patriarchal-feudal relations; and the tyranny of tsarism and its colonial administration. The peoples of the outlying colonial districts, constituting 56.7% of the population of the empire numerically,[5] peoples who had a glorious historical past and a rich and distinctive culture, were contemptuously slighted as "alien tribes" and subjected to forced Russification on the part of the orthodox missionaries and tsarist officials. It is not surprising that the national question was one of the sharpest and most complex problems in prerevolutionary Russia. Vladimir I. Lenin devoted tremendous attention to working out the theoretical and practical aspects of this problem from the first steps of his revolutionary activity. (The first work to contain a presentation of the initial provisions of the national program of the revolutionary proletarian party was written by V. I. Lenin as early as 1895-1896, when he was in prison).

The well-composed and polished study on the national and national-colonial question, drawn up by V. I. Lenin and taken as the basis for the national program of the Bolshevik party, had its origin in the need to "*link*

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[3] D. N. Logofet, *The Khanate of Bukhara under the Russian Protectorate*, Vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 268, fn.

[4] *The First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire, 1897*, Pt. 86, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. X-XI.

[5] K. Fortunatov, *The National Provinces of Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 4.

the revolutionary struggle for socialism with the revolutionary program on the national question."[6] This program required that the peoples oppressed by tsarism be given the rights of self-determination, even including separation and formation of their own independent states; abolition of all discrimination, or, on the contrary, of all privileges based on national or religious grounds; guarantee of full equality of all nations and all languages, which would eliminate any infringement upon the rights of the national minorities; absence of a compulsory state language and guarantee that the schools teach in the local languages. A democratic republican structure for the state, broad areal autonomy on a national (ethnic) basis, and democratic local self-government were an absolutely compulsory condition for solution of the national question in Russia. In drawing up the national program of the Bolshevik party, V. I. Lenin pointed out the need to establish actual (not formal) equality between the great and small nations which inhabited the Russian empire. V. I. Lenin stressed the need for the proletarian revolutionaries to engage in daily work on the international education of the laborers and on the eradication of ideas of national exclusiveness, egoism, stagnation, and hostility toward other peoples. Only such untiring work, in combination with broad, consistently democratic reorganization in all the spheres of political, economic, and cultural life could clear the way for uniting the nations of Russia and for socialist rebuilding of the country, for "victorious socialism is impossible without total democracy."[7] "Only sweeping democratic reorganizations can create national peace in the capitalist states," wrote V. I. Lenin, "and only socialism can put an end to national bickering."[8]

"To the old world, the world of national oppression, national bickering, or national isolation," stressed V. I. Lenin, "the workers oppose a new world of the unity of the workers of all nations, in which there is no place for a single privilege nor for the slightest oppression of one human being by another."[9] It should be emphasized that the Bolshevik party, created and directed by V. I. Lenin, was the only political party in tsarist Russia to devise a truly democratic program for the solution of the national question, and to struggle consistently and unswervingly to put it into practice.

While the extremely rightist Great Russian chauvinists, advancing the theory of "nation-landlord" who are "most important in the life and building of the state,"[10] in general denied the "aliens" any rights whatsoever (even the right to have school in their native language) and demanded of

[6] V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-determination," *Complete Coll. Works*, Vol. 27, p. 62.

[7] V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination," *Com. Coll. Works*, Vol. 27, p. 253.

[8] V. I. Lenin, "Theses on the National Question," *Com. Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 322.

[9] V. I. Lenin, "The Working Class and the National Question," *Comp. Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 150.

[10] From the program of the Union of Russian People, section VI (*Collection of the Programs of the Political Parties in Russia*, Pt. VI, SPb., 1906, pp. 13-14).

them the most rapid voluntary assimilation, publicly threatening that "otherwise they should be wiped from the face of the earth."[11] (Furthermore, they denied the Jews even the right to assimilation, demanding that they be declared foreigners and that they be evicted from the country.)[12] The officials of the bourgeois and bourgeois-liberal camp, verbally agreeing that the citizens of the Russian empire should be equal before the law, at the same time either totally rejected even the possibility of giving rights of autonomy to the national outlying districts of Russia[13] (not to mention the right to self-determination), or recognized this right with, however, the important stipulation that it "should not extend beyond recognition of their legal powers on questions of exclusively local importance,"[14] and that the Russian language should be the only state language in the country.[15]

Also serving to deny rights to the peoples of the outlying colonial districts of the Russian empire was the so-called "state nation" theory advanced by the Constitutional Democrats (Pavel N. Milyukov, and others), according to which all "109 nationalities living within Russia" should form a single nation.[16] It is not difficult to see that this theory essentially amounted to an affirmation of the fact that state affiliation (citizenship) was equivalent to a national (ethnic) community, and actually justified discrimination against the peoples enslaved by tsarism.

The leaders of the bourgeois and bourgeois-landlord nationalists from the outlying provinces of the Russian empire joined with the officials of the bourgeois and bourgeois-liberal camp (holding to the great power positions) in their programmed demands and practical activity. Summing up their activity in the third State Duma (1907-1912), the journal *Russkaya Mysl'*, published by the ideologist of the Constitutional Democrats, Peter Struve, noted that the Armenian nationalists went no farther than demands for introducing teaching in the native language into the local schools and proportional representation in the organs of self-government (as the journal emphasized—they even considered autonomy "unthinkable"). The Georgian liberals (Nikolay Chkheidze, and others) theoretically, it is true, acknowledged that the peoples of Russia had the right to self-determination, but in

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[11] From a speech by Markov—2nd in the Third State Duma (quoted from the journal: *Russkaya Mysl'*, Moscow, August 1912, p. 13).

[12] From the "Appeal of the Union of Russian People," section I (*Coll. of the Programs of Polit. Parties in Russia*, Pt. VI, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 20-23). See also: "The Nationalist in the Third State Duma," St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 144.

[13] From the program of the Trade and Industrial Party (*Coll. of the Programs of the Polit. Parties in Russia*, Pt. IV, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 55-56).

[14] From the program of the Democratic Reform Party, section 22 (*Coll. of the Programs of Polit. Parties in Russia*, Pt. IV, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 12-13). The Democratic Reform Party was created at the end of 1905 by M. M. Kovalevsky, K. K. Arsen'ev, M. M. Stasyulevich, D. V. Stasov, and others. They regarded themselves at "Left center."

[15] From the program of the Moderate Progressive Party, section 2 (*Coll. of the Programs of Polit. Parties in Russia*, Pt. IV, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 26).

[16] From a speech made by P. N. Milyukov at the Third State Duma (quoted from the journal: *Russkaya Mysl'*, Moscow, August 1912, pp. 26-27).

practice demanded only schools in the native language. The so-called Muslim nationalists (split into several groups) also limited themselves to raising the question in the Duma concerning proportional representation in local self-government.[17]

Lenin's program for a solution to the national question and the struggle which the Bolshevik party waged to consistently put it into practice had tremendous all-Russian and international significance. The activity of the Bolshevik-Leninists contributed to the liberation of the national masses from the ideological influence of the great power chauvinists and bourgeois nationalists, and to unifying and educating the workers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. It helped to expose the nationalistic programs of the Russian bourgeois parties and the opportunist aims of the revisionist leaders of the Second International, permeated with the spirit of national intolerance and chauvinism. The program drawn up by V. I. Lenin to solve the national question was the basis for the national policy of the Soviet government. Putting it into practice began from the first day of the Soviet State's existence.

On 25 October (7 November) 1917, in an address to the "Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants," the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed that Soviet authority "would ensure all the nations inhabiting Russia the genuine right to self-determination." On the following day, 26 October (8 November) 1917, the Council of People's Commissars issued its first decree, the "Decree on Peace," in which it declared that any annexation "of a small or weak people to a great or strong state without precise, clearly and willingly expressed agreement and desire on the part of this people," regardless of when this annexation had been made, regardless of who was the object, a developed or a backward people, and regardless of where—"in Europe or in the distant trans-oceanic countries"—this people exists, was "by seizure and force."[18]

The "Decree on Peace" recognized, for any people "contained in the borders of this state by coercion," the sacred right to decide by vote "with complete withdrawal of the troops of the annexing or generally stronger nation" the question of the forms of its state existence.[19]

On 2 (15) November 1917, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," in which the Soviet government solemnly decreed that "there was not nor should there be any return" to the shameful policy of systematic inciting of one people against another, which had been engaged in by tsarism: "Henceforth it should be

[17] "Nationalistic and National Currents in the Third Duma," *Russkaya Mysl'*, Moscow, August 1912, pp. 11-37.
[18] *The Newspaper of the Government of Workers and Peasants*, No. 1, Petrograd, October 28, 1917.
[19] *Ibid.*

replace with a policy of voluntary union for the peoples of Russia." The Council of People's Commissars announced its decision to base the national policy of the Soviet Government on the "following principles: (1) Equality and Sovereignty for the Peoples of Russia; (2) The Right of the Peoples of Russia to Free Self-determination, even to Separation and Formation of an Independent State; (3) Abolition of all and any National and National-religious Privileges and Restrictions; and (4) Free Development of the National Minorities and Ethnographic Groups Inhabiting the Territory of Russia."[20]

Two months later, in January 1918, the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the "Declaration of the Rights of Workers and Exploited People" which proclaimed that the "Soviet Russian Republic is being established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics" (I, par. 2). The Congress announced the full separation of the Soviet state "from the barbaric policy of the bourgeois civilization, which built the welfare of the exploiters in a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of the working population in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries" (III, par. 2).[21]

The Soviet government, headed by V. I. Lenin, also gave great attention to abolishing the national-religious inequalities which had existed in tsarist Russia. On 22 November (5 December) 1917, the Council of People's Commissars addressed an appeal "To all the Muslim Workers in Russia and the East," in which they proclaimed that henceforth the rights of the Muslim peoples, just as the rights of all the other peoples of Russia, "would be preserved with all the power of the revolution and its organs." The Council of People's Commissars called on the Muslims to organize "their national life freely and unimpededly" and guaranteed the inviolability of their faiths, customs, and national and cultural institutions.[22] The Appeal pointed out that now "when even the Indian Muslims, downtrodden and exhausted by the foreign yoke, are rising up against their enslavers, you cannot remain silent. Lose no time—throw from your shoulders the age-old invaders of your lands."

In January 1918, under the People's Commissariat for National Affairs (established on 8 November 1917) a special commissariat was instituted for Muslim affairs. In July 1918, a decree "On the Eradication of the Anti-Semitic Movement," signed by V. I. Lenin, was issued by the Sovnarkom.[23]

The abolition of national and national-religious oppression, the equality

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[20] *The Newspaper of the Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants*, No. 4, Petrograd, November 3, 1917.

[21] *Collections of Statutes and Decrees of the Government of Workers and Peasants from January 13, 1918*, No. 15, p. 215.

[22] *The Newspaper of the Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants*, No. 17, November 24, 1917.

[23] *Proceedings of the VTsIK* [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], No. 158, July 27, 1918.

of all the nations in the country, large and small, the equality of all citizens (regardless of race or nationality), the inadmissibility of any infringement of rights or, on the contrary, of any privileges on national or religious grounds was proclaimed as the basic law of the Soviet state by the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July 1918. Section I of the Constitution (chapter I, paragraph 2) said: "The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of the Soviet National Republics."[24] "Any oppression whatsoever of the national minorities or restriction of their equal rights" was declared contrary to the fundamental laws of the republic (section III of the Constitution, Chapter II, paragraph 22).

While putting into practice Lenin's program for solution of the national question, the Soviet government had already in the early months of the Soviet state performed tremendous organizational, ideological, and political work. The notorious "Jewish Pale" was abolished. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and Siberia, the tsarist machine of colonial oppression was destroyed, and all of the privileges which had been enjoyed by the orthodox missionaries, merchants, entrepreneurs, and kulak-immigrants from the European areas of the former Russian empire were abolished.

In carrying out Lenin's principles of national policy, the Soviet government granted state independence to the peoples of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Transcaucasus, Bukhara, and Khorezm. The unequal treaties concluded by tsarism with respect to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China were annulled, and tsarist troops were withdrawn from Iran.

The Soviet government's realization of Lenin's program for solving the national question, the guarantee of actual (not formal) equality for all the peoples of the former Russian empire, and granting the outlying colonial regions the rights to self-determination had a tremendous revolutionizing influence on the peoples who had been enslaved by the colonizers, especially in the countries of the East. A revolutionary, basically new approach to solving the most complex national problems was demonstrated by the government of a great power for the first time in history; the right of nations to self-determination was not only proclaimed, but put into effect; all forms of colonial oppression were condemned, and the sacred right of nations under a foreign yoke to struggle for their liberation was recognized.

The result of putting Lenin's program for the solution of the national question into practice was a rapid increase in the authority and influence of Soviet Russia, especially in the colonial and dependent countries of the East —Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the Arab countries, China, Mongolia, and the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The realization of Lenin's national program in Russia was a weighty contribution to the solution of a highly important international social and political task—turning the colonies and

[24] *Ibid.*, No. 151, July 19, 1918.

the semi-colonies from a reserve of imperialism into a reserve of the socialist revolution. The Indian revolutionaries hailing, in December 1917, the Revolution which had been achieved under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, noted especially that V. I. Lenin had "issued a Decree which proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, and the Baltic states and the Polish nation had already obtained the freedom to put this right into practice."[25] S. Sardesai, one of the leaders of the Communist Party in India, wrote about this communication fifty years later: "It is easy to imagine how the hearts of the Indians beat fifty years ago, when they learned of the Soviet decree which granted freedom to nations which had been under tsarist rule. After all, the Indians themselves yearned for nothing so much as liberation from the British yoke."[26]

Hailing the autonomy of Soviet Dagestan, which was proclaimed in December 1920, the leader of the national liberation struggle of the Turkish people, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, telegraphed V. I. Lenin: ". . . . I express to you my deep gratitude for that farsighted policy which on your High Initiative is being carried out by the Soviet Republic both in the East and throughout the world." In an answering telegram, V. I. Lenin wrote: "The Soviet government could be convinced from your communication that the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to nations in the Russian Federation has your sympathy. . . . I am glad to learn that you have correctly interpreted the measures which we have adopted with respect to the small nations, and that the reception which you give them can only be favorable to establishing good mutual understanding and mutual confidence."[27]

The solution to the national question, along with the other revolutionary social, economic, and political reforms carried out by the Bolshevik party, demolished the "prison of the peoples" which was tsarist Russia, and opened the way for socialist reconstruction of the country. The October Revolution made possible the restoration or creation of a national state for the peoples who had formerly been oppressed by tsarism; the establishment of social equality and genuine friendship between all the nationalities and nations of the former Russian empire. The truth of the historical foresight of K. Marx and F. Engels had been confirmed in practice: "To the extent that the exploiting of one individual by another is abolished, the exploiting of one nation by another will also be abolished. The hostile relations between nations will fall along with the antagonism of the classes within the nation."[28]

By the end of the Civil War, in most of the territory of the former tsarist

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[25] *Chitramaya-Jagat*, Bombay, December 1917 (monthly in the Marathi language. Quoted from the book: S. G. Sardesai, *India and the Russian Revolution*, New Delhi, 1967, p. 10).

[26] S. G. Sardesai, *India and the Russian Revolution*, p. 19.

[27] Quoted from *Kommunist*, 1957, No. 15, pp. 14-15.

[28] K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," *Works*, 2nd edition Vol. 4, p. 445.

empire sovereign republics had been formed in which the socialist and national-democratic revolutions had triumphed: the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian SFSR (which contained Azerbaydzhan, Armenia, and Georgia); in Central Asia the Soviet People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezem had been established.

Granting the nations of tsarist Russia the rights to self-determination and formation of their own independent states helped to overcome nationalistic and chauvinistic prejudices and to surmount the distrust which had formed through the centuries among the small nations with respect to their stronger neighbors. In this way the *moral and political bases* for uniting the independent Soviet republics into one union state were also laid. The combined struggle which the peoples of the Soviet republics were waging with foreign intervention and internal counterrevolution strengthened these moral and political bases and promoted the emerging of a military-political union of Soviet republics, expressed by the union treaties concluded at first between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR (January 1919), and later between the RSFSR and the Belorussian SSR, the Transcaucasian Soviet socialist republics, and the people's republics of Bukhara and Khorezem.

The military and political union of Soviet republics ensured their combined victory in the Civil War of 1918-1922, at the conclusion of which the need for their further, closer unification was revealed. The striving toward federative association was inherent in the Soviet republics. This striving was dictated by the objective course of historical development and grew out of the urgent tasks connected with the need for extremely rapid rehabilitation and reconstruction of the national economy; the need to unite, in the interests of the workers, all of the country's resources for building a socialist society, to struggle successfully with the forces of counter-revolution, and to organize joint defense against the danger of aggression.

This need was especially urgent for the backward regions of former tsarist Russia, which, without the thoroughgoing broad assistance on the part of the economically developed areas of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, could not in a historically short period overcome the huge difficulties in the national economy and other spheres. In Central Asia, for example, during 1917-1920, as a result of the devastation caused by intervention and Civil War, the number of horses on peasant farms decreased by 49.2%. A large portion of the farmers (27.5%) in general had no draught animals; there were no cows on 49.6% of the farmsteads; 15.8% of the farms in 1920 had no possibility of even sowing the parcels of land which belonged to them.[29]

The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the Soviet system, international in its nature, the formation of a unified Communist Party and unified trade unions, the social uniformity of the Soviet republics, which resulted from abolishing capitalism, were *extremely important political pre-*

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[29] *Collection of Statistical Information on the SSR Union, 1918-1923*, Moscow, 1924, p. 106, 113.

requisites for unification of the sovereign Soviet republics into a unified multination state. The *economic prerequisites* for this unification were: the socialist sector of the national economy, which had been established in our country by 1922; the long-range plan, developed according to the precepts of V. I. Lenin, for reconstructing and developing the national economy of the Soviet republic on the basis of electrification of the country, the GOELRO plan [State Commission for the Electrification of Russia]; and the transition to the New Economic Policy, NEP.[30] Through these, the foundation was also laid for socialist reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of a unified economic plan, for broad mutual assistance for the peoples, and for use of the historically established national economic ties and division of labor between the individual Soviet republics.

Lenin's principles for creating a multinational proletarian state were supported by the laborers in all of the Soviet republics, and took the form of a national unification movement. They were put into practice by the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, which ratified the Declaration and Treaty on the formation of the USSR on 30 December 1922.

The formation of the multination Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demonstrated the truth of Lenin's principles for solving the national question and was the practical embodiment of the theoretical bases devised by V. I. Lenin for creation of a multination socialist state. It is significant that the Union of Soviet Republics was created during the years when the multination bourgeois-landlord states of the Kaiser's Germany, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the Turkish empire, which maintained power by force and national oppression, were destroyed.

The formation of the USSR provided the best possibility for overcoming, in the briefest period, the historically established economic and cultural inequality between the peoples of the former Russian empire, for organizing their fruitful cooperation for the purpose of building socialism and communism; and on this basis, for the maximal development of the economy and culture of all the Soviet nations and achievement of their total unity.

An important role in creating optimal conditions for the national consolidation of the peoples liberated from the yoke of tsarism and for the development of their languages and culture was played by the sweeping reorganization of the administrative and territorial division which had existed in tsarist Russia, and by the formation of union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and national districts which had been constructed on a national basis. While in 1923 there were only four union republics in the USSR, today the USSR unites 15 union republics, which

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[30] By the end of 1920 in Soviet Russia over 45,000 industrial enterprises (according to the decree of June 28, 1918), all of the banks, and the means of communication had been nationalized, and the monopoly of foreign trade was operating (put into effect by the decree of April 22, 1918).

include 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous oblasts, and 10 national districts.

The mutual assistance and filial cooperation of the Soviet peoples, and the thoroughgoing assistance of the advanced regions of the USSR (especially the Russian Federation) ensured that the growth rates of the former outlying colonial districts and the equalizing of the levels of social, economic, and cultural development of the Soviet peoples proceeded ahead of schedule. A sizeable portion of the expenditure in the budgets of the autonomous and union republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus was covered through gratuitous subsidies, at first from the budget of the RSFSR and later from the All-Union budget (in Tadzhikistan, for example, in 1924-1929, from 46.5 to 79.9% of the republic's expenditures was provided for through subsidies). The rapid industrialization of the outlying districts was accompanied by the development of labor forces from the working class of the local population, and the elimination of illiteracy through establishing personnel from the local national intelligentsia. The real incomes of the population rose sharply. In this way conditions were ensured for the revival and all-around development of the socialist national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and for overcoming nationalist stagnation, narrow-mindedness, and egoism.

Overcoming the economic and cultural backwardness of the past turned the outlying regions of the former Russian empire into flourishing socialist republics which in growth rates and level of development left behind all the rival non-socialist countries.[31] Sweeping changes took place in the substructure and in agricultural production. The level of education of the population of the former outlying colonial regions rose with rapid strides.[32] These successes were evidence of the fact that in the USSR the progress of the entire multination socialist society as a whole is organically combined with the progress of each of the Soviet peoples individually.

Lenin's national policy ensured the powerful unity of the socialist commonwealth of Soviet republics, which emerged victorious from the severe trials of the Second World War. In the post-war years, through the self-affirmed labor of all the Soviet peoples in our country, a developed socialist society was built. The Soviet way of life was established, based on the social relations inherent in a developed socialist society and on the moral principles of socialist collectivism.

Not only the physical and social living conditions of the peoples of the Soviet country have changed during the years of the USSR's existence; the

[31] In 1971 the output of industrial production, in comparison with 1922, had increased 558 times in Kazakhstan, 483 times in Armenia, 150 times in Georgia, 381 times in Kirgiz, and 500 times in Tadzhikistan. The high growth rate of industrial production during those years are also characteristic of other national republics in the Soviet Union (in Bashkiriya it increased 1554 times, in Tatariya, 1127 times, and in Buryatiya, 786 times).

[32] In 1971, the number of students per 10,000 inhabitants was: 214 in Armenia, 192 in Azerbaydzhan, 187 in Uzbekistan, 161 in Kirgis, 152 in Kazakhstan, 149 in Tadzhikistan, and 131 in Turkmenya.

nature and character of the nationalities and nations of prerevolutionary Russia have undergone drastic changes. They have turned into developed socialist peoples and nations, united by the common vital interests and common features of their spiritual make-up. The flourishing of the socialist peoples and nations of the Soviet Union has ensured their close unity and general rapprochement. An extremely important result of this polyhedral process has been the emergence of a *new type of historical community of people—the Soviet nation.*

Inherent in the Soviet people as a stable community of people of the new, socialist type, is a unity of territory and of the economic, political and cultural life, a unity of communist world view and international consciousness; the Soviet people have a common language for communication between peoples, and common features in their moral and spiritual make-up.

The economic basis for the formation of a new social and political community of people in the Soviet Union—the Soviet people—was public ownership of the means and implements of production, and the planned development of a socialist economic system (with a view to the greatest satisfaction of the growing needs of the workers, to the rational organization of social production and the maximal acceleration of scientific and technical progress, in the interest of the entire country as a whole and of each Soviet republic individually). *The political basis* for formation of the Soviet nation as a new historical type of community of people was: the unified multination Soviet socialist state, in which oppression of classes and nations was abolished; all socialist nations and nationalities have a uniform social structure; the Marxist-Leninist ideals of class solidarity for the workers, and of socialist internationalism and the friendship of nations were confirmed; and all the conditions which would guarantee the active participation in the development of science, technology, and culture of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry and the laboring intelligentsia of all the union and autonomous republics, national oblasts, and districts were created.

The USSR experience proved that the closest unity and all around prosperity and undeviating closeness of all the peoples of the Soviet Union are determined by the nature of the Soviet structure and emerge as the objective principle for the development of socialism.

The formation of the Soviet nation as a basically new type of social and political community of people is convincing proof of the progressiveness of the Leninist experience in solving the national question in the USSR, and at the same time, of its paramount international importance. For, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, "the aim of socialism is not only to abolish the splintering of humanity into small states and all isolation of nations; it is not only the closeness of nations, but also their merging."[33] The merging of the socialist nations is a long historical process; begun in the era in which we are living,

[33] V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination," *Comp. Coll. Works,* Vol. 27, p. 256.

it will be completed with the formation of a communist type of ethnic community of people, into which all of mankind will gradually merge after the new structure is victorious throughout our planet.

The tension in relations between ethnic groups, which is characteristic of the intrapolitical situation in many states in the East, prevents the abolition of the grim heritage of the colonial past and exerts a negative influence on their social, economic, and cultural development. The unsettled state of the national question also has a negative influence on the ethnic processes taking place in these states.

A study of the ethnic processes in progress in Asia and Africa shows that certain basic tendencies are inherent in them. An obliteration of the boundaries between kindred nationalities (sometimes between groups of kindred tribes), inhabiting adjacent territories, is observed. Also attracting attention is their gradual consolidation into large ethnic complexes which, as they overcome the heritage of the colonial past in their economic system and their culture and overcome the remnants of the precapitalist industrial relationships in the social and economic sphere, in ideology, and in the social structure of society, acquire the features of a national community. This process is accompanied by the obliteration of regional (sometimes tribal) differences between the individual components of the large ethnic community (nation) which is forming. The obliteration of these differences is promoted by the steady flow of population from the rural areas to the cities, by the development of the economic system and of culture, and by the process of consolidating the forms of verbal communication, which is observed in many countries, and other factors. At the same time, a dissolution (assimilation) is taking place in the composition of the large nations forming from individual small ethnographic groups or isolated groups of other peoples who for various reasons live in the territory of this nation which is forming. As the economic and cultural backwardness of the past is left behind, the remnants of ancestral tribal daily life are overcome, literacy is spread, the inherent aloofness of the isolated ethnographic groups disappears, and these groups themselves merge (are assimilated) with the large nations which are forming.

At the same time, in a number of instances, under the conditions of independent state development the process of assimilation of the small nationality (ethnic group) by a larger ethnic community which has begun (and has sometimes gone a long way) is broken off. The Braguis of Pakistan and a few small nationalities in India are examples of this type of converted assimilation; as a result of gradually overcoming the grave consequences of the colonial yoke, a growth of economy and of culture is taking place in those more backward regions which are inhabited by these small nationalities. They have created their own written language. Literature in their languages has appeared and is being developed. Their ethnic self-consciousness has also become more clearcut; today they single themselves out from

the surrounding population, finding the concept of their own, distinctive ethnic community.

There is no doubt that the fifty-year Soviet experience in overcoming the social, economic, and cultural backwardness of the peoples of the former outlying colonial regions of tsarist Russia, of which we spoke above, the experience which revealed the optimal possibilities for their ethnic (national) consolidation, is of considerable interest for the developing countries of the East.

Finally, during the last few decades, tendencies to form communities which may conventionally be called regional (or, as they are sometimes called, ethno-political), have also begun to appear. The formation of regional communities is linked with the growth of political, economic, and cultural ties between the peoples of the large regions (or of individual large states with an ethnically uniform population). The development of these ties is favored by the common geographical conditions and cultural and historical traditions; the common interests connected with the struggle to strengthen independence and to increase the welfare of the peoples. Objective possibilities for development of the progressive tendency toward closeness of the peoples inhabiting the territory of the various regions (often representing major historic and ethnographic areas) are undoubtedly provided by modern industry, means of communication, information, and liaison. These objectively existing progressive tendencies do not always, however, receive the optimal opportunities for realization.

As is shown by the practical work of nation and state building in some of the liberated countries, serious political and emotional obstacles lie in the way of establishing friendship and cooperation between the ethnic groups which inhabit them and their gradual rapprochement, and create different conceptions of the alleged "national unity" of the ethnically nonhomogeneous population of these countries. On the basis of these conceptions (which, regardless of the subjective aspirations of their creators, deny the ethnically distinct quality of the peoples of the young states and justify their national discrimination) it is impossible to achieve close mutual understanding and friendship between peoples. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet experience in solving the national question, which contributes to more rapidly overcoming the distrust of the small ethnic groups toward their more numerous and powerful neighbors and creates the optimal possibility for rapprochement of the peoples on the paths of their joint struggle for a better future and for overcoming social, economic, and cultural backwardness, is of interest to the developing countries of the East. The utilization of the Soviet experience affords them the possibility of a successful solution to the complex national problems and elimination of the obstacles to realizing the progressive tendencies in the social and ethnic development of the peoples.

The Soviet experience was a graphic confirmation of the position ex-

pressed by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, that "to establish a harmonious international commonwealth of nations . . . above all, national conflicts must, as far as possible, be eliminated."[34] The experience of the Soviet Union at the same time confirms the precepts of V.I. Lenin concerning the fact that "the national question should be stated in historical and economic terms.[35] It can be seen from the Soviet experience that there can be no commonplace in the solution of the national question, and that relations between peoples in any country (or group of countries) must be decided with strict consideration of the historically established social, economic, political, ideological, cultural, ethno-psychological, and other factors inherent to them.

The Soviet experience also leads to the conclusion that for a successful struggle for their rights, the progressive forces of an oppressed people should establish the closest and most filial cooperative relations with the revolutionary-democratic powers of all the other oppressed peoples, as well as of the dominant nations in the given state. Only this kind of cooperation can open the way to a democratic solution of the national question, to the decisive extirpation of all of the remnants of national inequality, class oppression, feudal and usurious debt-bondage, and political lawlessness. This cooperation is also a reliable guarantee against the origin and development of the tendencies toward national exclusiveness in the districts and great power chauvinism in the center, which are extremely dangerous for the political stability of the young states of the East.

At the same time, the Soviet experience proved convincingly that a democratic solution to the national problems (and as V.I. Lenin pointed out, only "sweeping democratic reforms can create national peace in capitalist states"[36]) is impossible without compulsory adherence to certain general principles.

The most important of them is the recognition for each nation, large and small, of the right to self-determination (which of course does not necessarily presuppose, in any individual case, the division of any nation). Only persistent realization of this principal makes possible the origin and development of separatist tendencies and opens the way to creation of a state which, being a free commonwealth of free nations based, as V.I. Lenin stressed, "on complete confidence and the clear awareness of filial unity, and on fully voluntary agreement,"[37] will be free to withstand any tests.

A democratic solution to the national question, as the Soviet experience testifies, is also impossible without recognition of the unconditional right of all peoples living within the borders of a certain state to development of

[34] F. Engels, "The Role of Force in History," K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, 2nd Edition, Vol. 21, p. 421-422.

[35] V. I. Lenin, "Theses of an Essay on the National Question," *Comp. Coll. Works*, Vol. 24, p. 385.

[36] V. I. Lenin, "Theses on the National Question," *Comp. Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 322.

[37] V. I. Lenin, "A Letter to the Workers and Peasants in the Ukraine on the Victory over Denikin," *Comp. Coll. Works*, Vol. 40, p. 43.

their own language and culture, and without abolishing all discrimination and any privileges based on national or national-religious grounds.

A democratic solution to the national question was a constituent part of the struggle of the progressive forces for political and social equality—the sine qua non of the unity of the laboring masses, and also of the preservation and strengthening of state sovereignty and the integrity of the young countries of the East.

Full and conclusive overcoming, however, of the conflicts between peoples, and abolition of the conditions which produce them, as the fifty-year experience of the Soviet Union incontrovertibly proved, is possible only as a result of socialist reconstruction of society and the abolition of the exploiting of one human being by another. Only socialism creates the possibility for this type of solution to national problems, harmoniously taking into consideration the vitally important interests of the workers of different nations, and guaranteeing the conditions for all round development of their economic system, language, and culture. By guaranteeing real equality for nations, socialism thereby creates the basis for the inviolable integrity and unity of the multination states. Therefore, in our time the consistent struggle of the progressive forces in the countries of the East for powerful unity and solidarity of the peoples in their states is impossible without a struggle for the socialist reconstruction of society, and without overcoming the ideology of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism, inimical to the international solidarity and brotherhood of nations.

In a socialist society, where there are no antagonistic classes, there is no place for conflicts and hostilities between peoples. And, while in some socialist countries individual manifestations of national tension have sometimes arisen, this was usually based, as well known facts attest, on subjectivist perversions and errors of a different type. The Soviet Union has demonstrated to the world a qualitative new socialist type of relations between peoples in which the success of each people is the consequence and at the same time the condition of the success of all the other peoples in a multi-nation country. The Soviet type of relations between peoples is built on the principles of proletarian internationalism, equality, and the friendship of the peoples; on the principles of their unity in the common struggle to overcome the inequality between the peoples, surmounting everything that would create a basis for one people's opposing another.

The tremendous international significance of the experience in solving the national question in the USSR, and its value for the peoples of the East who are struggling for a better life lies in the fact that the Soviet type of relations between peoples has been formed, not haphazardly, but as the result and consequence of the realization of the basic principles inherent in the processes by which a socialist society is established and developed.

At the same time, the fifty-year experience of the USSR has shown that the socialist federation of union republics is the most perfect and viable form of state structure for a country with an ethnically nonhomogeneous

population, making possible the complete cooperation and mutual assistance of all the peoples who live in it and the strengthening of their powerful unity and solidarity.

The experience of the Soviet nation is an important stage in the social progress of mankind, and evidence of the fact that socialist construction gives the greatest possibilities not only for utilization of the latest achievements of science and technology in the interests of the broadest national masses (and the progressive forces of all the countries of the East are interested in this), surmounting the opposition between mental and physical labor, solving difficult demographic and other urgent problems, but also for combining the interests of all the nations in the multination state with the specific interests of each of these peoples individually. At the same time, the flowering of the economic system and the culture of the once backward peoples of tsarist Russia is evidence of the complete failure of the reactionary theories of "higher" and "lower" races, and of the alleged "inferior and non-historic" peoples incapable of progress and therefore doomed "by history itself" to degradation and extinction.

The experience of the Soviet people was convincing proof of the possibility of successfully solving in the shortest historic period the most complex problems of national and state building, of surmounting and overcoming the concept of national isolation and exclusiveness in relations between peoples, of educating the working masses in a feeling of collectivism and internationalism, and of the brotherhood and friendship of all peoples.

In his speech, given on 22 November (5 December) 1917, V.I. Lenin said: "We must smash the old, bloody, and filthy past, when Russia of the capitalist oppressors played the role of executioner of other nations. We will sweep away this past, we will raze this past to the grounds."[38] Lenin's bequest has been put into practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The people of the Soviet Union, along with all progressive mankind, triumphantly celebrated the 50th anniversary of its founding in December 1972.

[38] V. I. Lenin, "Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of the Navy," *Comp. Coll Works*, Vol. 35, p. 116.

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